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編輯室報告

「寮國人民的宗教生活」專題導言

寮國作為大陸東南亞的一個國家，相較於同屬於南傳佛教信仰圈範圍的泰國，在國際學術上始終位處邊陲，半世紀以來，難以形成重要理論典範，主因就是基本研究積累不足。近來情況有所改善，投入研究者日益增多，這一方面是國家政策開放使然，另一方面則是人類學追求文化傳統內容的學科學術方法論旨趣，促使學者越過業已現代化與全球化多時的泰國，來到小鄰居也是小弟弟的寮國，尋求更真實的泛泰語系人群的生活。

本次專題由筆者籌劃，大約二年前起跑。當時聯繫多位當前最重要的國際寮國社會文化與族群研究者，獲得廣泛回響。大家都認同應該要出版更多此類專冊，才能使相關研究成果更為鮮明，此一邊陲國度也方有機會被世人深度認識。無料，疫情當道，突然間，鎖住所有前往田野的管道。畢竟，在地材料正是我們以草根基礎述說人們點滴的依循，無法出行，簡直要命。幾位原本答應交稿的學者，紛紛表達歉意而退出，最後撐下來者，一共四位，也就是專號的這四篇文章作者。一個期刊專號四篇應是合理。當初很多人報名時，我還曾想過要分上下輯呢！

提到寮國是南傳佛教國家，其實，這並非標準答案。因為，主體族群寮人（Lao）才佔全國人口一半略少，其餘數十族群，多的是非佛教信仰傳統者。我們在組織專號時，當然會設法平衡，也就是主體與非主體各半是原則。這四篇文章大致達標，有主體寮人一篇，有也信仰佛教的非主體群體一篇，有單論泛靈信仰族群者一篇，以及有比較數個小群者一篇。這些篇章通通涉及該國不同群體的宗教生活。在順序上，我們先排置主體場域的文章，再接特定非主體山居群體的一文，然後多族比觀的論述隨之，最後係也是信仰佛教之範疇，更論及跨國景象的一篇。如此，從主到小，從多到廣，期望可以擁有一步步閱讀寮國的收穫。

過去農村社會時期，信徒多以個人名義捐獻佛寺，用以取得佛祖保佑，誰人在俗世生活比較成功，必定是對寺院的奉獻很大。Patrice Ladwig

以一衛星城鎮的某一佛寺為對象，探討此一傳統人與佛之關係的演變。社會主義寮國跟著中國腳步，於 1989 年開始改革開放，資本主義的種種要素，很快地湧進，商貿公司的出現，即為其中的顯要項目。有一位成功資本家，以公司名義捐獻佛寺，期望福分可以降臨作生意的單位。但是，這對寮國人而言，完全是一件新鮮事，所以，到底人們如何認知，以及國家又怎麼看待，就成了研究者探索目標。

資本家的捐款總是大筆，於是，整個佛寺無論大小建設或其他修行人的福利，大宗就是他的功勞。於是，慶典活動時，商業成功且對寺院有大功勞者，可以坐大位。Patrice 認為這是物質性化佛教的一個徵兆。佛陀自此可以賜福給賺錢的單位，而非以前只針對勤勞又樂捐的農人。大改變正在寮國主體寮人居多的各城市裡發生，政府的態度同樣積極，它說明著在佛教場域上，道德經濟與儀式經濟今日的雙重作用。

一般認為，在泰語系群體來到今天寮國地區之前，當地住民以南亞語族（Austro-Asiatic linguistic family）或稱孟—高棉語族（Mon-Khmer linguistic family）人民為主，Guido Sprenger 研究的寮北山區 Rmeet 族，就是尚存於今的群體之一。Sprenger 以多重交疊的人（folded persons）之概念，來說明該族的宇宙觀念。Rmee 為村寨型社會，採傳統民族學所稱的泛靈信仰制度。研究者找到族人常接觸或實踐的多類靈體被召喚入身或被拉出身體的過程，也界定了操作者本身的立場，其中的社會生活關鍵點，就是與婚配對象之村落的互動問題。不成功的婚姻被認是躲於森林內之惡靈作怪所致。不過，該族是父系社會，而妻方的力量卻常常試圖穿越打破，從而取得利益。林內之壞傢伙會闖禍，但，也並非總是如此，因為有可以外出又返回的內靈，它得以有效地抑制惡靈的揚威。身體、生命以及靈等質素在人們與宗教專家往來之中，被賦予意義。對 Sprenger 而言，Rmeet 人的人之體，與國家以中央為唯一之制度完全相左，它是散狀開葉，依照情境來鋪成納入或驅出的需求。社區內的宗教專家種類多，人數也不少，人們就按日子如何過的選擇，來與他們交往，而交疊一起的人之面向，也在此分別展開。其中正顯現了 Reemt 人延續與不延續的生命判准。

比 Remeet 的北部更為遙遠的東北部，是寮國原始森林覆蓋最為密集之處。不過，當地的非主體族群由於與接壤的中國密切互動，卻多呈現出北方來的特色。Vanina Bouté 的研究指出，共產黨 1970 年代中葉統治了該國之後，對於非佛教的泛靈信仰群體採取壓制的策略，因為那些都被認為封建迷信。不過，時至今日，由於國際的目光日增，政府不得不轉而表面上重視少數族群的文化，但，那對研究者而言，僅是一種將活的文化民俗化（folklorization）而已，被民俗化了之後，一切只能聽從政權管控，根本沒有生活的真實性可言。

然而，Bouté 發現，各個群體分別施出多樣性抵抗功力，以讓自我得以主體存在性地生活。屬於南亞語族的 Khmu 人方式是，一批人改宗佛教，以此避開政府監督之眼，其實暗藏不少原有信仰。另一批人直接轉信基督宗教，和政權硬碰硬。操用著混合漢語與寮國語言的 Phounoy 人，則堅持一年內要過很多節日，一方面同樣內藏自我傳統，另一方面即以此來強化認同，團結族人。而漢人移民後代的 Ho 人，就堅持過自己定義內容的中國年，另有人則紛往外國移民。少數族群的宗教生活飽受威脅，縱使政府態度軟化，也僅是民俗化的假象，各族多利用此一契機，在特定時空點上，展現出抵抗的態勢，被認诶失去了的古老信仰，其實還有方法得以生存。

最後一篇的書寫對象是也是佛教信眾的泰語系少數群體 Lao-Lue（或稱 Tai-Lue，一般中文寫成傣泐，亦即中國的官定民族傣族）。HSIEH Shih-chung 不認同如下說法：「該族信仰佛教，因此必定四處建寺，沒有佛寺幾乎就等於沒有佛教徒。」他以在中國雲南西雙版納、遷居美國、移民臺灣，以及生活於寮國境內的四地區 Lue 人為據，說明很多時候族人都是在缺乏佛寺的環境裡，繼續保持佛教信徒的身分，主要原因是，人們會將著名活佛或大和尚的照片置於家裡，或放在明顯的地方，認定他可以遠距引來佛的福佑。甚至，活佛神通廣大的說法也普遍流傳，信奉他比佛陀金座似乎更可解決現世難題。HSIEH Shih-chung 以「不穩固之制度性佛教擁有」與「穩固貼身的佛教擁有」二個概念，來指涉前者的佛寺信仰和後者的活佛信仰。在 Lue 人的例子裡，不穩固的一方，似乎難以得到長

遠的信仰保證，反而活佛與己黏身，實質穩固，更時時刻刻都發揮著護我的力量。

寮國的宗教文化極其複雜，大部分的研究起步不久。本期「寮國人民的宗教生活」專題四篇文章，分別分析了政治經濟衝擊的宗教場域（Patrice Ladwig）、特定山區族群的泛超自然信仰的細項（Guido Sprenger）、邊境偏區非主體族群在被剝奪傳統信仰之餘的與國家抵抗性對話（Vanina Bouté），以及非主體佛教族群以非佛寺擁有的方式來維繫信仰（HSIEH Shih-chung）。當然，未竟之處仍多，惟至少在臺灣立下一個寮國研究基點。本來構想邀請國際的三位作者 2021 年來台灣，以這些文章為據，召開一個小型研討會，無奈病毒仍猖獗，阻斷了計畫。但，大家堅持以恆，至少完成了論文，也給予台灣添具了一份東南亞學術知識。

謝世忠
國立臺灣大學人類學系兼任教授

寮國或許是東南亞區域研究中最被忽視的國家。近年來，由於寮國政府開放國家政策，以及泛泰文化圈研究者擴展研究視野，寮國慢慢步上東南亞區域研究的舞台。不過，在台灣，探究寮國的人仍然不多。透過國家圖書館碩博士論文加值系統查詢，能查到有關寮國的學位論文僅有七本。期刊論文索引系統能查到的研究論文，不到二十篇，其中大半是 1960 年代到 1970 年代的寮國共產勢力發展、寮國政情分析等可被視為早年匪情研究範疇的出版品。關於寮國社會發展、人民生活的研究僅有兩篇，皆為本期客座主編謝世忠教授所撰。

謝世忠教授是泛泰文化圈研究者跳脫泰國、前往其他國家／地區進行泛泰族群田野研究的先驅。他的《傣泐—西雙版納的族群現象》爬梳中國雲南西雙版納傣族如何因應國家民族政策而凝聚／維繫自身認同，並且兼有探討泰國曾提出的大泰族主義對泛泰文化乃的意義，乃至中國政府對大泰族主義的因應。該書提供泛泰文化相關研究的比較視角。謝世忠教授一度將研究關懷轉移至台灣原住民族，但近十年他重回泛泰文化研究，特別專注於寮國。有鑑於寮國研究在台灣東南亞研究社群屬於小眾中的小眾領域，以及謝世忠教授在泛泰文化乃至近年寮國社會與文化變遷的著墨，《台灣東南亞學刊》特別敦請擔任本期客座主編，協助規劃寮國專題，邀集國際資深寮國研究者共襄此專題。儘管因為新冠肺炎疫情影響，幾位原本答應撰文的研究者無法完成論文，但仍能集結四位國際上重量級寮國研究者的文章。《台灣東南亞學刊》感謝客座主編謝世忠教授和不吝貢獻研究發現的學者。

本期「寮國人民的宗教生活專題」除四篇專題文章，尚包括一般論文、調查報告與書評各一篇。魏艾妮〈印尼民主發展中身分認同議題對華人參與政治的影響〉指出，印尼華人與其他族群的認同分歧，以及因此分歧而來的認同政治，一度影響印尼的政治與社會發展，但印尼政府於 1988 年排華事件後推動政治改革，其中，去中央化的政治革新，提供更多人透過選舉參與地方政治的機會。儘管過往認同政治所引發族群緊張的副作用仍存在於印尼社會，但隨著華人參與印尼政治日多，或將有機會替印尼的政治發展帶向好的循環。

林育生〈泰國南部普吉鎮啅世 To Sae 信仰初探〉一文是泰國南部普吉人民宗教信仰的調查報告。林育生指出，To Sae 是泰南普吉的常民信仰，與普吉鎮上土地守護靈的概念有關。但從 To Sae 神廟發展來看，該信仰已不再如同過去僅是象徵身處陌生危險土地面對穆斯林開拓者的集體焦慮；在當代，透過乩身解決信眾問題，To Sae 已成為一個靈驗的神明，而近年 To Sae 神廟的發展多與商賣事業或公私建築的改建有關，則另外呈現一種常民信仰的現代經濟面向。

林平、劉倢彣的《沒有不散的筵席：顧維鈞夫人回憶錄》，簡明扼要地評論該書如何呈現黃惠蘭女士的生命故事。出生於荷蘭殖民時期的爪哇、冷戰時期中華民國外交才子顧維鈞的夫人，透過自身家庭的經濟資本以及印尼與中國文化雙重洗禮的文化資本，貢獻於中華民國外交的同時，也呈現黃惠蘭女士「海洋中國與陸地中國」之雜揉認同。

《台灣東南亞學刊》是國內唯一東南亞區域研究的專業期刊。除研究論文，本刊亦接受青年學者將自己的初步發現以「調查報告」或「研究紀要」形式投稿。最後，《台灣東南亞學刊》再次感謝台灣大學人類學系謝世忠教授協助規劃並邀請國際資深研究者共襄寮國專題。

趙中麒

《台灣東南亞學刊》副主編

專題論文

台灣東南亞學刊，16 卷 2 期，2021 年，頁 7-48

Wealth, Social Stratification and the Ritual Economy: Large-scale Donations and Prosperity Buddhism in Laos

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Abstract

This article explores the effects of the recent economic transformations in Laos on Buddhism with regards to large-scale donation rites and the ritual temple economy. An ethnographic case study of a donation of a wealthy business woman from Vientiane for the renovation of a rural temple is discussed as an example of an emerging prosperity Buddhism that reflects increasing competition, rural-urban differences in wealth, and a conjuncture of market and religion. However, the Lao case also exposes some differences from prosperity cults in Thailand and Myanmar that have been researched. Although the donation rite involved advertisement and branding related to the business of the donor, I argue that traditional notions of collective merit-making and other aspects of the moral

* A first, more theory-driven version of this paper was presented in May 2021 in the seminar series of the Max Planck-Cambridge Centre for Ethics, Economy and Social Change (Max-Cam). Thanks to all participants for their ideas and feedback. Research funding by the same center, and the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity (Göttingen, Germany) is gratefully acknowledged. Thanks also to all collaborators in Vientiane, laypeople and monastics alike, who helped me during fieldwork in 2019. I am grateful for the thorough reading, and very insightful comments, by two reviewers of TJSEAS. I tried to incorporate most of the excellent points made in the reviews. However, some comments would have required extending the paper substantially, and could therefore not be fully taken into account. All data and statements relate to a time before the Corona-virus pandemic.
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economy of rural Buddhism are still significant. By discussing the organizational aspects of the ritual, I show that the continuity of these moral economy aspects, such as the limited role of the main donor, and the emphasis on collectivity, are reinforced by a politics of religion still marked by remnants of socialist discourse. I finally argue that the donation rite created a temporary space where social differences between the diverse rural and urban participants were downplayed, but that this could not hide the increasing inequalities and stratifications that now mark much of Laos' social fabric.

Keywords: Buddhism, Ritual, Economy, Donation, Social Stratification

I. Introduction

Vientiane has become an utterly different city in recent years. Oversized billboards of Chinese companies, traffic jams with cheap motorbikes cramped between large SUVs, and the sheer endless building boom in town, despite spiraling land prices, are some of the most visible signs of this transformation. The stilt houses of "urban peasants", the rice fields and the water buffaloes I still encountered during my first fieldwork in the middle of the Lao capital in 2004 have all but vanished. Laos' economic liberalization—introduced in 1986 in parallel to Vietnam's economic *Đổi Mới* ('renovation) policy—has over the last twenty years gradually substituted the socialist economy of the past, and has now developed into an economic boom. The latter is mainly visible in urban areas, and primarily fueled by investments from China, Vietnam and Thailand that finance infrastructure projects often linked to mining, dam building and large-scale rubber plantations. However, economic growth rates of about 8-11% per year for the last decade (BTI 2018: 3) say little about the complex reshuffling of the social fabric in the sprawling capital with its approximately 800.00 inhabitants, and its ripple effects on more rural areas. Although agricultural labor and rice-farming still represent the overwhelming part of means of livelihood in Laos (UNPD 2018: 9), the market economy has enveloped most sectors of urban Lao society, and has led to a sharp increase in inequality, both in the city, and between urban and rural areas (UNDP 2018: 7).

During my fieldwork in 2019, I set out to trace some of the effects of the expanding economy on the Buddhist religious field. With more cash being available, ritual activity had increased significantly compared to a few years ago. The donations (P. *dāna*)[1] the monastic order (P. *saṅgha*) received during festivals of the yearly ritual cycle had grown substantially compared to a decade

[1] Central technical terms in relation to Buddhism are sometimes also listed with reference to their origin in Pāli (P.) or Sanskrit (Skt.). Terms in Lao and Thai are given in brackets with no special signifier, unless there is a marked difference between the languages.

ago. Moreover, lavish commemoration rituals for deceased relatives, the sponsoring of ordination rites or temple construction had also translated some of new wealth into the religious realm. With increasing inequality, however, it also became obvious that those with less money and more precarious existences could only moderately participate in this boom and therefore resorted to temples and monks specialized in rites that are more affordable and of direct practical use, such as the shedding of bad luck. Most of the prosperity-enhancing rites and larger donations I attended were by no means inventions spurred by the evolvement of a capitalist economy. They have a long history, but were flourishing because the increased competition of the market had partially been transposed to the religious domain. The higher acceleration of goods and capital was paralleled by an intensification of the ritual production of Buddhist merit, luck, and auspiciousness.

These developments reflect some of the major themes that have been discussed in a bourgeoning literature on the links between markets, religion and morality, both in comparative terms (Rudnyckyj & Osella 2017), as well as in relation to Buddhism (Brox & Williams-Oerberg 2020). The evolvement of prosperity cults, which as a topic of research initially emerged from studies of charismatic Christianity and its prosperity gospel (Bowler 2013, Coleman 2000), have also been observed in various forms of Buddhism, ranging from Japan (Borup 2018) to Theravāda Southeast Asia. Whereas in Thailand this has been a topic of research since the late 1990s, when the country's economy boomed and Buddhism and the religious landscape underwent major changes (Jackson 1999), similar developments have more recently been discussed with reference to Myanmar (Foxeus 2018), and Cambodia (Christensen 2020: 172). Despite the huge diversity of prosperity cults, and the large differences between Christianity and Buddhism, the literature on the phenomenon often seems to feature a bifurcation, as Simon Coleman (2017) has recently argued: First, neo-Weberian approaches discuss the convergence and synergies of religion and the economy, and the formation of various spirits of capitalism, in which cosmologies

and rituals reflect, embrace and even enhance the competition of the market. A second set of studies focuses on the "dark side" (Ortner 2016) of the competitive rat race of the capitalist economy, and discusses the formation of cults that arise out of exploitation and marginalization. When the hopes for prosperity among the marginalized remain unfulfilled, occult magical practices and even zombie-like figures are mobilized (Comaroff & Comaroff 2000).

My research to understand the changes in Vientiane's urban Buddhism and its connections to rural areas did not lead me to the exploited and marginal, the path of Sherry Ortner's dark anthropology. Instead, it just happened by chance that I followed the trace of money, and ended up doing fieldwork with a wealthier woman and her family. Her company had profited substantially from the economic boom, and she regularly supported the monastic order and temples by organizing donation rites. What interested me was if, how and why newly acquired wealth is channeled into Buddhist rituals. Are the larger donations performed by an emerging affluent Lao middle and upper class driven by a new competitive entrepreneurial ethos and an intensified quest for status and prestige? Do donations and their ritual performance actually reflect or even intensify inequalities? With the economic changes that have occurred in Vientiane, I also wondered to what extent the motivation for, and desired outcomes of giving, had changed. Do these donations hold on to traditional ideas such as the collective sharing of merit, and the sponsorship of Buddhism as a social good, that have been described as characteristic for Lao peasant Buddhism? Or do we witness a resignification of giving itself as a mere search for individual power and status, and the rise of a commercialized and commodified prosperity Buddhism like in neighboring Thailand (Kitiarsa 2012, Scott 2009), or Myanmar (Foxeus 2018).

This article focuses on a large-scale donation organized by a business woman and her family who own a mid-size company in Vientiane. Manivong[2]

[2] All names of persons in this essay have been changed in order to anonymize the identity of my collaborators. Concrete places, such as temples, have mostly been relabeled for the same reasons.

and her husband, both in their late 40s, run a business that regularly hosts and sponsors rites of various sorts, ranging from small blessings with a few monks on the company grounds, to the event discussed in this article in which ten-thousands of dollars were donated for the renovation and construction of a rural temple. The latter rite in particular is used to demonstrate how wealth among urban donors now also effects the ritual economy of more rural areas, giving a glimpse of the increasing links, but also disparities between the two. Although the ritual largely followed established patterns, and brought increased status for the donors and their recognition as pious Buddhists, I encountered something new: The ritual explicitly foregrounded Manivong's company, and involved quite a substantial amount of advertisement and branding. The ritual seemed to be part of a business strategy. The essay starts with a short overview that connects wealth and donations for temple-building with basic Buddhist notions such as karma and merit etc., and then briefly outlines the potential effects of this ritual and moral economy in terms of social stratification and redistribution. Next, I introduce Manivong and her business, and then give a detailed ethnographic account of the donation rite I attended. In part four, I situate the advertisement for the company during the ritual in a somewhat generalizing and broader comparative perspective with reference to various accounts of prosperity Buddhism in Thailand and Myanmar. I discuss to what extent the foregrounding of the company can be understood as a commodification of Buddhism, or at least an intrusion of the competitive market into the religious sphere. By looking in more detail at the effects of giving, I argue that despite increasing differences in wealth, the individualistic focus of Thai and Burmese Buddhist prosperity cults was not pronounced in the Lao case. Instead of the donor as a person, the company as a collective was foregrounded, and thereby represented as a "moral entity" equipped with positive Buddhist qualities. In the final section, I suggest that this reduction of the role of the main donor, and the emphasis on collectivist ritualism, can be understood as remnants of a moral economy of rural Lao peasant society which has been partially conserved by the socialist politics of

religion. I discuss the organizational set-up of ritual, and the influence of various actors linked to the Lao state and Buddhist institutions in larger donation rites.

In conclusion I argue that on the one hand, the economic boom in Vientiane supports the evolvement of various facets that have been taken as characteristic for prosperity Buddhism. The donation rite and the foregrounding of the company as a religious agent reveal a crossover of the liberalized economy and the religious field. On the other hand, I claim that the ritual advertisement for Manivong's company and her increase in prestige was only perceived as legitimate because of the "traditional" organization and set-up of the ritual itself. The collectivist agenda (such as the sharing of merit), partially deriving from rural village Buddhism, downplayed her status as a main donor during the rite. At the same time, this representation of an egalitarian ritual community during the rite cannot hide the increasing social stratification that has been fueled by economic transformations during recent years. The ideal world as depicted in ritual can only be of temporary nature, and quickly fragments when wealthy donors and villagers encounter each other.

II. Sponsoring Temple Construction: Karma, Status and Business

Western followers and adherents of "Buddhist modernism" (McMahan 2008) or "protestant Buddhism" (Gombrich & Obeyesekere 1988) often perceive its ideas and practices as egalitarian. By de-emphasizing the role of rituals and traditional cosmologies, and by foregrounding meditation and the possibilities of working on an ethical self, it promotes a rather modern view of social structure and hierarchy. Historically speaking, however, most variants of Buddhism actually promoted a more stratified social order. To put it very simply: Buddhist kings are in their position because of their karma and an adequate amount of merit accumulated in past lives. Merit can be acquired in various

ways such as moral discipline, keeping precepts, meditation, and by ordaining as a monk or novice. For most laypeople in Southeast Asian Theravāda Buddhism, however, performing *dāna* and giving to the monastic order is the most common way of improving one's position in this and future lives. The centrality of giving has been extensively documented in both textual (Heim 2004) and anthropological (Sihlé 2015) research. From a purely materialistic perspective, the monastic order as a kind of religious leisure class, and monasteries as religious institutions, has a parasitic relationship with society. Reiko Ohuma's (2005: 104) simple statement that "the very existence of Buddhism as such has been dependent on the gift" describes this fact very well. On a quantitative level, the amount of surplus invested for the upkeep of Buddhism is staggering. Studies on rural Southeast Asian Buddhism from the 1960s give us some numbers. Milford Spiro reports that "the typical Upper Burmese village is reported to spend from 30% to 40% of its net disposable cash income on *dāna* and related activities" (Spiro 1970: 458-459). Even higher numbers have been reported from Laos by Christian Taillard (1974), who in the early 1960s examined rural investment patterns in thirty-one villages in the Vientiane area. On average the temple consumed almost 60 percent of all mobilizable investments. These statistics derived from pre-capitalist rural peasant economies are hard to compare with the current urban situation. Nevertheless, they reveal a mode of surplus allocation in which the temple acted as a central communal institution of accumulation and redistribution, financed by a "voluntary taxation" through the gift economy[3]. In the interpretative framework of economic anthropologist Steve Gudeman (2001: 27-31), the temple could be described as a "base", and a form of commons, which exemplifies important collective values, expressed and maintained by a ritual economy.

[3] Georges Bataille's (1988: 104) remark that "on the whole, a society always produces more than is necessary for its survival; it has a surplus at its disposal. It is precisely the use it makes of this surplus that determines it" may seem a bit exaggerated, but fits the numbers we have for the case of pre-capitalist peasant economies in Buddhist Southeast Asia.

While the numbers above give us a good picture of the overall investments of village communities into *dāna*, larger projects such as building monasteries also needed, and indeed attracted, sustenance by wealthy donors. As Tambiah points out with reference to rural Thailand, temple building "is open only to the rich" (1968: 69). In early Buddhism, some of the most important patrons of the Buddha and his followers were wealthy businessmen, as reflected in popular narratives such as that of Anāthapiṇḍika, a merchant and banker who founded the Jetavana monastery where many episodes of the Buddha's life take place[4]. This dependency on larger gifts shows that karma and merit have hierarchical implications. With reference to Southeast Asia, this impact of Buddhism on the social fabric has been discussed in Edmund Leach's (1954: 197-212) classical formulation of oscillating types of egalitarian (*gumlao*) and stratified (*gumsa*) forms of social organization among the Kachin in highland Burma, as well as in James Scott's (2009: 10, 19) more recent proposal that many "egalitarian" upland minorities fled the "civilized" and stratified Buddhist states of the Southeast Asian plains. What are the general features of this stratification? Being well-off gives a person more opportunities and time to invest in the ritual economy to enhance his or her status. As merit can be accumulated, this also influences the potential to do so in the future. Congruently, the production and distribution of merit has often been described as an economy of merit, or, alternatively, as an "economics of salvation" (Walsh 2007). F.K. Lehmann also understands Buddhist merit as analogous to the economy in the modern sense: "Just as in a market economy, it takes money to make money, so it takes merit to make merit" (Lehman 1996: 25). Moreover, he remarks that "merit making is a very competitive game, the object of which is sheer one-upmanship," and supports the claim that doctrinal Theravāda Buddhism "is profoundly concerned with ranked statuses"

[4] Anāthapiṇḍika became a follower of the Buddha, donated a monastery and invited the monks to spend the rain retreat there (see Lewis 2014: 30). Religious metaphors about travelling to shores beyond rebirth were also suggestive for merchants and long-distance traders, which in Pali and Sanskrit sources describe the Buddha as a "caravan leader" who protects merchants (LIU 1997: 114).

(ibid: 26). From this perspective, merit could be understood to have certain affinities with a modern market economy, in which participants can have rather different amounts of investment capital due to its unequal distribution.

At the same time, however, the individual quest for status outlined by Lehmann, and the stratifying effects discussed by Scott and Leach, are only one side of the coin. Other mechanisms of the ritual economy reinforce material redistribution and the sharing of merit, features that are often taken to be characteristic for a moral economy. The latter notion has been subject to controversial discussions in recent years due to its wide and fuzzy use of "moral", and certain romanticizing tendencies[5]. Staying somewhat closer to the discussions of the topic related to Southeast Asian peasantry (Scott 1977; Popkin 1979), I think one can indeed argue that rural Lao villages expose such features. Georges Condominas (1968: 114-118), who did fieldwork in villages around Vientiane before the revolution in 1975, proposed that the ritual economy that links laypeople, monks, and monasteries has redistributive features that even out differences in wealth, and offers opportunities for making merit for poorer members of a community. Therefore, he concluded, their social structure was hierarchical in the sense of ranking and prestige, but egalitarian in terms of distribution of wealth.

Although the business connections of early Indian Buddhism, the individualistic stance on merit-making and its emphasis on status and rank are subject to huge variation when operating in different regions and economic systems, I suggest that one can still make out a certain affinity between business men as wealthy donors, temple construction and Buddhism in the current era. Constructing, enlarging or renovating monasteries was in the past (Tambiah 1968), and is still today (Hornig 2019: 175), considered to be among the most

[5] I will only employ a rather cursory approach here focused on Southeast Asia and Buddhism. See Hann (2018) and Fassin (2009) for the wider picture that has emerged out of recent discussions in the anthropology of ethics, and economic anthropology.

meritorious deeds one can perform in Theravāda Buddhist Southeast Asia. Sponsoring temple-building, so to speak, materializes a specific Buddhist idea of the social good, which is valued higher than any other gift.

III. Manivong's Business and the Donation of the Lao Plastic Company

With a more affluent middle and upper class emerging in Laos, a veritable monastic building boom has been triggered in Vientiane. Since around 2010, most monasteries have at least temporarily become building sites, and most temples in the city center are now almost as shiny (and sometimes as ugly) as in neighboring Thailand. Although the *dāna* investments reported for Burma and Laos in the 1960s are hard to imagine today, the temple building and renovation boom in Vientiane shows that substantial amounts of money and surplus continue to be invested. The ethnography provided in this part can be understood as a contemporary version of the relationship between Buddhism and wealthy merchants I outlined above. It reveals some of the classical traits of patronage, but also exposes features that are very characteristic of the current market and economic boom in Laos.

The search for wealthy sponsors of Buddhism in Vientiane was at first easy because their names circulate widely. However, getting in touch with them and being able to work with them at times turned out to be rather difficult. Wealthy businessmen and members of the elite have little time, and some of them were for reasons of discreteness not very keen on working with a foreign researcher. After some days, however, the abbot of a central Vientiane monastery put me in touch with Manivong, the owner of a mid-sized company and factory that specializes in the production and marketing of plastic parts. Her family business, which she runs together with her husband, is located in the outskirts of Vientiane in an industrial estate zone. Since its founding ten years ago, the company has

grown tremendously, and now employs about one hundred workers. The market for the plastic parts the company produces is huge in Laos, and the rising demand will probably stay high for years to come. Arriving at her company, I was immediately struck by the contrast between the largely empty surrounding industrial wasteland, and the compound of the company: a well-kept garden with roofed sitting places encircled the office spaces of the company. Entering the compound, I immediately spotted two large shrines for the spirits of the place (*cau ti*), which most Lao houses have. Manivong's shrines were—relative to the size of the company—pretty large, and the daily feeding of the protective spirits was visible through fresh bananas and flowers, and some opened soft-drink bottles.

Having a cup of tea outside, she started talking about the history of the company, and how she became a businesswoman. Originating from a mid-sized town 200km north of Vientiane, she mentioned that her father was a rice-farmer and trader. Being a little bit better off than neighboring families and having good grades at school, she was able to get a higher education. In the early 1990s, she moved to Vientiane to study to be a school teacher at Dong Dok university, the only institution of higher education in the whole country at that time. After graduating, she worked in various office jobs. But the private sector was at this time very small, as the socialist economy was only slowly opening up for private businesses. She worked a lot during these years, and her private life suffered a bit. By Lao standards she married rather late in life, meeting her current husband at age thirty. Things worked out, and they had two kids. With her husband, who had some experience in technical things and production, she opened the business in 2009. "You know how things were back then in Laos" , she said, and then continued: "The new economic mechanism the government already implemented in 1986 didn't change much for twenty years, and it was really difficult to found a private business. No credit, no legal framework and no security. But at the end of the 2000s things really changed, and we dared to do it". Indeed, Manivong's experiences reflect very clearly the economic take-off in Laos, which was rather

slow in comparison to Vietnam, for example. The level of industrialization and urbanization for a long time remained very low, and its effects on various regions and provinces have been very uneven (see Phimphanthavong 2021). Recent infrastructure projects such as railways and roads, however, have contributed substantially to connecting regions, and have also led to new entanglements (and disparities) between urban and rural areas in Laos (UN Habitat 2020).

Turning the conversation to Buddhism, she directly remarked that overcoming all the difficulties her business encountered during the first years would have been impossible without her faith. Having established relationships to monasteries and monks helped her a lot. Talking about her practices and beliefs, it came out that her Buddhism represented an interesting mixture of modern themes and traditional beliefs. Her interest in textual Buddhism and meditation (both of which she had no time for) was paired with pronounced notions of fate and luck based on merit and karma, the worship of protective spirits of the place, and the conviction that one's course of life can be substantially changed through ritual action. Her husband, whom I got to know some days later, supported her religious engagement, but left many of these issues to her.

A Dream, and Temple Construction

During our numerous conversations, Manivong repeatedly emphasized that supporting monks and monasteries through donations is a way to ensure the upkeep of Buddhism itself, and its teachings, the *dhamma*. The monastic order and the world of lay-people were, in her account, not separated, but had relationships beyond reciprocity that constituted a more encompassing notion of Buddhism (cf. Jonuthyte 2021; Mills 2021). Her traditional understanding of giving as sustaining Buddhism can be theorized with reference to Maurice Bloch and Jonathan Parry (1989: 25), who proposed that capital and goods gained in

the short-term cycle (her business) are transposed to a morally positive long-term cycle, which is concerned with the reproduction of the social and cosmic order (Buddhism and its *dhamma*). However, the intensity of this engagement can also change through the course of one's life, and she pointed out that with increased means, ideally a higher level of responsibility should be taken. This increased engagement materialized in a sponsoring rite that was going to be held in a few weeks. The money gathered for this rite was going to be used for the upkeep and enlargement of the temple close to her native village, 200km north of Vientiane[6]. As most temples in the city center have already been renovated in recent years, the support of rural temples has now become widespread. As I shall outline, this implies an interesting urban-rural dynamic with regard to the guests and heterogeneous audiences of such donation rites. Organizing and carrying out a large donation rite that sponsors temple construction or renovation is a complex process. The size of the ritual and the amount of different people involved, the sums of money handled, and the bureaucracy differentiate it from smaller donations. For Manivong, the process started with a dream, which she vividly described to me when we met a few weeks before the rite:

> "My mother died already two years ago. Back in the early 1990s, she donated a plot of land to the monastic order in my home village. Over the years, the village community and other believers financed the construction of smaller buildings such as the main hall with the Buddha statue, the monk's living-quarters and a wall encircling the monastery. It today houses two monks and several novices, but the temple is not complete yet. Then, during several nights last year, my mother suddenly appeared in my dreams. She complained that although she had donated the land, and the temple had developed, the

[6] Although I attended this rite, the preparation work involved can here only be reconstructed because it took place months before my fieldwork. I collected numerous images and written documents for this event, which I obtained when visiting the temple afterwards, and interviewed monks and laypeople who were involved in it.

monastery would still lack some things. She then asked me if it would be possible for me to further sponsor the temple, so that the efforts of our family and the monastery could come to completion".

Dreaming of deceased relatives is considered by many Lao as containing important messages that give hints to the afterlife, and the potential needs of the dead. Dreaming of a deceased parent who stands unsheltered in the pouring rain, for example, lead a layperson in my monastery to visit a monk living in the room beside my monastic cell. She donated an umbrella and food to him, which was then ritually transferred to the deceased. Although the interpretative frameworks for dreams vary widely, Manivong took her dream and the message of her mother seriously. A few days later, she visited the monastery and talked to the abbot and the village headman. Both explained to her that a proper road leading to the temple, a new entrance gate and several Buddha statues were needed. Extensive preparations followed. Papers had to be prepared for the provincial branch of the Lao Buddhist Fellowship Organization (LBFO), and the Section of Religion of the Lao National Front for Reconstruction (*Neo Lao Sang Sat* - NLSS), a mass organization and subbranch of the Lao Communist Party. The papers had to outline the construction project itself, the budget, schedule and the involvement of donors, monks and local officials. A committee for the supervision of the funds had to be created. I shall discuss more details and the effects of these procedures in a later part of the essay.

With the help of some influential monks from Vientiane, Manivong was able to speed up the paper work, and permission for the project and holding the rite was given after two months, which is indeed very fast. Then, weeks of preparation for the event itself followed. She mobilized many of her friends and invited them to participate in various ways and to add smaller donations for the project. She visited the temple several times and discussed organizational details with the monks, the temple's laypeople committee and the local branch of the NLSS. These larger rites held in the temple usually extend over two to three

days, and the provision of food and drinks, as well as entertainment (music, bands, stalls, and other funfair attractions) for the numerous guests have to be organized. Here the local village community was willing to invest some time, and Manivong provided them with an additional budget. Once all had settled on a date, the invitation cards sent out to the numerous participants outlined the construction project itself and a detailed ritual schedule of the event. The company's social media pages were also used to spread the message.

The Great Donation

In late February 2019 everything was set for the big weekend. For Manivong and her family, the action started on the compound of her company in Vientiane, where friends assembled the paraphernalia that were given to the attending monks, such as monastic robes, sandals umbrellas, alms-bowls and so forth. Friends and family also prepared their own donations, which were given individually during several stages of the rite. Most of the hundred employees of the company helped with practicalities, but also participated in the rites to follow. Bank notes were folded into plastic flower arrangements, and envelopes with the names and money of people who could not attend in person were collected. Then about 15 cars, pick-ups with numerous people, a truck loaded with large banners of the company and a mobile soft-drink stall all took off. This drive to the temple was explicitly described as a procession (*hae*), which I joined on my motorbike. After arriving at the temple, they set up a drink stall and several large banners were unrolled and hung up at different places on the temple grounds. All banners featured the name of the company and its icons, also used in other forms of advertisement. The text on one of them read: "Faith. Donation of the *Lao Plastic Company*". Faith (*sattha*) here denotes faith and trust into the triple gem: the Buddha, the monastic order, and Buddhist teachings. Manivong put on an apron and served soft drinks to the numerous guests most of the day.

To external guests who had just arrived and had no direct connection to her family, the company or the village, she probably just looked like a normal person who had volunteered to serve drinks—a short woman with glasses, wearing a house-wife's apron, with a large poster declaring the faith and generosity of the *Lao Plastic Company* behind her. The monastery grounds were packed during the day. In the evening, the party continued just outside the monastery. Noisy live bands, karaoke, barbecue stalls, and drunken village teenagers took over for the rest of the night. Manivong and most of her friends were already sleeping, exhausted from a long day.

On Saturday morning the main rite took place, involving the handing over of the main and minor donations, long chanting, and the feeding of monks. Manivong and members of her family were seated in the first row, just in front of the approximately 30 monks, most of whom were from the surrounding villages. Many Buddhist rites in Laos start with receiving the five precepts in order to purify the donor for the time of the rite. Accordingly, she and her family were dressed in white cloth while all attendees received the precepts from the monks. Then the abbot of the monastery held a sermon for approximately 10 minutes. In Laos and Thailand, there exists a whole genre of texts that outline the merits and beneficial outcomes of a huge variety of donations, ranging from donating flowers to daily food, and from sponsoring Buddha statues to whole temple buildings. These sermons, in Lao called *anisong* (from Pali *ānisaṃsa*), can be in poetic language filled with Pali vocabulary, partially not easy to understand for a lay audience (Jaengsawang 2020). They praise the generosity of the donor and outline the amount of merit and blessings obtained. They are very specific (there is an *anisong* for building toilets in a temple, for example); hence, the sermon at this event was called "sermon on the benefits of temple road and gate construction". Interestingly, the name of Manivong and her family was rarely mentioned, but the name of the company was foregrounded either as "employees, families, and friends of the *Lao Plastic Company*", or just with a

reference to the company as the main sponsor (*cauphab*). The villagers, who also donated smaller sums and helped with the festival, also received a lot of explicit praise. The monk then elaborated on the need for "solidarity" and cooperation in society and among people of different social standing, employing the Lao word numerous times. Solidarity (*khwamsamakhi*) has some socialist connotations, and is still today used a lot in written and spoken language, both in propagandistic contexts, but also in everyday conversations.

After the sermon, people prepared the offerings they had brought with them (food, money, flowers). As women are not allowed to hand over something to monks, the envelope with the main donation was handed over by Manivong's husband to the officiating monk. It contained the paper copy of a bank transfer to the temple fund. The monk read out that altogether 45,000 US dollars had been donated by the *Lao Plastic Company* and the laypeople of the village for the construction of the road, the entrance gate, and the Buddha statues. Manivong later told me that 40,000 dollars were from her own pocket, and the other 5,000 had been given by her friends, the employees and the villagers before the ritual. With 250 US dollars being the average monthly salary in Vientiane, this was indeed a substantial amount. Then, a long sequence of chants followed, during which the participants seated on the floor lit candles and filled a small container with water, signifying the flow and sharing of merit. Others rose up and started queuing up in front of long tables that had been set up along the walls of the temple hall. Approximately 30 alms-bowls of the attending monks were placed on them, and people dropped food, money and other small objects into them. The chanting continued and bestowed blessings (*phoon*) and auspiciousness (*mangkhala*) on all participants. When the chant ended, Manivong's family and other guests crawled on the floor towards the elevated position of the monks, and moved small rattan tables in front of them. They lifted the plastic covers from the bowls, arranged them neatly, and the monks started eating. Only after the monks had finished eating did the attending

laypeople start to eat together. Seated on the ground inside the temple around a rattan table set with small bowls of food, I was struck while we were eating by the non-hierarchical seating arrangements. The villagers and workers of the company, obviously much poorer than Manivong and her rather classy friends, treated her with great respect. But while eating, all groups were mixed and conversed with each other in a relaxed manner.

After a short midday break, more guests started to arrive, reflecting the mixture of urban and rural guests. Inside the main hall, monks continued to receive donation envelopes, mostly from villagers coming from places nearby. The envelopes had been produced for this specific event and featured the name of the company and its logo. They were an invitation to attend the rite outlining time and place. Two blank lines had been inserted, leaving space to write down one's name and the amount donated. Seated in a line, the monks practiced a division of labor. One monk received the envelope, the donors folded their hands, and the monk chanted a short Pali sequence recognizing the gift. He then passed the envelope to a second monk who counted the money inside. A third monk was seated together with a lay member of the temple committee and wrote down the name of the donor and the amount received. The queue of donors on that day did not seem to stop, and the notebook filled up quickly with numbers. Seated beside the monks, I guessed that on average, one envelope contained two to five US dollars—a donation deemed appropriate for a villager who lives on rice-farming. These notebooks are very common in temple rituals and primarily serve two purposes. First, they are a form of book-keeping done together by monks and members of the laypeople committee. Secondly, they are often used for reading out the names of donors and the amount given, or the content of the list is typed up and put into a display case in the temple. The gift is thereby recognized, publicly declared and made visible. On this occasion, several A4 pages with donor-names and sums of money were glued on a board inside the

main temple hall a few days later, meticulously listing every name and sum, no matter how small.

Manivong and her family were busy hosting more arriving guests and making small-talk. Among them were business people from Vientiane who arrived with their big SUVs, but also some of the workers of the company with their friends, and people from nearby villages. In the afternoon, the party was in full swing again, and beer started to be served outside the temple. Here the sociality was very different compared to the rite inside the temple in the morning. The stark contrast between the wealthier guests and the workers and villagers was not only visible due to their different looks and clothing styles. It was, moreover, clearly reflected in the seating arrangements. Each group had its own seating area, and I could observe that guests were circulating between tables and making small-talk only inside their particular zone. The urban business middle and upper class from Vientiane stayed on one side, while the workers of the company and the villagers mixed on the other side of the temple ground and drank beer together. The donation fostered an urban-rural connection, but at the same time revealed the stark disparities between them.

IV. Effects of Giving: Prosperity Buddhism, Advertisement and the Company as a Moral Entity

With the multiplicity of actors involved in the ritual, the motivations to participate in the large-scale donation I have described above certainly vary widely, as do the effects on the donors. The participants who came from the temple's or neighboring villages, Manivong's company and its employees as a main donors, and the wealthy business friends coming from Vientiane all had very different levels of involvement, both in terms of roles and investment. However, despite all these differences, the outcomes and effects of this ritual engagement are by people broadly subsumed under one notion—merit—in Lao

called *boun* (from Pali *puñña*). Any ritual event conducted in temples is first and foremost labeled *boun*, which besides religious merit then refers to the event itself, also in the sense of a collective party. But beyond this collective vocabulary, what other effects of giving are to be considered? Rites of giving and their outcomes are marked by overlapping semantic fields (see Keyes & Daniel 1983). The above-mentioned genre of *anisong*—the text that is read out during rites of giving and elaborates the merits obtained by the act—already indicates this polyvalency of giving. Besides merit, giving also produces *bounkhuson*, which is a combination of Pāli *puñña* (merit) and *kusala* (wholesome or skillful). The production of merit through giving has, at first sight, and on a more doctrinal level, what could be called a supramundane effect. This effect works on one's rebirth, but at the same time influences what is called *khamwen* (fate, destiny) and *sook* (luck), both of which also have direct consequences in this life. Beyond karma, rites of giving in Lao temples always contain a "begging" for blessings by laypeople when transferring the gift. When monks respond to the gift and thereby recognize it, it is not only merit whose production and flow is made explicit in the chants, but also the bestowing of prosperity (*khwamchaloen*), health (*khwamsuk*) and auspiciousness (*mangkhala*). These various effects are not clearly delineated in the ritual itself or by the donors. The overwhelming majority of Lao rituals that produce merit share it among the participants, and also transfer it to the deceased[7]. Although prestige and rank obtained are considered to be proportional to the contribution of the giver, this redistributive mechanism enables people who can give less to gain better access to merit.

In the ethnography I provided above I already mentioned that the focus on Manivong as a main donor was largely downplayed, and that the company was foregrounded. When I talked to Manivong (and later to some of her employees) about the effects of the donation, she created an interesting argument about the

[7] In most events of the Lao Buddhist ritual cycle, the dead are singled out as one of the main recipients of merit. They are, so to speak, fed with merit, and thereby cared for (Ladwig 2012).

effects of giving. She elaborated that she believes the merit produced by the donation works on the karma of all participants, but also stated that her company will receive benefits from this act in two ways. First, the company as a whole (including people, but also its buildings and machines) will be protected (*phokphon*) from misfortune through blessings (*phon*) and luck (*sook*), and will prosper (*chaloen*). Secondly, the reputation and standing (*sue siang*) of the company will be elevated, and thereby attract new customers. While listening to her, I got the impression the company had become a living entity that had received a shot of vitality through these various positive Buddhist qualities. Actually, Manivong regularly hosted other protection rites, and I attended two events that took place a few weeks later on the grounds of her company. Both invoked a similar impression to me, namely that the company was represented and understood as an entity that is not only composed of people and objects, but which through ritual action can be transformed into an agent that can receive moral qualities[8].

From the perspective of a modern public relations manager, the event was a "concerted advertisement campaign". The large posters that were hung up on the temple ground, and the soft-drink stall where she served drinks on the first day, were all branded with the name of her company. Moreover, on the social media page that informed people about the donation, and afterwards featured numerous images of the event, the name of the company and its symbols (various sorts of products, smiling workers with protective helmets etc.) featured prominently. Indeed, every image was underlaid with a watermark of the company. In my perception, this was a new phenomenon I had never seen before in collective donation rites. Merit-making groups are usually referred to by their place of origin (village unit XYZ), but not as businesses or companies. Interestingly, when I talked about this case with some of my Lao friends, none of them found this

[8] Several monks were invited, and the ritual here explicitly addressed the spirits of the place (*cau ti cau taan*). The two large spirit shrines that house them always looked proper when I visited the company. At another occasion, a master of ceremonies (*mo phoon* – a Brahmin) blessed the company for Lao new year, and sprinkled purifying water not only on the attendants, but also on production machinery, vehicles and buildings.

surprising or astonishing. They thought it is completely legitimate to perform a kind of 'branding' of the ritual by a business, and only mentioned that this could be perceived as problematic if the company became involved in some sort of scandal that would throw a dubious light on the donation. However, the "animation" of the company through the ritual in my view allows for a different perspective beyond that of advertisement and business strategy. The banners and logos of the company here referred to an entity that was not only composed of people and objects, but acquired an identity of its own beyond its parts. Therefore, the effects of the donation Manivong described and the ritual revealed can be interpreted as a mixture of traditional notions of prosperity (protection against misfortune of humans and objects through blessings and spirits), and an economic prosperity embedded in market relations (advertisement banners, the enhanced reputation of the company resulting in more customers).

This cross-over of magic, religion and the market shows some similarities to phenomena that have been associated with prosperity cults. The effects of these rites are often geared towards this-worldly needs and, like in the Indian case described by Osella, are often intended "to shore up chances of success in an increasingly competitive economy and expanding culture of aggressive entrepreneurship" (Cited in Osella & Rudnycki 2017: 3). Prosperity cults are also associated with an increase in success in a competitive market. Although a comparative approach to Buddhist prosperity cults that uses material from neighboring countries might involve a larger level of generalization, the parallels (but also differences) that can be made out are striking[9]. In the context of

[9] This comparison necessarily implies a certain level of generalization while at the same time allowing us to see these developments in a larger perspective beyond the purely local. The question of to what extent economic transformations produce similar "patterns" (increased competitiveness, market mechanisms entering the religious sphere etc.) and forms of Buddhist modernism in different places and contexts cannot be fully answered in this essay. However, I think that a focus on the similarities and differences that I will describe in relation to Thailand and Myanmar can reveal insights that would get lost by only focusing on the local. For a theoretical elaboration of this comparative stance towards the anthropology of Buddhism, see Sihlé & Ladwig (2017).

Thailand, this has been described as commodified Buddhism (*phutta phanit*). Pathana Kitiarsa defines the link between merit-making and the modern economy as a phenomenon "engined by the large-scale merit making-industry" and argues that "the prosperity cult of *phuttha phanit* represents a religio-cultural space where popular Buddhism has converged with market economy" (Kitiarsa 2008: 212). Indeed, the donation exposed a conversion of market and religion. Undoubtedly, Manivong's donation was also intended to increase the company's chances in a competitive market through the spiritual protection it received by being foregrounded as an entity equipped with positive Buddhist qualities.

However, some important differences between the large-scale donation I have described and other forms of prosperity Buddhism come into view. The latter often has a focus on charismatic monks, and actors from the periphery or outside the monastic order, such as spirit mediums, fortune tellers and so forth. An intense mediatization of monks and objects as carriers of charisma, such amulets and other religiously loaded objects have been identified as the most common signs of commodification in Thai prosperity Buddhism (Tambiah 1984, Kitiarsa 2008). In contrast, the donation I described took place in the context of organized state Buddhism, and involved no religious actors that could be described as charismatic. The absence of a publicly visible and mediatized cult of charismatic and magic monks in Laos is grounded in the socialist politics of religion, which since 1975 has opposed such cults (see Ladwig 2013a). Moreover, the rite did not feed into a commercialized industry that markets objects such as amulets. The market for Buddhist amulets—as sedimentations of charismatic power—is still rather small in Laos, and currently does not constitute an important aspect of the commodification of Buddhism[10].

[10] The sheer absence of amulets in Vientiane ten years ago was really striking, especially when one crossed into Thailand, where almost all taxi and motor-riksha drivers were wearing huge amulets. As the influence of Thai Buddhism on Laos remains crucial, these developments are very much in flux. In recent years, a market for such paraphernalia has developed in Vientiane, and will probably become more important in the future.

Manivong's donation is also different from the prosperity cults that Nicolas Foexus has described for contemporary Burma, where we find "a variety of novel, *individualistic, and non-institutionalized cults* of prosperity Buddhism" (Foxeus 2018: 1108, my emphasis). Astrologers and other specialists obviously exist in Laos and are also consulted for economic questions, and female mediums (*nang tiam*) and fortune tellers are currently in greater demand in Vientiane than in the past, but do currently not openly advertise their services like in Thailand. Their presence is much more elusive, and they are often kept separate from organized state Buddhism. Organizing a large donation rite could, for example, not involve possessed mediums in a temple, as described by Foxeus (ibid.). Numerous actors linked to the state and involved in religious affairs continue to oppose such hybrid cults, which in Thailand have been understood as being part of Buddhism's post-modernization (Jackson 1999, Kitiarsa 2012), and have recently also evolved in Burma. I want to add another point, which Foxeus alluded to, namely the individualistic focus of some prosperity cults. It is here important to recall that Manivong and her family were recognized as main donors, but that the company was very much foregrounded as a collective entity. This also represents an interesting difference from the large merit-making industry of Thai prosperity Buddhism. Speaking from a very general perspective, the cults that have been described for Thailand seem to have a stronger emphasis on the individual quest for prosperity. Many *phuttha phanit* rites, and new Buddhist movements such as Dhammakaya (Scott 2009), reinforce the ritual access to various forms of power and effects we encountered in the donation rite; merit, blessing, auspiciousness etc., were all present. However, there is a more frequent use of the term *barami* ("perfections" from P. *pāramitā*) in many Thai prosperity rites. Although this is a basic concept of power in Lao Buddhism as well, and, for example, describes the mastering of virtues and striving for perfection of the Buddha himself in the course of his numerous rebirths, it often remains reserved for persons who are more advanced on their path such as monks or very pious and high-ranking members of society.

Edoardo Siani confirms this previous use of the term as well, but states that in "contemporary Thai society, however, the term has come to designate a kind of power that anyone may accumulate through moral behavior" (Siani 2019: 269). *Barami* is strongly associated with success, power and prosperity, and seems to have gained huge popularity in recent decades during Thailand's economic boom. In the case of the donation I described, none of the documents dealing with the rite (invitations, letters etc.) which I read, nor the participants, used the term. This in my opinion reveals a marked difference between many Thai and Lao prosperity rites, their conceptions of power and the role of the individual[11].

To summarize this section, the donation rite clearly exposed features of a prosperity Buddhism. The focus on the company reveals that market competition, and branding and advertisement, have entered certain Buddhist rituals and temples in Vientiane, and now also extend through donation networks to more rural areas. However, as I tried to show, the branding of the company was not simply a hijacking of ritual practices by an entrepreneurial and capitalist spirit. A dream of Manivong was the starting point for the donation, and the rite did not aggressively promote her as a main donor. Although there was a marked absence of magical, charismatic features often implied in prosperity cults, traditional notions of protection were still invoked. They transcended the individual participants and turned the *Lao Plastic Company* into an agent that received blessings and protection, and therefore magical protection. In comparison to other accounts of prosperity Buddhism, the more individualistic

[11] I have no data on the frequency of the use of the word, but in Thailand it seems to be very present and almost as central as merit. In the past, it was in Laos used, for example, with reference to the Vessantara-Jātaka, which describes the perfection of generosity by a prince who in his next rebirth will become the Buddha (see Ladwig 2016a). See Siani (2019: 269-271) and Jory (2012) for further historical explanations of why *barami* has become so central to popular Thai Buddhism. As Buddhism in Laos is heavily influenced by Thailand, the term will probably be more widely used in Laos in the future. Other conceptions of power are also at play here, and, like in Thai prosperity cults, the term *Saksit*, deriving from Skt. *shakti* (strength, source of empowerment) and *sitthi* (supernatural powers), is also used in this context. However, the term is often still used in the sense of "holy" for denoting qualities of relics or statues, for example.

aspects were rather underplayed in this context of institutional state Buddhism. Collective ritual action and the sharing of merit were emphasized; the company in fact became a merit collective that united an audience of diverse social backgrounds. The religious leaders of the rite praised the virtuousness of the main donor, but largely foregrounded the company, and also the attending rural villagers and their contributions. Although the different standing of the rural villagers and business friends of the family were obvious, during the rite these were at least temporarily softened in the space of the temple.

V. Remnants of Socialism: The Ritual Limits of Individualism

The downplaying of Manivong and her family as main donors is, however, not only a free choice which she determined herself. The marked absence of the individual quest for prosperity and power that have been described as essential for prosperity Buddhism in Thailand and Burma demands a second explanation. Although the company can be understood as an extension of her as a person, the focus on it as a donor, and the involvement of numerous people that were not linked to it (such as the villagers) also hint to other features that do not conform to an individualistic, neo-liberal market logic transferred into the religious sphere. I will in this final section of the essay argue that these absences are grounded in a rather traditional understanding of a moral economy of giving that was (and to a certain extend still is) characteristic for peasant villages. Some of its features have been maintained and artificially conserved by the socialist politics of religion. Despite the demise of socialism and the emergence of a free market in Laos, the organization of large donation rites involving temple building and construction are still today tied to notions of sharing and re-distribution, and a specific kind of egalitarian ideology that prevents donors from appropriating such rites on an individual plain. This is not the case in other

rites, such as ordinations, where wealth and status can be more easily individualized due to the different logistics, and a much less pronounced role of state officials.

In order to understand the origins of these politics of religion in relation to the sponsoring of temple building, a short excursus is needed here. In section two, I briefly referred to the support of Buddhism and temple building by wealthy merchants and businessmen. Under socialism, this patronage obviously became problematic. The idea that giving in Buddhism can be linked to a waste of resources, and even exploitation, was widely spread under various socialist regimes. This "pathology of giving", as Benavides (2005: 89) labels some of the more excessive cases in Buddhist history, were criticized because what was given as *dāna* had been taken from others. Indeed, there are cases in Asian Buddhist history where building temples was not simply supported by the wealthy, but involved considerable levels of exploitation[12].

When the *Pathet Lao*, the Lao communist movement came into power in 1975, the monks who sided with it had already identified large-scale donations for building and renovating temples as one of the features that would have to be changed in order to make Buddhism compatible with Lao socialism. Maha Khamthan Thepbuali, the leading monk and chief ideologue of Lao Buddhism after the revolution, outlined in his work that the "feudalists request the people to perform meritorious deeds and donate their work-force in order to build temples, but in reality this is only a betrayal that masks the exploitation of people" (Thepbuali 1976: 18; see also Ladwig & Rathie 2020). Phoumi Vongvichit, Minister of Religion in Laos after the revolution, argued that the new Lao Buddhism that was supposed to emerge under socialism should promote

[12] Jacques Gernet (1995) has shown for Buddhism's development in China between the fifth and the tenth century that corvée labor was used to build extravagant temples, and that the peasants recruited for this lived under miserable conditions (see also Lopez 2009 and Silk 1999). Similar developments have been documented for the building of Angkor Vat in Cambodia, and during different historical periods monasteries in both Burma (Aung-Thwin 1979) and Sri Lanka (Evers 1969) became large and wealthy landholders.

solidarity, and that donations should be performed by egalitarian groups (Vongvichit 1995). Hence, one of the first measures that the communist government undertook in its politics of religion was linked to the regulation of donations. This reinterpretation of Buddhism reflects the fact that "the socialist habitus in Laos has mainly developed out of a peasant culture, as reflected in its particular interpretation of solidarity and equality" (Rehbein 2017: 136). After a few years, however, this reorganization of smaller donations was quickly abandoned, and by the 1980s ordination rites, for example, had already quickly reemerged as occasions to show off the wealth of a family. However, what have been kept in place to this day are the mechanisms that regulate donations, which are considered to be most virtuous—those used for temple building and renovation.

In many accounts of *dāna*, the focus is often on a layperson or the laity as giver, and the *saṅgha* as receiver. But the trajectory of giving can also be regulated by other actors. Appadurai's (1986: 13) statement—that it is necessary to focus "on the total trajectory from production, through exchange/distribution, to consumption" when we analyze the social life and circulation of things in exchanges—describes this widened approach to donations very well. The whole trajectory of the company donation, and the downplaying of the individual achievements of Manivong as a main donor, can only be grasped when we take into account the state bureaucracy that surrounds large-scale donations in Laos today. I have partially outlined the paperwork Manivong had to complete to hold the rite. In fact, this comes close to submitting an "application" that circulates in a variety of state bureaucracies and offices[13]. The committee that was formed for the rite, and the subsequent building works, was composed of several state

[13] First, the papers were evaluated by the village headman, the abbot of the monastery and the local representative for religious affairs, linked to the Lao Communist Party. In a second step, the papers were forwarded to the Section of Religion of the Lao National Front for Reconstruction (NLSS), which reviewed the papers and the budget together with monks from the Lao Buddhist Fellowship Organization (LBFO), and then issued a document which listed the necessary requirements for forming a committee that included monks, the laypeople's temple committee (*salavat*) and the local official of the NLSS. This composition was also reflected on the invitation card of the rite that I received.

officials and was listed on the invitation card[14]. When I visited the temple a few days after the ritual, I talked to the members of the temple's lay-people committee about the procedures. First, they pointed out that building works, due to their size and complexity, have to be reviewed like any other secular construction project.

What was more interesting for my case, however, was the way one of the men explained to me how invitations to attend such a ritual are handled. It is not only the host of the rite who determines who is invited. The organizing committee makes sure that the villagers from the surrounding area are invited as well: "When large donation rites like the one last week take place, it is crucial that the common people are also given the chance to participate in the rites. The merit made is shared with all people who attend the rite". I have observed a similar emphasis on mixing in Buddhist temples attended by different ethnic groups in southern Laos (Ladwig 2016). Probably because I was recording our conversation, he then launched into a sort of short propaganda speech mainly dealing with "solidarity" between people of different social standing, employing the same word the officiating monk had used during the rite. Later that day, I met the representative of the local branch of the NLLS who was responsible for religious affairs and was involved in the logistics of the construction project. Asking about the diverse audience for the donation, he mentioned that in the context of such great events people are encouraged to form merit-groups, ideally composed of "common people" (*phasason*), thereby highlighting the temple as a collective beyond the main donor. He pointed to the long print-outs of the donation list on the temple wall, underlining the contributions made by the villagers on the day of the rite. When I asked him about the *Lao Plastic Company* as a sponsor, he gave me an answer that surprised me due to its consequential logic and simplicity: "The company is a merit-group composed of people of

[14] Besides date, schedule, and the announcement of the rite, including company logo, it listed two groups responsible for the finances of the project: one composed of monks (some being local representatives of the LBFO), and another one of laypeople including the official of the NLSS, the village headman and members of the laypeople committee of the temple.

different social standing. It included the owners, office staff, but also the workers, cleaners, drivers and so forth". Suddenly, I realized that Manivong had accepted this collectivist agenda, but that by pulling herself back and reducing her own role, was able to foreground the company, and share her donation project with her staff and many other people[15].

Coming back to the differences between descriptions of prosperity cults in other Theravāda Buddhist countries and my specific Lao case, I think the emphasis on the individual's increase of merit and status that has been documented in neighboring countries was less pronounced in Manivong's donation because of these mechanisms. Crucial here are the conditions for the development of prosperity cults. A booming economy alone is not sufficient to trigger a prosperity Buddhism; but a "retreat of the state" from the religious sphere is essential, as Jackson (1999: 286) mentions. Whereas in Thailand a "rapid decline in Thai politicians' and bureaucrats' interest in controlling Buddhism" (ibid.) in the late 1990s created favorable conditions for prosperity cults, the Lao state has since 1975 established an institutional network that carefully orchestrates the revival of Buddhism, and has to a certain extent blocked a stratification and heterogenization of Buddhism (Ladwig 2017: 298f.).

The committee set up for the festival and the building works ensured that the audience of the rite was mixed, which became obvious when the merit of the donation was shared after giving, and when the lay-people ate together in the temple hall. The stark differences between Manivong's urban business friends and the workers and villagers were momentarily effaced, and the ritual here temporarily downplayed significant differences. From a classical perspective of ritual theory, a kind of liminal stage (Turner 1969) emerged, and ritual here opened a space in which the social world is imagined to be in its ideal form. But

[15] However, there are also limits to this collectivism of the gift and its recognition. Temples in Laos can be veritable 'donation maps', and numerous objects and built elements feature donor names. It was her family's name that was finally inscribed into the new gate of the temple, and not that of a merit group or the company.

then, as I described in the section on ethnography, this ideal world must also fall apart. Once the rite was over and the temple hall was empty, social stratification and differences became utterly visible in the seating arrangements outside. The urban business class and the economically less successful attendants—some workers and some rural peasants—quickly separated. The temporary space of collectivity and sociality quickly evaporated, revealing the artificiality of these measures. The ritual facade that socialism here had conserved in a kind of romantic image of an egalitarian rural past was deconstructed by the reality of new social stratifications that have come with the economic boom in recent years. The case here reminded me of the comparative study carried out by Chris Hann and Steve Gudeman (2015: 19), who propose that many rituals in contexts marked by the demise of socialism "can also be a facade or mystification of sociality that does not exist...they frequently mystify community identity and cohesion, sometimes with barely concealed nostalgia". Given the highly visible differences between the guests in terms of style and clothing, the reinforcement of a temporary mixing of people as a temple collectivity, and its subsequent and instantaneous evaporation, was not only nostalgic, but in my eyes also had something paradoxical, because this actually revealed the increasing inequalities that have evolved in recent years.

Collective ritual action, the sharing of merit, and the absorption and redistribution of surplus—which evens out differences in wealth but allows for status differentiation—are all elements that have been described by researchers who worked in rural Laos decades ago (Condominas 1968: 114-118; Zago 1972: 372; Taillard 1977: 78). They are now vanishing quickly, and not only in urban areas[16]. Perhaps many Lao who, like me, got to know Vientiane as a communist

[16] Some of the villages in Khammouan province where I did fieldwork in 2005 had little labor migration. All households were involved in rice-farming, displaying rather minimal differences in wealth. Some years later, labor migration to Thailand had changed this. This change was clearly visible with regards to houses, vehicles and the absence of young people, most of whom had left the village and sent remittances home from their wage-labor in Vientiane or Thailand.

capital mainly inhabited by urban peasants, are getting nostalgic, and have started to see temples as one of the few remaining places where a certain ideal of the rural religious life can at least temporarily be reenacted in ritual.

VI. Conclusion

Large amounts of wealth acquired in Laos' expanding economy continue to be invested into the upkeep of temples and their construction, and one can observe an evolving donation network that connects urban areas such as Vientiane with more rural settings. Manivong's large donation was in that sense presented as a traditional religious practice that aims at sustaining Buddhism and the *dhamma*. The basic parameters of the economy of merit—marked by hierarchy, and greater chances given by increased wealth—for her also implied greater responsibility. With more wealth being available, more of this surplus was to be invested into the ritual economy. I argued that her donation reflects themes that were described by previous researchers, and can be linked to larger discussions on the moral economy. On the one hand, the economy of merit and its associated cosmology supports increased social stratification, especially with regards to larger projects such as temple building, as I outlined in the second part of this essay. However, this can only be achieved through redistributive mechanisms and a channeling of wealth into the monastic order, which evens out differences in wealth on a material level. This, at first sight somewhat paradoxical dynamic, has been very well captured by Edmund Leach's (1954: 197-212) classical formulation of oscillating types of egalitarian (*gumlao*) and stratified (*gumsa*) forms of social organization among the Kachin in highland Burma.

At the same time, I conceptualized Manivong's gift as related to a relatively new phenomenon, in which businesses sponsor rites and use these as a means to advertise their company, and thereby improve their reputations. I related this branding mechanism to other phenomena which in the anthropology of religion

have been described under the larger heading of prosperity cults (Coleman 2000), and which have also been documented for Buddhism in general (Borup 2018), and Theravāda Southeast Asia (Jackson 1999; Foxeus 2018). From this perspective, the rite seemed to operate along the border of private religious engagement and business strategy—reflecting convergences and synergies of religion and the economy—in which cosmologies and rituals embrace and even enhance the competition of the market (Coleman 2017). However, Manivong's entrepreneurial religious ethos was not only a quest for status in an increasingly competitive economy, and a simple formation of a new Buddhist spirit of capitalism. It harnessed much older conceptions of protection and blessing that can be obtained through donations and ritual action, but were transposed to the market economy in a manner that did not only promote her as an individual business woman with the human agency of a *homo economicus*. Manivong stepped back from her role as a main donor, and thereby allowed her company to take center stage. The company, including not only its staff but also its machinery and buildings, was ritually equipped with positive qualities derived from the donation, such as protection and blessings, reaching beyond a pure economic rationality that might be associated with commercialized forms of Buddhism. Therefore, despite the novelty of her branding and advertisement strategies, the effects of the donation were not purely rationalized by a this-worldly economic approach, but embedded in traditional ideas of ritual efficacy and spiritual protection.

I then presented her reduced role as a main donor from another angle and argued that large donations such as her company's are subject to complex bureaucratic procedures that also impose certain logistics on the ritual. As a still active remnant of a socialist politics of religion, large donations are carried out as collective ritual acts which are supposed to integrate diverse audiences. The urban middle and upper class from Vientiane, and the rural villagers shared the ritual space of the temple for some time, and thereby enhanced the efficacy of

the rite by sharing the merit of the donation. The donation rite thus acted as a kind of performance of how the ideal world is imagined. However, I concluded that this reinforced collectivity quickly crumbled, reflecting increasing inequalities between rural and urban people and also the general social fabric that has been transformed by a liberalized market and economic boom. Given the rapid economic developments in recent years, I wonder how long this liminal ritual 'façade' of equality can be upheld in the face of the quickly changing realities of increasing social stratification and the growing divide between urban and rural life-worlds.

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專題論文

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Folded Persons: Shamans, Witchcraft and Wayward Souls among the Rmeet in Laos[*]

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Abstract

Religious phenomena in Laos contain numerous examples of decentered and relational concepts of personhood, manifest in shamanic trance, wandering witchcraft spirits and soul loss. Possession in particular represents a connection between non-Buddhist uplands and Buddhist lowlands. The Rmeet, Mon-Khmer-speaking uplanders, provide examples of folded personhood – persons whose various aspects sometimes represent a coherent whole and sometimes split off, forming separate person-like entities. Folded persons can be positively valued, like in shamans' relationships with their helping spirits, or negatively, as in witchcraft spirits. Both forms are associated with other phenomena, like soul journeys and dangerous shapeshifters. These forms all relate to the manipulation of processes that recreate life, particularly marriage. This also links them to lowland Theravada Buddhist forms of witchcraft, that equally derive from an abusive form of a central exchange relationship.

Keywords: Personhood, Magic, Sorcery, *Zomia*

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I. Introduction

Like elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the study of religion in Laos has thrived upon the tension between concepts of scriptural, doctrinal and unifying "world religions" – commonly identified as Theravada Buddhism – and a residual category often called "animism" (e.g. Holt 2009). This tension operates both in the lowlands, where Buddhist institutions and non-doctrinal practices intersect, and between lowlands and uplands, where animist cosmologies and ontologies are dominant. This article addresses two issues of religion – or rather, cosmology and ontology – in Laos. It analyses a particular theme of upland cosmology and ritual, but it also argues the comparability of this aspect for uplands and lowlands. It thus suggests more general processes for cosmological variations within and beyond Laos.

The theme that crosses Laos' uplands and lowlands is the idea that persons are unstable and permeable. Living humans appear as temporary relationships between various corporeal and incorporeal aspects of personhood that are strung together at birth, dissolve after death and remain volatile during lifetime (e.g. Baumann 2020; Stonington 2020). Non-human or non-living beings commonly called spirits are also persons, in the sense that they are able to communicate, express intentions and recognize mutual obligations (Harris 1989). Spirits may enter into desired or unwanted relationships with living humans, sometimes by penetrating their bodies. Thus, the personhood of living humans in Southeast Asia demands constant attention and practical maintenance, as it is subject to the danger of decentering. "Possession" and "shamanism" suggest two separate modes of decentering personhood (Condominas 1976). The possessed person or a medium becomes, sometimes involuntarily, the vehicle of an invading spirit, while the shaman detaches his or her "soul" from his or her body in order to travel into the world of spirits. The movement is reversed, and the two modes seem sufficiently distinct for analysis.

However, the Rmeet, a non-Buddhist, village-based society in northern Laos, defy any easy distinction between these two categories. While lowland societies in their vicinity have a well-defined role of spirit mediums (Brac de la Perrière 2011; Doré 1979a; Hours 1973; Johnson 2014; chapter 3; Morris 2000; Ratapopn 2007; Pattana 2012; Visisya 2019), among Rmeet a number of phenomena may qualify as possession, but none of them neatly so. Also, Rmeet make different kinds of distinctions between these phenomena. The two phenomena that may qualify most clearly as possession are from virtually oppositional categories, while each of them is closely associated with other phenomena that are, analytically speaking, quite unlike possession.

Both these phenomena accord with a definition of possession that focuses on the direct communication of a spirit through a human body. In the first, spirit familiars (*gorn mor*) occupy the body of a ritual healer or shaman (*mor*) during trance sessions and cause strange behavior. In the second, a type of illness-inducing witchcraft spirit (*ngem ngao*) speaks through the mouth of his victim. These two types of spirit presence, however, are entirely separate, one being voluntary and desired, the other a sign of serious danger. In fact, the healers battle the latter spirits, and witches can never be shamans.

In addition, these phenomena are not isolated, but linked to other forms of decentering personhood that are phenomenologically different. When spirits act through the shaman's body, his *klpu* (soul) and consciousness are absent and travel in the spirit world. This type of possession is dependent on trance and the shamanic quest – its opposite, in Condominas' classification.

In contrast, the spirits speaking through the mouth of their victims are associated with two kinds of deviations. First, they do not originate in their victims, but in their hosts who are, in Evans-Pritchard's terms, witches – people who involuntarily accommodate a dangerous force (Evans-Pritchard 1988). Rmeet associate witches with two other types of persons who are more or less

in control of their dangerous powers – sorcerers and dangerous shapeshifters called *proong* (see below). All three share the fate of expulsion from their villages when their identity is disclosed. The second type of deviation connected with the *ngem ngao* is their origin in a break of marriage regulations.

The type of possession found in most Theravada Buddhist societies[1] in Southeast Asia is thus absent among Rmeet. However, related phenomena suggest a comparable concept of personhood underlying both lowland Buddhist and upland animist cosmology – a kind of personhood in which each expression of coherence, each aspect of a person is at the same time similar and different from the others. The deviations from healthy or standard personhood are equally comparable.

Even aspects that are fundamental for establishing personhood in the first place tend to express their own agency and distinction. These are identified with the visible, social person in some contexts, while they are separate, even opposed to it in others – like a folded piece of paper that is continuous on one side while separate and merely touching on the other. I propose the term 'folded person' to address this specific type of fragmented and decentered personhood. The term indicates that, among these people, the standard definition of person implies an internal split. This concept of personhood therefore bears similarities to what Wagner (1991) has called "fractal person" and Strathern (1988, 2018) "dividual" or "partible person" – anthropological terms that offer alternatives to the presumably integrated, autonomous and closed personhood of Western-modern individualism.

In addition, possession and trance are indicators of a kind of ontology that Philippe Descola (2011, CH.9) has called analogism. In this ontology, each

[1] I am making this specification as Vietnam with its Mahayana Buddhist orientation may differ from the pattern of possession cults in the rest of mainland Southeast Asia. While certain features appear to be similar, the question of comparability needs to remain open at this moment (see Endres 2011).

being is different from any other, but never entirely unlike some other beings as well. The analogist world consists of beings separated by minute, yet unsurmountable differences. Descola suggests that analogism is not so much explicated by its practitioners in these terms, but rather emerges from their practice of classification. Analogist ontologies require that the array of beings be arranged into complex classes and sequences that connect various domains of the world with each other. Thus, cardinal directions, body humors, stars and animals can be associated with and influence each other. Analogism thus identifies and differentiates beings at the same time. This implies a specific sequence of the intellectual development of such systems: Initially, people perceive other beings as always slightly different and therefore start ordering them into classes. Descola's description of analogism concludes from the observation of the second phenomenon, a claim of identity for beings within a system of classes, to the first.

This distinction between implicit, passive cognition and explicit, active ordering, however, seems somewhat artificial. The material presented in this article suggests a different, but equally coherent account of such identities-in-difference. With its focus on possession and decentered personhood, my data show all indications of an analogist ontology[2]. Yet, I propose that the notion of folding in the present case better accounts for the oscillation between the fine-grained differentiation of beings and their identification as members of a class. Folding encompasses the difference between continuity and discontinuity.

[2] In a lecture, Descola has identified Rmeet cosmology as a hybrid of animism and analogism. I myself use animism in a wider sense than he does (Sprenger 2016), in order to accommodate what to me appears as fairly coherent systems. I appreciate Descola's scheme for the discussions and comparisons it enables. See Philippe Descola: Les composition des collectives: forms d'hybridation. Course taught at the Collége de France. Session March 21, 2018. Video recording available at https://www.college-de-france.fr/site/philippe-descola/course-2018-03-21-14h00.htm.

II. The Rmeet Concept of the Person

Studies of mainland Southeast Asian concepts of personhood often highlight the multiplicity of soul-like aspects of the person, such as the 36 "life souls" (*kwan*) of the Lao (Condominas 1976; Formoso 1998). Across ethnicities, but sometimes even within them, the numbers given for "souls" and their specifications vary significantly (Moréchand 1968: 85; Stolz 2020: 248). This suggests that such designations depend on the communicative context in which they are evoked, stressing the relational character of aspects of personhood.

The Rmeet are in a number of ways typical for this region. They currently number around 21,000 persons, mostly living in upland or rural villages in northern Laos. They speak a Mon-Khmer language and have no history of political units beyond the village level. They are seen and consider themselves as the earliest settlers of their land. In contrast to the Buddhist majority of the country, they address their major rituals to a multitude of spirits. Village economy, in the villages I studied, is based on dry rice grown on swiddens. In addition, Rmeet have a century-long history of labor migration and trade with domestic animals, forest produce and a varying range of cash crops. This way, they are part of a highly differentiated cultural landscape in which neighbors adopt cultural representations from each other while modifying them to their own conceptual systems.

This includes concepts of personhood. Rmeet consider the living human person in terms of three aspects of rather different qualities: *to* is the body; *pääm* can be translated as life, character or mood; and *klpu* is what leaves the body during dreaming, or when ill, and later turns into the spirit of the dead. *Pääm* is not so much an essence but rather a category of qualities. It shows in breath, regular living movement and growth, and is shared by humans, animals and plants. In this meaning, *pääm* disappears after death and is not subject to ritual care. The occurrence of *pääm* in clocks or motors is somewhat debated. In

addition, terms for emotional states like anger or happiness and character traits like fearlessness or patience are combinations with the word *pääm*.

Klpu, in contrast, is more bounded and localised. The spirit of the dead (called either *klpu ii yoom* or *phi ii yoom*, soul or spirit of the dead), when appearing to the living in dreams, looks and talks like the deceased person. *Klpu* thus represents much of the identity of the living person and is the aspect of the person that is of most concern in rituals. This is because it is constantly attracted to the spirit world. When dreaming, people see the world through the eyes of their *klpu*, which equals the point of view of the spirits. *Klpu* originates either ex nihilo or is sent by the dead ancestors of a woman during her pregnancy. There is no notion of rebirth.

Living human persons consist of internal relationships between these three aspects that need to be stabilized by proper external relationships with living relatives and with spirits. In particular, the relationship between body and *klpu* is a constant concern of ritual activity. Lack of respect for the family of origin of a wife may cause her house members' *klpu* to leave for their house, causing illness. Also, the *klpu* may be attracted to its lineal forebears in the graveyard. In addition, it may be abducted or 'bitten' by spirits of the forests. There are thus many occasions for tugging the *klpu* away from its body, through force, obligation or seduction. The integration of body and *klpu*, however, is protected by benevolent spirits, predominantly the house spirit – a conglomerate of lineal ancestors – and the village spirit, often seen as a conglomerate of house spirits. Disrespecting these spirits or failing to keep the dangerous forces from outside the village at bay leads to a disintegration of body and *klpu*. People then will fall ill or die unless these relationships are reinforced, often with the help of shamans.

The word for body, *to*, is a Lao loanword that in both languages also means animal. Apart from sale, domestic animals are destined for sacrifice to the spirits. Often, illness or another threat for the body-*klpu* bond is the occasion

for sacrifice. Then, the animals (*to*) are given to the spirits – who exist in a way similar to *klpu* – in order to strengthen the relationship between human bodies and their *klpu*. Human rituals thus create exchange relations involving animals and spirits, representative, as it were, of body and *klpu*, in order to maintain human personhood. These are the conditions for a variety of body-*klpu*-spirit relationships of which I will present several prominent examples.

III. Trance and the Shaman's Possession

The first instance of possession-like phenomena I want to address occurs in the sessions of the main ritual healers, called *mor*. Here, the folding of personhood is apparent in the relationship between shamans and their spirit familiars, which are at once separate beings and part of his person, as he cannot live without them. Shamans can be men or women, but women *mor* are rare, and I never saw a woman perform a healing ritual[3]. I prefer to call them shamans here, for the following reasons. *Mor* is a Lao loanword that covers a great variety of ritual specialists and healers, including biomedical doctors (Condominas 1976: 217). In Lao, each type of *mor* is specified by an additional word (e.g. *mor tham* for spirit specialists), but often, if the context is clear, only *mor* is used. Therefore, to use the common Lao (and Thai) word may be confusing in the Rmeet context.

The term "ritual healer", however, is also not entirely satisfactory, as *mor* are not the only type of healer that employs ritual techniques among Rmeet. *Khru*, for instance, master the art of bone-setting, some types of divination, the use of medical (e.g. herbal) substances, and ritual verse that are applied together with substances and bone-setting. Neither spirits nor *klpu* are involved in this type of healing.

[3] The only woman shaman I met had retired due to her age – she was said to be 100 years old – and due to her deafness I was unable to interview her. I have heard that a younger woman recently initiated into the craft but have not met her yet.

Mor, however, concur to a large extent with the common image of the shaman (e.g. Atkinson 1992). *Mor* specialize in curing diseases caused by spirits. This does not exclude some knowledge of *khru* techniques, but does not necessitate it either. The shamanic cure does not forbid patients to seek other kinds of treatment, like biomedicine. Diseases caused by spirits are usually described as soul loss. The *klpu* of a living human being leaves his or her body and is abducted by spirits. At the same time – or maybe, from a different perspective – the spirit enters the body of the person and "bites" (*kheak*) it.

The shaman effectuates his or her cure with the help of spirit familiars, the *gorn mor* (children/extensions of the *mor*). They enable him to go into trance and visit the various spirits suspected to have caused the illness. By talking to them, he figures out who has abducted the *klpu* and then negotiates its return, usually through a sacrifice.

Trance sessions are not the most common type of curing ritual that the shaman employs. Often, a diagnosis involving spoken verse and reading the yolk of an egg will reveal the identity of the spirit and the proper kind of sacrifice. In these cases, the *gorn mor* make the illness visible to the shaman, for instance, by signs in the egg. However, if trance sessions are deemed appropriate – and the ill person is willing to organize this larger ritual – they last for hours, sometimes the larger part of a night, and can draw a considerable audience.

During these sessions, the shaman uses a variety of ritual paraphernalia, most prominently a sword and a fan. The sword serves to make the spirits afraid and demand their respect, while the healer presents small offerings of liquor or tobacco to the spirits on the fan. He also uses it to hurl uncooked rice into the audience, thereby calling the spirits. Shortly after that, the shaman goes into trance. He sits on a small stool, closes his eyes and falls backwards into the arms of two people sitting behind him. Fits of trance occur several times during the sessions.

At this point, two things may happen. Either the shaman returns to his normal self after a short time or his spirit familiars start acting through him. In the latter case, the shaman exhibits strange, somewhat outlandish behavior. This was particularly expressive in one shaman I knew, now deceased, called TaaLää. When possessed by his helper spirits, the expression of his face changed, his eyes widened, his movements became lively and somewhat edgy, and he started to speak a different language. Some shamans say that the spirits speak Lao, so this is what they do when possessed. Most, however, speak an incomprehensible "spirit language". At other times, the shaman would start whistling, a speciality of the spirit familiars and the reason why my own occasional whistling met with some irritation.

One famous shaman of the recent past was known for lifting heavy clay jars with his teeth alone when in trance and hurling them up in the air. TaaLää, an elderly and somewhat frail man, still managed to lift a jar from the ground by his teeth. Another indicator of TaaLää's possession was his predilection for mixing tar from pipe cleaners into his liquor and then drinking it, as spirit familiars like to do.

In contrast to possession in lowland societies, the audience did not attempt to interact with the spirits in the shaman's body, indicating that possession is of subordinate interest in Rmeet ritual healing compared to the shamanic journey. However, audience members sometimes did intervene when the possessed shaman indulged in somewhat dangerous practices.

Due to their life-giving relationship with their spirit familiars, the personhood of shamans diverges from that of most Rmeet. Shamans acquire spirit familiars in two different ways, which distinguishes their major types. "Born shamans" (*mor geud*) are chosen by the spirit familiars themselves. This usually manifests in types of illness that come with fits or dropping unconscious. When a young boy once started whistling, I was told, this was seen as an

indication of his destiny as a shaman. The future healer then has to learn the appropriate ritual verses from an established shaman and go through an initiation. After that, he houses his invisible spirit familiars on a shelf under the roof above his sleeping place. Several times a year he has to perform a sacrifice of a chicken and some liquor for them. Some people with this vocation, however, refuse to become active shamans but nevertheless establish a shrine and perform the proper sacrifice once a year.

The second avenue to becoming a shaman is by deliberate decision. The procedure of learning is the same, but at its end, the teacher will share his *gorn mor* with his apprentice. In both cases, learning proceeds in an abandoned field hut, to keep curious villagers away. After the end of the teaching, a pig or buffalo sacrifice to the novice shaman's house spirit introduces his *gorn mor* to his own household.

In many respects, *gorn mor* and the shaman are separate persons. They hail from a remote mountain area called Singjuk Sinlääng where they have their own villages and they bear individual names like human beings. Usually, a shaman lives with nine spirit familiars who never operate separately – in this respect, the distinctions suggested by their names merge into a single agency. In other respects, *gorn mor* are aspects of the person of the shaman. Crucially, a shaman's life depends upon the presence of these spirits. They constantly watch him from above, and if they turned their eyes away, he would die. The spirit familiars thus occupy an ambiguous position. In so far as they are necessary for the shaman's life, they resemble aspects of personhood like *klpu*, but their origin in a remote place and their individual names signify the difference from him – facing him, as it were, in a fold.

An important part of this nexus of difference-within-identity is the manner in which the shaman initiates his relationship with the spirit familiars. The exchange that brings the relationship about has obvious and sometimes explicit

similarities with marriage. A typical gift from the apprentice to his teacher is half a buffalo (by shared ownership) and eight silver piasters (colonial-era money). Buffaloes and piasters constitute the major elements of bride wealth for a woman's parents, and both the latter and the gift for the senior shaman are called *ngooi*. While this is the common Lao word for "price", it is not used for any other ritual prestation, not even for the bride wealth apart from the parents' share. The acquisition of spirit familiars thus follows the rules of a correct marriage. Also, in both cases, the new members of a household, be it a bride or the spirit familiars, are announced to the house spirit by a sacrifice. In this sense, the relationship between the shaman and his spirits is in line with the relationships of kinship and reproduction. Just as the relationship between body and *klpu* is established and possibly disturbed by the relationship between wife-givers and wife-takers, the relationship between shaman and spirit familiars stabilizes the body-*klpu* unity when patterned upon marriage. The other kind of possessing spirits, the *ngem ngao*, however, emerge from a perturbation of correct marriage.

IV. Casualties of Bad Marriage

Hosts of *ngem ngao* witch spirits diverge from most other people due to the hostile agency that is part of themselves and different at the same time. *Ngem ngao* make their victims ill or even kill them. However, their hosts are not their victims, nor are they necessarily intent to do what their *ngem nao* do. On the contrary, their hosts may be fairly innocent people – mostly men, as far as I can tell – who happen to contain an aggressive spirit that strikes out against anyone who dissatisfies its host.

Several examples were related to me. "Say, me and you host *ngem ngao*", Khamjan, one of my main informants told me, "and we go to visit TaaAad. TaaAad does not slaughter a chicken. We are hungry, we get angry. We walk

away. Then TaaAad falls ill. He loses consciousness. People ask him: 'Who are you'? – 'I am Guido' [he responds]". Another example concerned amorous approaches: If a girl liked to flirt with a boy but he rejected her, her *ngem ngao* may attack him.

Therefore, the Rmeet explained, the *ngem ngao* "walks with the *klpu*". It follows a person's intentions or feelings without actually being under his or her conscious control. The wording serves to mark a split between what properly makes the public, visible person and the sociopathic additional spirit.

These hypothetical examples were supported by actual, albeit not very recent events. In one case, a man from a neighboring village had moved to my research village in 1976. He had been expelled after being revealed as a witch, but this was unknown in my research village at the time. Together with his family, he stayed there for two years. During that time, a number of children became ill and died for unknown reasons. Finally, one of his victims was asked for the *ngem ngao*'s identity. One of the *mor* of the village identified an ancient and apparently rather special skirt as the bearer of the spirit and asked its owner to sell it off. The owner refused, and thus, the entire family was expelled again. In earlier times, the shaman asserted, these people would have been killed, but things had changed.

For a better understanding of how *ngem ngao* come into being, a brief summary of Rmeet kinship is in order. Rmeet society is structured by the idea that families (called *ña*, houses) are constituted by the intersection of two lines of the transmission of life. The first is a patrilineal succession of fathers and sons who inherit the family house and membership in agnatic groups. The latter make sacrifice together to their house spirits and bury their dead in the same section of the graveyard. The men in these graveyard groups, as I call them, together with their wives, turn into protective house spirits after death. These spirits stabilize the relationships between bodies and *klpu* in the house of their

descendants. House spirits thus do in everyday prophylaxis what shamans do in moments of illness and crisis.

The patrilines are crossed by lines of origins of wives. In many respects, Rmeet kinship terminology and rules follow a pattern of asymmetric alliance, in which men should normatively marry their mother's brother's daughter (MBD) and women their father's sister's son (FZD) (Lévi-Strauss 1969; Sprenger 2008). These kin positions only represent the genealogically closest representatives of extensive classes for whom a single kin term is used — *hääm*, a symmetric term for both men and women. This denotes any person of similar age in an agnatic group to whom previous marriage relationships can be traced.

Marriages should ideally maintain a pattern in which women move in one direction from their natal house to their husband's house. This movement establishes cross-generational relationships between households who call each other *taa* (the wife's side) and *pesao* (the husband's side). The optimal, albeit rare, way to marry is thus the aforementioned MBD-FZS pattern, as it renews the relationship established in the parents' generation in that of their offspring. A marriage between mother's brother's son and father's sister's daughter, however, would reverse the movement and is thus forbidden, as are sexual relations among people who share the same patrilineal origin.

These marriage relations are not only important for the way people procreate, but also for what James Fox (1980) has called the "flow of life". The wife's relatives figure prominently in any context in which the production of life is at issue: birth, house warming, sowing, harvesting, and so on. They are a constant source of fertility for people and fields, and therefore treated as hierarchically superior to the husband's house (Sprenger 2006).

The violation of the direction of marriage, then, produces dangerous effects, *ngem ngao* among them. Varieties of these violations are reverse marriage (wife-givers becoming wife-takers), marriage between agnates

(classificatory incest), and even marriage with members of other ethnic groups – the latter probably seen as least problematic today.

According to different interlocutors, the first "wrong" marriage either has no consequences or produces *sewui* – spirits imagined and depicted as dogs or pigs that "bite" their victims and make them ill. These illnesses do not differ much from attacks by earth or sky spirits and involve no stigma. Also, the *sewui* never speak through the mouth of their victims or show the double possession of host and victim. *Ngem ngao* only appear after three generations of wrong marriages, although opinions differ as to how this succession is counted.

The principles behind this become clearer when *ngem ngao* are placed in a broader field of generically invisible spirits that intrude into human bodies to make them ill. Rmeet consider spirit illness as a kind of replacement. The *klpu* of the victim moves out of his or her body, and the attacking spirit moves in. The healing rituals effectuate a reversal of this process. This exchange is of beings that are intrinsically similar. As mentioned above, in dreams, *klpu* sees the world from the perspective of spirits, and it turns into a spirit after death. Thus, *klpu* is that aspect of human personhood that enables communication with the spirit world. For the same reason, it may switch places with spirits.

The relationships with these dangerous spirits are graded according to their origin. Most common are illnesses caused by the spirits from the domain of the forest and the sky. The same goes for spirits of people who have died of a violent or sudden death whose burial in unmarked graves outside of graveyards associates them with the forest. None of these spirits speak through their victims. It is the shaman only who, shielded by his *gorn mor*, dares to talk to them. The spirits of the forest, from people's point of view, behave like predators when "biting" them. In turn, they see their human victims as prey animals – the attribution of a non-village order of humans to spirits is mutual. As in the perspectivism in Amerindian hunting – which Viveiros de Castro (1998) used

for analyzing human-non human relationships in a number of societies – the others always appear as forest animals, in a gaze that is symmetrical in its asymmetries (see also Århem 2016).

However, the spirits of bad marriage are of a different type. Marriage produces the village sociality proper, and the violation of its laws brings a disturbance that resembles the disorder of the forest domain without being identical to it. *Sewui* spirits do not resemble predators, but rather omnivorous domestic animals, predominantly dogs. Pigs are sometimes mentioned as well. The spirits of bad marriage thus belong to the village, but they eat humans for meat, just like the forest spirits do.

The perturbation caused by bad marriage is, however, sometimes enhanced through repetition. This produces dangerous beings that are unlike animal members of households but just a small step away from human beings. *Ngem ngao* are like violent doubles of their hosts, identifying with their names when asked and acting along with their desire and envy, amplifying them to destruction. As it is human to restrain your desires, this prevents *ngem ngao* from being human (but not their hosts). The three types of spirit attack can thus be summarized as in the table below.

	Domain: forest – village		
Event	Exchange with capricious powers of forest beyond village	Single disturbance of life-producing exchange among humans within village	Repeated disturbance of life-producing exchange among humans within village
Spirit type	Spirits who behave like predators (forest/bad death spirits)	Spirits resembling domestic animals (*sewui*)	Spirits speaking like and resembling human persons (*ngem ngao*)

The Rmeet invoke the dangers of *sewui* and *ngem ngao* in two different ways regarding the ideal of MBD-FZD marriage. Close marriage of the latter type is highly valued, but close marriages with any other cousin is restrained by the risk of *sewui* and *ngem ngao*. As mentioned above, the term for potential marriage partners may be used for remote relatives and even for strangers. This expansive potential, however, is again checked by the same issues. Rmeet explain their preference for marriage with relatives in terms of the very splits of personhood that I have described. With your close relatives, you know that they do not have *ngem ngao* and are not *proong* either. These destructive instances of folded personhood signify the dangers of remote marriages, just as *ngem ngao* represent the dangers of wrong marriages that are too close.

A brief comparison with Tai-speaking lowland societies suggests that the respective concepts are transformations of each other. This is not the place for comparing Rmeet and lowlanders in more detail, but even a sketchy account helps to highlight some general ideas about witchcraft in this region. The *ngem ngao* are quite similar to spirits known in lowland Laos and Lao-speaking northeastern Thailand as *phii pob* (Doré 1979b; Hours 1973; Wattanagun 2016, 2018). Even the Rmeet themselves acknowledge this as the correct translation (*phi ka* being an alternative).

However, the origin of these spirits is significantly different. According to Kanya (2016), *phii pob* in Northeastern Thailand emerge from the disturbance of a flow of cosmic power that is most properly handled by Buddhist monks. This relates to the central exchange relationship that defines a Buddhist village. Villagers provide monks with food and shelter while the monks provide the opportunity to make merit (Strenski 1988). This exchange serves to channel cosmic power properly, but danger lies in laypeople's attempts to appropriate this power for selfish purposes, in the form of magic. When this goes wrong, especially when the precepts against eating or doing certain things are broken,

the unfortunate sorcerer becomes host to a *phii pob* (Hours 1973: 135-6; Sangun 1976: 69; Kanya 2016: 163).

Behind the surface difference between monk-laypeople relations in the lowland and wife-giver-wife-taker relations in the uplands lies a more profound comparability. In both cases, human sociality, in contrast to the forest, is defined by an important exchange relationship that generates life by channeling cosmic power. The relationship is asymmetric and hierarchical, and it addresses personhood. However, when this relationship is disturbed, it seems to open a fissure in the person of the perpetrator, creating a being that is intrinsically bound to a living human and at the same times moves around like a spirit.

The association with human reproduction, featured prominently in the Rmeet marriage system, occurs similarly among the Lao and northeastern Thai. A common form of the potentially dangerous use of cosmic power among the latter is love magic. Lao and Northeastern Thai kinship systems are bilateral and discourage marriage with close relatives, kings and high nobility being the historical exception. Compared to the Rmeet, the idea of irregular marriage as a danger to the flow of life is thus much less prevalent. However, Lao love magic that goes awry may cause damage to personhood in two directions: if too strong, the addressee (usually a woman) will lose her mind; if not done correctly, the sorcerer will become the host of a *phii pob* (Terwiel 2012: 131-140; Wattanagun 2016). *Phii pob* and *ngem ngao* thus both result from the misdirected manipulation of the cosmological aspects of sexual relationships.

Both Buddhist lowlanders and Rmeet recognize the disturbance of a central life-giving exchange relationship that defines village life. The result is comparable – a spirit that uses its host as a guide and springboard to attack other persons. These spirits are thus partly identical with and partly different from their hosts. They represent an incomplete split of the person, emerging from the very forces that create and stabilize human personhood in the first place.

V. Witches and Shapeshifters

There is another type of decentered person that needs mentioning here, as it is sometimes confused with *ngem ngao*. These are people called *proong*. While *sewui* are etiologically related to *ngem ngao*, but sociologically different, the reverse is true with *proong*. Like *phii pob* hosts, *proong* are normal villagers with a destructive aspect to them. *Proong* are in the habit of turning into a kind of blood-and-feces-eating beings after consuming a particular ginger-like root. They walk around at night, with glowing eyes and protruding mouths that turn into snouts by which *proong* suck out the life of the weak, the newborn and the sick. They also eat human corpses.

Sometimes, people speak of *phi proong* – *proong* spirits that inhabit normal people. This idea, however, seems to be modelled upon the *ngem ngao*, as the majority of people denies that *proong* are spirits. Apart from the consumption of the *proong* root there are no specific origin stories about them. I only chanced upon them in a single version of the common origin myth of the Rmeet. In this story, all the people of the world emerge from a giant gourd born to an incestuous brother-sister couple after a flood. In some versions, each kind of people, usually defined by ethnicity, acquires its specific features just after leaving the gourd, and in one of them, the *proong* came out at night.

With respect to *proong*, I restrict myself to those features that associate them with *ngem ngao*, in two ways. First, both represent what one could call a perversion of desire. The *ngem ngao* turn a grudge that a host holds against someone else into revenge, thus turning destructive (internal) feelings into destructive (external) effects[4]. The *proong* are equally driven by antisocial

[4] This distinction between internal antisocial desires and their control as external affect is an important value in lowland Buddhist societies (e.g. Cassaniti 2015: chapter 2), but much less so among Rmeet. Still, the expression of anger or envy is not encouraged. Visisya (2019) argues that possession in northern Thailand offers opportunities to enact desires beyond standard gender roles.

desires to consume the life of the weak, the bodies of the dead or – in less harmful cases – rotten meat and feces. They thus blur the distinction between human consumers and non-human food sources (also problematized in the symmetric asymmetries of predatory forest spirits). They also treat as food what has already left the cycle of the production of life[5]. As mentioned above, normative objections against marriage with strangers are rationalized with fear of *proong* and *ngem ngao*.

Second, revelations of both lead to their exclusion from village life. Expulsion is probably what links them most strongly in people's memory. In 2018, one of my informants pointed out to me a small, shabby house at the edge of a neighboring village, separated by a river, and explained that a *proong* man lived there who would kill people on a regular basis. *Proong* status usually encompasses entire families, as they all would consume the *proong* root together, sometimes unknowingly driven into their fate by their affected family members.

The *proong* thus represent a different version of the duplicated self of the *ngem ngao*. Although *proong* are not evil doubles like the *ngem ngao* are to their hosts, they are still divergences of identity. While *ngem ngao* hosts split up when the destructive version of their selves invades a different body, the *proong* diverge into a daylight identity and a nighttime one. While the split in *ngem ngao* is marked by the body-*klpu* difference and thus belongs to the code of spirits, *proong* experience transformations of their body and its desires. In this sense, they are indeed not spirits. What associates them with spirits, however, are their anti-social eating habits, at their apex the desire to eat humans. Even the *mor*'s benevolent spirit familiars – who never eat humans – are distinguished by their taste for waste like pipe tar. Therefore, the word *proong* is also, sometimes jokingly, used for people who behave in an abject manner or perform

[5] Comparable associations of decentered personhood and feces are present in other spirit forms, like the *phi krasue* in northeastern Thailand (Baumann 2016). A comparison of this idea requires more complexity than the present article allows.

disgusting pranks, like hurling animal feces. Their nighttime prowling, which hides their visual shape and identity, also moves *proong* closer to the spirits, whose most prominent quality is invisibility.

Socially speaking, *proong* propose a paradox. Accusations of being *proong* are strongly discouraged. If not substantialized, the accused may demand compensation amounting to those for murder, with "character assassination" being the issue. Yet, if a *proong* is successfully disclosed – i.e. with the shared conviction of villagers – the entire family is forced to leave the village, just like *ngem ngao*. People in my host village mentioned a single case of expulsion sometime in the late 1970s. But while some would say this family were *proong*, others – including the *mor* involved in the case (see above) – identified them as *ngem ngao*. Thus, despite their ontological difference, *proong* and *ngem ngao* hosts share the same social fate, and this blurs their distinction in many people's minds.

VI. Folding the Person

Shamanism and witchcraft highlight a general feature of Rmeet personhood that is not restricted to these comparatively exceptional phenomena. *Ngem ngao* spirits demonstrate this particularly well. They cannot simply be considered as separate from their hosts – they are different, and they are the same. Something similar – again, the same and not the same – can be said about the spirit familiars. While no Rmeet, I guess, would equate the dangerous *ngem ngao* and the protective *gorn mor*, both 'walk with the *klpu*', as Rmeet said separately at one or another occasion. The meaning of this phrase differed in both cases. The *gorn mor* protect the *klpu* of the shaman when he talks to spirits that are otherwise dangerous. For any normal person, talking to spirits elicits the spirit-like side of his/her *klpu*, prefiguring death. As *klpu* and spirits are relational, behaving like a fellow villager of the dead could mean that someone will join their village soon. The life-asserting relationship with the *gorn mor* adds a

relationship to the shaman that keeps his *klpu* away from the spirits in a manner that is ontologically similar – soul-fortification in the same terms as soul-loss. While seeing spirits creates a dangerous proximity to them, being seen by the *gorn mor* ties the shaman to them.

The *ngem ngao* reverse this situation. They are harmful like spirits of the wilderness, and instead of protecting life, they destroy it. Still, they emerge from village society – they bear the name of their hosts and do not abduct *klpu* to the forest. *Ngem ngao* and *gorn mor* relate to the central life-giving relationship of affinity in opposed ways. While the shaman's relationship with the *gorn mor* is modelled upon the correct transfer of bride wealth, the *ngem ngao* emerge from a reversal of correct marriage.

Both the *ngem ngao* and the *gorn mor* belong to a series of types of internal splits. When Rmeet separately say of both that they "walk with *klpu*", they are revealing the concurrence of the spirit with a proper aspect of the person. However, not even *klpu* necessarily represents the true intentions or personality – the social, visible identity of a villager. There are cases in which even *klpu* diverges from its human being's position.

In 2016, I saw a gourd bottle with a figure painted in chalk below the stairs of a house. A shaman had hung it up there in order to get the *klpu* of the house's mother back in line. Her small child had been crying constantly, and the shaman had found that it was the woman's *klpu* that had been frightening the child because it did not like it. This did not imply that the woman 'unconsciously' dislike her child or any such psychoanalytical projection. Rather, even *klpu* harbors the potential of separate agency.

Similarly, the inclination of *klpu* to visit the spirits indicates its distinction from its bearer. *Klpu* likes to play in graves, as Rmeet told me, as they cut little hooks from forked tree branches after a funeral. When leaving the graveyard they gestured with the hook as if they were dragging something invisible behind

them, pulling their irresponsible and childish soul away from the dead. *Klpu* cannot be separated from a human body without the person falling apart, but it is also not merely identical with it. Here, any attempt to establish an identity that is not split in the first place is impossible.

Gorn mor and *ngem ngao* are one step further along this series of semi-independent quasi-persons. At once, they correspond to the person they belong to and at the same time are different. I thus suggest the term "folded person" to describe this type of relational personhood, drawing my metaphor from a folded piece of paper – continuous on one side and discontinuous, like separate pieces of paper touching each other, on the other. Another possible image is the Möbius strip – a circular strip that is twisted so that its opposite surfaces are connected, forming a continuous, single surface that is at the same time its own backside.

Folded personhood is thus a specific form of the dividual or fractal personhood that has been derived from Indian and Melanesian ethnography (Strathern 1988; Wagner 1991). This concept draws attention to the way persons are constituted by communication and relationships. It does not posit an essential substrate of personhood that is given before any social relationship, but considers persons as emergent from the interaction of humans and non-humans alike, through gift exchange, for instance. This concept thus focuses on the kind of internal self-difference that I also observe among Rmeet. However, the concept of folded personhood complements the generic self-difference of dividuals with the analysis of contexts in which continuity and difference are enacted or experienced.

This issue comes down to the very conditions of personhood, through the *klpu*-spirit duality. *Klpu* emerges from the convergence of patrilineal and affinal relationships in a house. The house spirits are married couples that protect the relationship between *klpu* and body of the house's inhabitants. *Klpu* itself emerges from wife-givers' graveyards. The difference between parents and

children, on the one hand, and wife-givers and wife-takers on the other, thus conditions the 'internality' of personhood in the first place.

If *klpu* depends on this difference, it is unsurprising that it is self-different by itself, taking on intentions that sometimes oppose its bearer. *Gorn mor* and *ngem ngao* amplify this difference into two different directions. The shaman's helping spirits fortify him against the attractions of a spirit world that seductively poses as the real home of the *klpu*. In contrast, witchcraft spirits destroy life by double possession. They possess their hosts, with whom they identify when being addressed; and they possess their victims, against whom the host bears asocial feelings.

Other fragmentations of personhood follow comparable lines. Spirits of the wilderness may slip in and out of human bodies and people reverse their relationship to a life-giving social environment by becoming *proong* with the turn of day and night. As Cécile Barraud (1990) has stressed, people in Southeast Asia are temporary bundles of relationships that are in danger of disassembling any time. But these aspects are not just heterogeneous. In being identical and different from each other, they implicate permanent instability.

Both *gorn mor* and *ngem ngao* emerge from a sociocosmic code of marriage. The relation with the shamanic spirits is established through a bridewealth-like transfer, while witchcraft spirits are born from wrong marriages. Marriage thus appears as a cosmological code of folding identity into difference. The link between marriage and these spirits is the fact that marriage is an exchange, just like the relations between monks and laypeople in the lowlands. Exchange maintains difference in its minimal form of the distinction between givers and takers and at the same time suggests the unity of this difference, its necessary complementation that constitutes its two sides as what they are. Exchange thus constitutes an ontology in which identity only comes about by difference, and therefore must include difference. Any entity that

comes about by exchange, be it correct exchange leading to *klpu* or a botched one leading to *ngem ngao*, is internally self-different.

VII. Conclusion

The cases of possession and trance that I describe here may seem to be exceptional and rare occurrences in Rmeet everyday life, or in those of other people with similar concepts like *phii pob*. However, even if extreme, they are indicators of a concept of personhood that is general among Rmeet, and presumably in other local cosmologies in the region as well (for Akha, see WANG 2019: 54). Even *klpu*, the most basic aspect of personhood, diverges occasionally from its bearers. The very differentiation that makes *klpu* identifiable as an aspect of the person enables its agentive separation. Possession and trance thus highlight the very condition of personhood as folded – continuous and discontinuous at the same time.

The aspects of personhood that split partially from the visible, social person are doubles and analogues, perhaps in Descola's sense of analogism: a series of separate beings, different in their ontological setup, but still resembling each other enough so that their difference only comes about sporadically (Descola 2011). Descola stresses the separateness of these beings, while their similarity to others makes classification systems possible. Therefore, classification seems like an afterthought, a reaction on their ultimate differentiation. This does not seem to be the case here: the wayward aspects of personhood are sometimes identical to, and sometimes separate from, the visible identities of their bearers.

Eduardo Viveiros des Castro (2019: CH.6) suggests a more radical way of conceiving identity and difference in his appropriation of Deleuze and Guattari. He speaks of "multiplicities": beings that have no substance but are defined by their difference. In the Amerindian ontologies that he analyses, beings are

different from the perspective of different observers – what is beer to a jaguar is blood to a human. Viveiros de Castro argues that there is no substrate of identity. Neither is there one real way of seeing things while others are illusions, nor is there an abstract essence from which its various appearances derive. Instead, the being in question contains all its different appearances, and it is their difference that makes it what it is. A multiplicity, Viveiros de Castro argues, is less than one; subtracting "one" reveals the "many".

This approach may shed some light on the Southeast Asian examples of folded personhood. They are similarly relational, even though perspective is not the dominant code to express this relationality. Rather, exchange appears as a major ontological determinant for the split beings that are never fully split. Without difference there is no exchange; but exchange establishes bounded entities such as persons, polities or village communities. These entities work on the maintenance of their boundedness, while at the same time they are internally different.

This tension translates into concepts of folded persons. Folded persons are examples of a contextual oscillation between being part of an integrated whole and separate entities facing each other. They are thus identical and different, continuous and discontinuous, within the same being. This seeming paradox infuses and establishes the being of spirits in general in this region (see also Baumann 2020). Societies as different as the Buddhist, bilateral and state-building Lao, and the animist, village-oriented Rmeet, with its asymmetric marriage system, converge on these fundamental issues.

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專題論文

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Religious Changes, Ethnic Minorities and the State in Laos

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Abstract

As a communist state, Laos did not adopt atheism in absolute principle. Unlike the initial situation in communist China or in Cambodia with the Khmer Rouge, the Pathet Lao communists quickly gave up rejecting religion when they took power in 1975. They tried instead to integrate Buddhism into their Marxist reading of the country's development, seeing it also as a force for cultural unification given the nation's ethnic diversity. From a historical perspective, we will first look at state policies on religion in the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) in order to highlight the way in which the new state gradually addressed the country's religious diversity. While officially promoting the cultural diversity of the country's different ethnic groups, the place given to the religious beliefs and practices of 'minority' populations has been singularly restricted. We will look at the different ways the members of three local

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populations of Northern Laos, considered “ethnic minorities”, responded to the centralizing and homogenizing vision of the state.

Keywords: State, Ethnic Minorities, Religious Changes

I. Introduction

As a communist state, Laos did not adopt atheism in absolute principle. Unlike the initial situation in communist China or in Cambodia with the Khmer Rouge, the Pathet Lao communists quickly gave up rejecting religion when they took power in 1975. They tried instead to integrate Buddhism into their Marxist reading of the country's development, seeing it also as a force for cultural unification given the nation's ethnic diversity (Stuart-Fox and Bucknell, 1982; Evans, 1998). From a historical perspective, we will first look at state policies on religion in the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) in order to highlight the way in which the new state gradually addressed the country's religious diversity. While officially promoting the cultural diversity of the country's different ethnic groups, the place given to the religious beliefs and practices of 'minority' populations (subsumed under an ad hoc category *satsana phi*, i.e. spirit cults) has been singularly restricted. "How does the Laotian state consider and manage ethnic and religious diversity today?" This will be the first question we will ask here. We will then look at the different ways the members of three local populations of Northern Laos, considered "ethnic minorities", responded to the centralizing and homogenizing vision of the state. Through ethnographic data I collected in Phongsaly, the northernmost province of Laos, bordering on China[1], we will see their adaptations, their resistance, or their "lines of flight."

[1] Since 2018, I have benefited from the support of the European Project H2020 *Competing Regional Integrations in Southeast Asia* (CRISEA) for my field research conducted in Phongsaly province (January-February 2018 and February 2019). I also relied on previous fieldwork conducted in Khmu villages in Phongsaly and Luang Namtha provinces in 2017.

Pic.1 Map of Northern Laos and Phongsaly Province. (@G. Schlemmer)

II. Lao State and Religion

Wishing to build the unity of the young Lao PDR, the new government of Laos faced two challenges: the question of the integration of the different ethnic minorities in the country and the question of its position, as a Marxist-Leninist party, regarding religion. Indeed, according to scholars and policymakers, Western theories of modernization adopted by rulers of the new South East Asian nation states should have led to increased secularism. But what happened in Laos? I will review here the evolution of the position of the state regarding

religion, showing that it has on the one hand defined what a good religion is, while on the other hand rejecting other less prominent or local religions, considering them "false beliefs". This has led to the adoption of several paradoxical attitudes, particularly towards ethnic minorities.

State Management of Multi-ethnicity

When it was created, the Lao PDR government had to deal with something that sets Laos apart from neighbouring countries: extraordinary levels of ethnic and cultural diversity. The ethnic Lao account for only 50 percent of the country's total population (6,400,000 inhabitants in 2015), while the other 50 percent is divided among forty-eight officially registered ethnic groups. Another characteristic of the Lao PDR is a major cultural division between the Lao-Tai majority, largely Buddhist and practising irrigated rice cultivation, and non-Buddhist ethnic minorities (thus labelled as "animist") practising dry rice cultivation in the foothills of the mountains and adhering to various slash-and-burn agricultural methods. Valley inhabitants manifest a cultural unity based mainly on a common adherence to Theravada Buddhism, while highland societies include a wide diversity of social structures and religious systems.

Upon taking power in 1975, the communist government of the Lao PDR made it clear that it would make the unity of the country a priority. It promised that every minority could retain its "ancestral customs" and that the party would ensure that all ethnic groups were treated equally. Indeed, liberation of the country had relied largely on rural ethnic groups. Under the new regime, minorities initially enjoyed special privileges, including formal representation in several institutions (in the National Assembly, where the two vice presidents were from "ethnic minorities", and in the Front for National Construction), and were able to obtain high positions in some provincial governments and in the army (Rathie 2017). But unlike the early revolutionary positions of the Chinese

or Vietnamese, the Lao PDR refused any recognition of nationality or regional autonomy, or as in Burma, divisions into "ethnic states". Instead, multi-ethnic solidarity in the context of a single and indissoluble Lao nation was proposed, to be supported by a national culture, the latter being modelled on Lao-Tai cultural norms. This was only partly because the Lao-Tai constituted a majority, and was primarily because the group had the highest level of "cultural development" (Goudineau 2015). As Kaysone Phomvihane, the party's central committee president stated:

> "Lao culture must be the basic culture shared by all the ethnicities, and must be the one to provide the connections for the exchange of culture between all the ethnicities; spoken and written Lao is the common language, and written Lao is the regular writing of all the ethnic groups". (op. cit. in Evans 1999: 171)

Thus, the Lao state has adopted a contradictory stance towards ethnic minorities. On one hand, the national Constitution acknowledges and hence protects the multi-ethnicity of the country; the state has been tasked with preserving the intangible heritage of all ethnic groups within the country. On the other hand, as a promoter of "modernity" and "progress", and more specifically, to aid the positive development and living conditions of these groups, the Lao PDR deploys several policies towards ethnic minorities which strongly encourage them to join what is regarded as the better ethnic Lao way of life. These policies have included arbitrary political decisions forcing massive displacements of highland communities to the lowlands (Goudineau 1997*b*), and a ban on shifting cultivation which has deeply impacted rural people's livelihoods as well as their cultural reproduction (Evrard and Baird 2017).

As a result, the ethnic issue (even if it has not really been a threat to the state in the past, apart from the Hmong rebellion) is under control. As ethnic communities are scattered among provinces and, in most groups, the political

structure does not traditionally exceed the village level, individuals do not really have a sense of a greater 'ethnic' community. It also appears any future threat remains minimal.

The Communist State of Laos and the Question of Buddhism

Since its advent, the Pathet Lao communist government has relied on Buddhism to establish national unity. Chinese and Cambodian communists neutralized religious institutions by demolishing monasteries and temples, murdering monks and generally forcing secularization. The need to build national unity in Laos forced the communist parties to behave differently and take advantage of ethnic Lao culture, and consequently, Buddhism. Therefore, the latter was integrated into official rhetoric to show that Buddhism and Marxism share a similar vision of the world, i.e. an ideal of social progress (Stuart-Fox and Bucknell 1982; Stuart-Fox 1996: 65).

As the Pathet Lao increased the use of the Sangha to establish its ideology, it gradually imposed its own vision of Buddhism and how it should be practiced in the country. The Pathet Lao government then had two expectations: on the one hand, to radically establish a break with "ancient" Buddhism (many of whose rituals were linked to royalty), and on the other hand, to reject anything that could hinder the constitution of a socialist and "modern" nation (e.g., to purge things in the Buddhist religious field related to beliefs in supernatural entities in order to establish a national religion free of all elements perceived as irrational). On 30 June 1976, the National League of Lao Buddhists made the following statement: "In the social field, the Association will defend all fine customs and habits of the people and the good morality of religions, while eliminating superstitious practices and all other social evils left behind [by] the old regime (...) The spread of Buddhist morality must accord with the line and policies of the Laos People's Revolutionary Party ..." (Evans 1998: 61). Even

before the integration, the form that Buddhism would take was first revised and transformed by the new leaders of the country. Teachings delivered by the monks to the laity were changed to reflect communist ideals, and religious ceremonies were tightly controlled. In addition, in order to avoid jeopardizing the establishment of a "modern" and scientific socialist nation, the communist state rejected anything related to beliefs in spirits (*phi*).

The attitude of the ruling communist party towards Buddhism softened somewhat after the economic reforms of 1986. This situation has gradually evolved with, on the one hand, the need to build a unified national history and culture (in a country known for its great ethnic diversity and divided by war) and, on the other hand, with the imperative for party elites to build legitimacy based on this history and culture, conceived as that of the Lao majority ethnic group — of which Buddhism is one of the characteristics (Evans 1998, 2002). For the last two decades, Buddhism has been given a prominent place in the Lao PDR's policy regarding religions. Although the government does not recognize a state religion, its provision of financial support and promotion of Buddhism, along with its willingness to exempt Buddhist groups from a number of restrictions, has given the religion an elevated status — at least until the promotion of a new decree in 2016[2]. Kaysone Phomvihane, the party's central committee president (1992), stated: "Buddhism contributed the greatest benefit for the preservation and the development of the national culture"[3]. Similarly, Grant Evans observed that in the Constitution enacted in 1991, "the profile of Buddhism was also upgraded from one religion among others, to being the one specific religion named in the documents" (Evans 1998: 65). This more tolerant

[2] A 2016 decree with the stated intent of clarifying rules for religious practice extended registration requirements to Buddhist groups, which had previously enjoyed a de facto exemption, and defined the government's role as the final arbiter of permissible religious activities.

[3] In Maha Khampheuy Vannasopha, *Religious Affairs in Lao P.D.R.: Policies and Tasks*. Vientiane: Department of Religious Affairs, Lao Front for National Construction, Central Committee, 2005.

attitude was evident in through increased participation and visible support of Buddhism by the party cadres, including demonstrating devotion during Buddhist ceremonies; conspicuous religious patronage of Buddhist activities (Evans 1998); the integration of several Buddhist festivals as national holidays; and erection by the state of Buddhist stupas (*that*) in each provincial capital as national landmarks[4].

A Different Challenge for the State vis-à-vis Religious Diversity

While the government had to swiftly deal with the country's extensive ethnic diversity, it found itself facing a dilemma: it needed to recognize the cultural diversity of the country's populations, find cultural unity and forbid the development of "superstitions". While the scattering of the various ethnic minorities across the territory never led to indigenous or territorial claims, it was different for religion. Several insurrections led by charismatic leaders between the end of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth succeeded in unifying different villages and sometimes different ethnic groups. All were religion-based messianic or millenarian movements, such as the Khmu unified rebellion at the end of the nineteenth century (Proschan 1998), the Hmong millenarian rebellions[5], and the anti-colonial multi-ethnic millenarian movements in southern Laos on the Bolaven Plateau (Baird 2013; Gay 1989). Although the Lao PDR Constitution ensures the right of Laotians to believe or not to believe in a religion, and the right to choose a religion, all religious activities remain under the strict control of the Central Committee of the Lao Front for National Construction and, since 2016, the Ministry of Home Affairs.

[4] The 2016 decree states the government may continue to sponsor Buddhist facilities, incorporate Buddhist rituals and ceremonies in state functions, and promote Buddhism as an element of the country's cultural and spiritual identity and as the predominant religion of the country.

[5] The Hmong messianic movements occurred not only in Laos, but also in Vietnam and Thailand (Culas 2005).

Religion is indeed identified as a possible threat to the Lao state, as it is the most likely channel for two 'evils': superstition and division.

The reforms aimed at purifying Buddhism, mentioned above, first of all addressed what were considered to be superstitions: beliefs in spirits, worship of territorial spirits, cults addressed to ancestors inside people's homes, and sacrifices to spirits, etc. These are all the different elements which are part of the religions of non-Buddhist ethnic groups. Therefore, they were stigmatized as irrational, backward and even stupid. These reforms led to purges, particularly among Buddhist minorities (such as the Phounoy), where monks from the capital came to burn altars to the ancestors and the paraphernalia of shamans (Bouté 2018). Similar measures were taken with other non-Buddhist minorities at the bidding of the local authorities: in Phongsaly province, the Khmu's spirit altars were also destroyed; in Luang Namtha province in the 1980s, mountain worship officiants were sent to re-education camps for a few days after celebrating village rites to the spirit of the mountain[6]; in the south, the Katu were forbidden to perform large, lavish buffalo sacrifices (Goudineau 1997*a*).

Nowadays, beliefs in spirits, even if they are no longer directly attacked, remain stigmatized. This is illustrated, for example, in documents produced for provincial officials by the Ministry of Information and Culture to label villages as "cultural villages" (*ban vatthanatam*). Encouraging the promotion of good behaviour and good culture, the brochure puts forward several criteria: good moral behaviour (no divorces, no single mothers, etc.), impeccable cleanliness of the village area, and the rejection of "superstitions". This latter criterion was left to the discretion of provincial and local authorities. In 2017, in Phongsaly province, I asked about villages that could be labelled "cultural villages", and I mentioned the name of this or that village. Then, the authorities replied, embarrassed: "Ah no, these people are practising shifting cultivation, it's a sign

[6] Interviews conducted in Ban Nateuil, Luang Namtha province, November 2012.

of backwardness"; "In this one, the inhabitants still believe in spirits. They cannot be cultural villages". In fact, the only ten villages in the province to have been labelled "cultural" were Buddhist villages practising irrigated rice cultivation on the plain.

The government strongly emphasized another problem potentially caused by religion: the risk of dividing the nation. *De facto*, Article 9 of the Constitution discourages all acts that create divisions between religious groups and persons. It urges awareness of enemy strategies taking advantage of religious affairs in order to oppose the current government regime (Maha Khampheuy 2005: 22). The government has interpreted this clause to justify restrictions on religious practice by all religious groups, including the Buddhist majority and animists[7]. Even if it is not mentioned specifically, these provisions also target Christianity and, more particularly, the numerous evangelical churches[8]. The party's stance led authorities, notably at local levels, to intervene in activities of minority religious groups, especially Protestants, on the grounds that their practices disrupted the community. Several documents report occasional displays of intolerance towards minority religious groups, again notably the Protestants, such as eviction from villages, conflicts between ethnic groups, forced relocation to new areas, arrests and detentions[9].

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[7] We can find other examples in the Constitution such as: "some religious workers have infringed on the rules and laws of the Lao PDR, creating sabotage and destroying harmony among Lao ethnic people" (Instructions of the President of the Lao Front for National Construction 2002), or, "they are wrongful people (…) who use religion as a tool to oppose and destroy our new regime as well as government and party policies" (Instructions of the Central Committee of the Lao Front for National Construction on Registration and Formulation of Religious Organization, Sect and Religious Committees in Lao PDR 2004). This is a very similar vision to that of neighbouring Vietnam: in 2003, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) produced yet another Resolution (No. 25) on government administration over religious organizations: "The government guarantees respect for religious freedom and the realization that religion and faith can fulfill the spiritual needs of the people", adding in Article 8: "Any using or abusing (*loi dung*) of religious worships for the purposes of creating superstition and other unlawful activities are strictly prohibited".

[8] Only the Evangelical Church and the Seventh-day Adventist Church are registered.

[9] See Foreign & Commonwealth Office (2016); US Department of State (2017).

A tangible sign of this urge to control is that, despite the extensive diversity of religious and spiritual practices in the country, only five religions are officially recognized: Buddhism (according to the 2015 National Census, 64.7 percent of the population is Buddhist. Buddhism is also presented in the Ministry of Home Affairs report as a "national and indigenous religion linked to the national unity"). Then there are three religions which are presented as "foreign religions": Bahai is a small community of 800 persons based in three cities of the country; Islam has approximately 1600 adherents, the vast majority of whom are foreign permanent residents of South Asian or Cambodian (ethnic Cham) origin, and Christianity. This last category includes Catholics (45,000 persons) and Protestants (67,000)—the latter rapidly grew during the last decade, and Lao Evangelical Church officials now estimate that Protestants number as many as 100,000. The fifth category was first called "Others" in the 2005 Census, noting that "animism was not regarded as a religion". This category was revised in the 2015 Census as "*bo thue satsana/seua thue phi lue banpha bulut*", i.e. "those who don't believe in religion/believe in spirits or spirits of ancestors". It is more commonly used in the provincial census and among the population under the unregistered name of *satsana phi* (spirit cults)[10]. This latest category indiscriminately includes the very diverse religious practices of one-third of the population of the country. As with Buddhism, these spirit cults are considered local and indigenous practices.

[10] This is a Lao term that consists of the aggregation of the word *satsana* (religion initially referring to Buddhism) and "spirits".

Table P2.9 Total Population by Sex and Religion

Religion	Population			Percent		
	Total	Female	Male	Total	Female	Male
Total	6,492,228	3,237,458	3,254,770	100.0	100.0	100.0
Buddhist	4,201,993	2,104,718	2,097,275	64.7	65.0	64.4
Christian	112,230	56,403	55,827	1.7	1.7	1.7
Bahai	2,122	943	1,179	*	*	*
Islam	1,605	749	856	*	*	*
Other	19,901	8,279	11,622	0.3	0.3	0.4
No religion	2,040,365	1,009,893	1,030,472	31.4	31.2	31.7
Not stated	114,012	56,473	57,539	1.8	1.7	1.8

Table 1 The five religions officially recognized by the Lao State.
《No religion》 = in the Lao Language Version of the Census: ບ່ຖືສາສະຫນາ/ເຊື່ອຖືຜີ ຫຼືບັນພະບຸລຸດ "Those who don't believe in religion/believe in spirits or spirits of ancestors". (Source: Steering Committee for Census of Population and Housing, 2016)

Collusion between Ethnic Traditions and Religions: A Way for the State to Gain Control?

The state seems to face several contradictions. While it aspires to build a national culture based on ethnic Lao customs and therefore on Buddhism, it also aims to promote multi-ethnicity and protect the traditions of all ethnic groups. Advertising the diversity of ethnic groups' cultures, the state puts limitations on their religious practices. This leads to a legitimate question: How does the state manage the "ethnic religions" (spirit cults) which are representative of almost 40 percent of the population?

As Goudineau (2015) has shown, the discourse on multi-ethnicity has not fundamentally changed, but its form has evolved over recent years in Laos. Never before has so much importance been officially given to the cultural heritage of minority groups. Officials at the district level are required to "present" their local traditions. In addition, increasing numbers of villagers are mobilized to show their own "ethnic characteristics" in new festivals or on new

‘”stages”, and foreign experts — who were mistrusted before — are now invited to share their knowledge of specific groups or to participate in the creation of museums in the provinces (ibid.: 43).

Pic.2 National Day Celebration, Phongsaly Province, Dec. 2018. The inhabitants of the province were invited to dress in the emblematic clothes of “their” ethnic group and to make a parade, representing the ethnic diversity of the province, for the celebration of the national day. A woman, at the head of each group, carries a sign with the name of the ethnic group.

The religious festivals of some ethnic groups have been included in this cultural exhibition. By virtue of the principle of equal treatment of all ethnic groups, and at the request of high-ranking military ethnic officers in particular, the two most populous groups, the Khmu and the Hmong (who are also depicted—with ethnic Lao—as emblematic of the multi-ethnic nature of the nation), have each been granted an emblematic festival modelled on the Lao

New Year (*Pimay*). This acknowledgement has been extended to other minorities, and now every official provincial radio and TV station covers all regionally associated "New Year" celebrations[11].

Interestingly, in reality, officially recognized 'ethnic' festivals do not resemble what people used to do in the past; they have been cleansed of their devotional and spiritual content. From household or lineage ceremonies, they became—according to the state vision—collective and village festivals. They mainly consist of the promotion of beautiful costumes and 'nice traditions' and the celebration of the perpetuation of a reinvented normative tradition. An indicative key of this 'folklorization', and especially of this forced hybridization of tradition and religion, is the new term invented by the Ministry of Home Affairs in 2016 to replace the category 'spirit cults': *satsana hitkong* (religion-tradition).

I argue that the effect and/or objective of this policy of "culturalization" of local ethnic religions is to rid them of the devotional aspects that were once manifested in collective rites addressed to local spirits. Everything has been done to eliminate practices that might help federate a group, with forms of "localisms" being perceived as competitive and dangerous to state legitimacy and national unity. This is reminiscent of similar forms of repression carried out by the rulers of the small Sipsong Panna (now southern Yunnan) kingdom in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries against village cults, as they viewed them as competing with territorial cults (e.g. *phi müang*)[12]. In another way, too, we can relate this situation to what Mendelson (1963) pointed out about the history of Burma: when Buddhism is strong, spirit worship is weakened—partly because

[11] A similar shift has been analysed by Malarney (2002) in Vietnam where a number of ceremonies and rituals, once stigmatized as superstition, are increasingly tolerated as long as they are not perceived as disruptive or politically subversive. Malarney emphasizes several reasons for this shift, one being the authorities' deep concerns about the detrimental impact of Western culture to which many Vietnamese are increasingly exposed. (In some ethnic minority areas, there are parallel efforts to promote traditional culture as a bulwark against the encroachment of evangelical Christianity.)

[12] See Tanabe 1988.

of repressive measures; Buddhism accompanies a powerful centralized monarchy, while animism coincides with the triumph of local forces and rebellion. Similarly, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the King of Thailand launched reform movements aimed at integrating the Tai Yuan people in the north of the country, which until then enjoyed great autonomy; these measures are said to have been based on a desire to reduce local religious practices, potentially linked to secessionist intentions that would call into question the unity of the country and royal power (Keyes 1971).

There is thus a permanent feature in the articulation between state and centralized/local powers and Buddhism/spiritual cults that transcends the case of the particular relationship of the Laotian party-state to religions. How does this articulation between state power and authority and local religions and traditions translate on the scale of a multi-ethnic province of northern Laos?

III. Local Response to this Religion-Tradition Link Driven by the State

While Laos was originally portrayed as a rural, mountainous country where individual ethnic groups lived in separate villages, Laotian provinces today are increasingly characterized differently. Laos is experiencing growing urbanization due to forced displacements of mountain populations towards the plains and the roads (Goudineau 1997*b*), imposed and binding agrarian policies (Baird and Evrard 2017), and the development of trade and increased wealth of a middle class. As mono-ethnic villages shrink, multi-ethnic small towns and provincial capitals are growing as a result of rural-urban migrations (Bouté 2017).

How is the religious coexistence of different groups developing in this context? Is this religious heterogeneity a potential factor in challenging the

hegemonic authority of the state which attempts, as noted previously, to keep all this under control? To answer this question, we consider three different groups that are perceived as ‘ethnic minorities’—the Khmu, the Phounoy and the Ho—located in the provincial capital of Phongsaly province, in northern Laos[13]. I will present how these three groups respond differently to this state-enforced hybridization of tradition and religion[14].

Pic.3 The provincial capital of Phongsaly province on heights of the mountain (1400m), Northern Laos, home to members from three "ethnic minorities"—the Khmu, the Phounoy and the Ho. Photo by V. Bouté.

[13] This province is bordered by China and Vietnam, and there are very few ethnic Lao.

[14] I would like to point out that I have observed a similar configuration to the one described here in other small cross-border towns where I have conducted surveys previously, such as the town of Nateuil, 20 kilometers from the Chinese border in Luang Namtha province, or the main town of Boun Tay district.

The Khmu: An Oscillation between Integration into the State and Contesting the State

The Khmu are a Mon-Khmer-speaking population of some 700,000 persons—the largest one in Laos after the ethnic Lao—living mostly in northern and central Laos. Those living in Phongsaly city are mostly employed by the army. In rural areas, before they joined the army and left to live in the city, the Khmu had a ritual cycle focused on rice culture and dedicated to territorial spirits (mountain spirits, village spirits, cemetery spirits, etc.) with specialized and sometimes hereditary officiants.

When I inquired about religion and rituals among the urban Khmu in Phongsaly, I discovered that little remained of their "*satsana hitkong*" (religion-tradition), especially for the growing majority who had never experienced village life. Former rituals were linked to places (mountains, rice fields) as well as to a specific community (the village) and to cultural practices (tending rice fields) which did not exist in the urban context. Some of the oldest people emphasized the incompatibility of traditional animist beliefs with modern conditions. For instance, due to the road, the ritual for the village cloistering is no longer possible, nor can traditional funerals be carried out because the cemetery is shared with other groups with different beliefs. When I asked about what remained of "Khmu traditions or customs" in this context, people had very little to say. They could only speak about their annual festival, Boun Greu, officially recognized by the state and the other ethnic groups in town. The younger people couldn't offer any example of Khmu traditions and mocked them as an ethnic group without "traditions". Some high-ranking, ethnic Khmu-origin members of the provincial government tried to increase the visibility of their own group by making the Boun Greu festival a more consequential event. The effort failed as the initiators could not generate sufficient support from the Khmu population, because they faced difficulties rallying people around a common definition of the Khmu tradition.

Pic.4 Boun Greu Festival organized by "Sensaly Guest House" in Phongsaly Province 2019 (the owner invites her friends, Khmu, Ho and Phounoy to celebrate and wear ethnic Khmu clothes (@Cortesy: Seng)

In this context, two tendencies related to religious conversion emerge among the Khmu. The first is a tendency to occasionally join the pagoda for practical reasons (for instance, for the cremation of the deceased; cemeteries do not exist in urban places, and the crematorium is the property of the Buddhist pagoda) and social motives. This Khmu-Buddhist conversion does generate generational conflict between, on the one hand, the older Khmu—who still say they believe in the "religion of the spirits"—and the younger ones who want to join the pagoda and the "religion of the Buddha" (because everybody is going). As the majority of converts do not master the Buddhist models, codes and rules, they are considered by other Buddhist ethnic groups in the city—the Phounoy, the Tai Lue—as second-rate Buddhists[15]. Note that the Khmu conversion to Buddhism is strongly endorsed by the state, which also encourages monks to

[15] This observation is also noted by other scholars among ethnic minorities in Thailand. Kammerer (1990), for instance, observed that among the Akha in Thailand, conversion to the Protestant religion was chosen primarily to avoid being 'second-rate' Buddhists.

teach Buddhism to Lao ethnic groups. Van, a middle-aged Khmu woman working as a hairdresser, explained, for instance:

> "They explained us that when one is Buddhist (*phut*), one should not believe in spirits; but when one belongs to spirits religion (*satsana phi*), one can believe in Buddhism; that's new. Buddhism is a good religion, right? It's followed in the whole country".

The second tendency is Protestant conversion, which is increasing among the Khmu in the neighbouring provinces of Luang Prabang, Luang Namtha and Oudomxay, as well as across the whole country, where most Protestants are members of ethnic Mon-Khmer groups (US Department of State 2017). As Keyes (1996) and Salemink (2009) noted, this is a widespread phenomenon in continental South East Asia among those groups where "the practice of localized animistic religions is markedly disjunctive with the world in which they now live" (Keyes 1996: 288)[16]. Protestant conversion, then, becomes a form of "modernization". Through the alliance with a major world religion that is different from the dominant religion of the nation or state, ethnic difference is still expressed, but without inferiority.

But unlike the cases pointed out by Salemink (2009: 47), where "Christian conversion can be seen as marking difference without breaking off contact", here the conversion works as a point of rupture with the state. Converts cannot ignore that they have adopted a religion which is considered 'foreign', to which the Lao state is strongly opposed (as noted above), and of which a negative vision has been widely spread through national rhetoric including: "We already have a religion, Buddhism is good enough", or, "We do not want people to take religion from another country".

[16] But the same observation can be made elsewhere. HSIEH Shih-chung (1987) thus noted that in Taiwan the aborigines' almost universal belief in Christianity could be seen "as a means of releasing long-term anxiety about Han domination and of coping with the impact of the Han civilization" (*op. cit.* in HSIEH 1995: 323, footnote 17).

The Phounoy: Mirroring the Power through Religion

A Tibeto-Burmese-speaking group of nearly 40,000, the Phounoy emerged as an ethnic community during the eighteenth century by constructing a privileged "mirroring" relationship with the various Tai and Lao realms dominating the region. As guardians of the borders and allies of the colonial authorities administering Phongsaly province, they became crucial allies of the communist administration and eventually took control of key positions in local administration. They securely established themselves as indispensable intermediaries between state power and the other mountain ethnic groups (Bouté 2018).

Another characteristic distinguishes the Phounoy from other non-Tai ethnic groups in Laos: they are Buddhists, and have been for quite a long time. Their Buddhist ways of performing ceremonies, as well as the rules for monks, were directly inspired by their Tai Lue neighbours[17]. In Phounoy villages, Buddhism was closely associated with—as is the case in ethnic Lao villages—spirit cults addressed to the rice and territorial spirits. The purges carried out in the 1960s to purify Buddhism of superstitions resulted in the disappearance of devotions made to territorial spirits, or to ancestors in homes.

However, though most Phounoy now living in urban settings, unlike the Khmu, they maintain a strong identity of tradition. Being the largest Buddhist population in the province, Buddhism is closely associated with them at the local level (a panel detailing Phounoy history is located at the provincial stupa). The Phounoy themselves finance the construction of new pagodas, supply them with monks, and thereby establish their prestige.

[17] The Tai Lue are a Lao-Tai-speaking population, located mainly in Sipsong Panna in Yunnan province. Like the Lao and the Thai (in Thailand), they were organized in principalities. Those living in Phongsaly province were, until the end of the nineteenth century, part of the twelve Panna principalities.

Over the past few years and in this context, Phounoy ethnic songs and costumes—which were previously only used during provincial cultural or political festivals to highlight the multi-ethnicity of the province—have been introduced "offstage" into Buddhist ceremonies. The Phounoy wear their ethnic costumes during individual or family Buddhist temple events, such as ceremonies for the deceased or rituals to expel individual misfortunes or increase lifespan, etc. Instead of the spread of a standardized Buddhist way of practising coming from the capital Vientiane, one can observe an upholding of the old Phounoy—and also Tai Lue—way of performing ceremonies, different from the ethnic Lao practices.

Pic.5 Buddhist Ceremony among the Phounoy in Honour of the Deceased, February 2019. Women and men now wear black clothes with red borders - an innovation based on a traditional costume that had not been worn for about 30 years. Photo by V. Bouté.

Here, playing the game of integration into nation-state through an old, strong commitment to religion seems at first sight to be a strategy which pays off for the Phounoy. At the provincial level, as well as in other northern provinces, the adoption of Buddhism allows the Phounoy to assert local practices of this "national" religion; being at the heart of the organization of Buddhist ceremonies in places where they are the majority offers them greater ethnic visibility. Additionally, it gives them a way of showing "their" great traditions embodied in various Buddhist festivals—unlike other provincial ethnic groups who are only allowed to express their "ethnic" identity on a yearly basis.

However, does this strategy really strengthen the group's ethnic identity? According to the National Census, between 1995 and 2015, 25 percent of the Phounoy people did not register under the ethnic category "Phounoy". Given that a quarter of the group has thus merged into the ethnic Lao population, the state's goal of integration is being realized even in this case.

The Ho: Towards a Transnational Religion: Escaping the State?

The Ho, with a population of 12,000, are the third largest ethnic group in Phongsaly's capital (after the Phounoy and the Khmu). The Ho were originally Han peasants who, fleeing from wars in Yunnan in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, settled in Phongsaly province. Some joined a small Phounoy village in the beginning of the twentieth century and, as a result, the two groups were the first inhabitants of what became the capital of the fifth military territory administered by the French. They also founded other villages where they lived mainly from cattle breeding, peddling, and until the early 2000s, from poppy cultivation. In official statistics, they constitute their own ethnic category, i.e. they are clearly distinguished from the Chinese, and they account for one of the forty-nine officially registered ethnic groups.

Among the Ho were former Chinese dignitaries and officials who, in Phongsaly, became public figures notable for their acute sense of business and trade both within the city and across the province. Several waves of migration eventually dispersed the group throughout the country and abroad. The first migration occurred after the communist takeover of Laos in 1975, when many Ho fled to America, Australia and Macau (China); the second wave occurred in the late 1990s with the state prohibition on opium production. Gradually, investments of opium money and expanding trade in the country's major cities led to their relocation to Vientiane (near the old Chinese district) as well as to major northern cities (Luang Prabang, Oudomxay), where they developed trade with Chinese companies. The Ho, who speak a dialect very close to Mandarin Chinese, have largely benefited from the opening of Laos to China and cross-border trade.

In the current urban context, where religious minorities (*satsana phi* and Christians) tend to maintain a low profile if they do not fully abandon their ritual practices—because those practices are devalued, folklorized, or simply cannot be maintained in an urban and multi-ethnic context—the Ho are an exception.

The Ho are not Buddhists. In Lao language, they say they belong to the "*satsana phi*" category. Unlike other non-Buddhist minorities in the country, they are the only ones (along with the Hmong and Yao, other largely "sinicized" groups) to possess a script using Chinese ideograms. The cycle of Ho ritual ceremonies is not related to the agrarian or livestock cycle, but instead, to ancestors (and to trade). There is no institutionalized priest, and ritual practices are performed within individual households; therefore, migration did not affect Ho ritual practices.

On the contrary, with the growth of cross-border trade, we can observe a revival of Ho rituals in urban locations. Household rites have gain more visibility. For example, the Ho temple (*miaofang*) has been enlarged and embellished with Ho emigrants' money and family altars are clearly visible from the street. Neighbouring China's influence is apparent in this process on all levels. When ritual

elements are missing or forgotten, the Ho consult the Chinese rites on YouTube; there is an abundance of New Year's "Chinese" costumes (purchased over the border), and above all, an increasing interest in participating in this transnational 'great religion' practised by the Chinese of South East Asia, China and beyond.

Pic.6 Above: Ho's New Year Celebrations, February 5, 2019. Below: left, the Ho temple (miaofang); right: a house decorated for the New Year. All elements (clothes, temple, Chinese characters) were much less visible in the public space twenty years ago. Photo by V. Bouté.

This link with the transnational community is manifested on the occasion of the Chinese New Year with increasing demands on members of the community at the transnational level to donate and participate[18]. This is similar to Jean DeBernardi's (1994: 138) description of the Chinese folk religion in Penang. The practices of Chinese folk religion are shown to be not simply remnants of a once coherent Chinese religious culture, but "a central means to the Chinese community's awareness of its own history and identity and an opposition to the Malay-dominated Malaysian state's attempts to establish Malay culture as the basis for a new Malaysian cultural tradition".

IV. Conclusion

The idea that Western theories of modernization adopted by rulers of the new nation states of South East Asia would lead to an increased secularism had prevailed among scholars and policymakers for a long time. The collective book edited by Keyes, Hardacre and Kendall (1994) provided some interesting first answers, arguing, on the contrary, that "as these states have modernized, religion has become more, not less, significant" (1994: 3).

The dialectic between religion and the state has, until recently, been a national affair, internal to each country. In contemporary times, secular governments such as the Lao PDR co-opt religion (or, more accurately, those aspects of religion of which they approve) in the interests of nation-building. Religion, in other words, often becomes a major ingredient in the construction of a new national identity. This desire for control through religion results in the potential for minority religions to be perceived as threats to power. In Theravada Buddhist countries, many observers have noted—from ancient times to the twentieth century—how Buddhist monarchs and former nation states attempted

[18] In 2020 all the Ho originating from Phongsaly, and their descendants who had settled in the USA or Australia, Macau, etc., were invited to return for the New Year celebration.

to suppress the threat posed by 'spirit cults' (Mendelson 1963, Tanabe 1988) or the "supernatural" (Jackson 1989)[19], because of their local (versus national) influence and power. More recently, the Lao state has abandoned trying to ban local religions, but has increased its control over them through the staging of their public manifestations and removal of their devotional content by extending folklore from the category "spirit cults" to "religion-tradition".

But today, in continental South East Asia, increasingly the threats posed by religion to the state no longer originate at the local level; now powerful transnational religions threaten national governance. In Laos' case, the dominant religion is tightly linked with the state at the national level, while 'minority religions' prove to be increasingly connected to transnational networks. Supra-national religious identity (for example, adherence to Christianity) renders state co-option more problematic than in the case of nationally organized religious traditions such as Buddhism or "*satsana phi*". This is evidenced by the Ho, who increasingly engage with Chinese religiosity, and in the Khmus' conversion to Christianity. The first example serves to demonstrate that groups have more room to negotiate with the state about the representation or evolution of their cultures if they are less isolated, involved in cross-border relationships, or are linked to diasporas. The case of the Christian Khmu—quite the reverse of the Phounoy, for whom 'religion' means integration—illustrates, on the contrary, how conversion to a transnational religion can be perceived, both by the converts and by the state, as a major break with national identity.

Modernization has thus created a certain tension among ethnic, national and religious identities. This tension arises, in part, from the often-competing

[19] "That is, because of its individualistic emphasis on personal protective power. Thai supernaturalism is seen as undermining the collective or community identity nurtured by participation in the national Buddhist church. As indicated by Sophanakhanaphorn's reference to 'the nation' and 'religion' above, supernaturalism is regarded as weakening the authority of Buddhism and as threatening its legitimatory function in Thai society" (Jackson 1989: 58).

efforts of both secular and religious institutions by both the state and those opposed to the state, to define the collective, resulting in a politics of ritual displacement. As Palinkas (1997: 194) noted, “the politics of ritual displacement also provide an arena in which the local and the transnational are brought together to shape modern ethnic and religious identities”. At the heart of this phenomenon is the contest for ritual space and control over how ritual practice is represented.

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專題論文

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Really Need a Temple? The Lue as Flexible Buddhists

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Abstract

Both scholars and tourists may imagine that people can find temples everywhere in the Buddhist Tai world. Yet, in the process of practicing beliefs, do we assume that if there is no temple then there are no Buddhists? In this work, I take the Tai-Lue people who live in Sipsong Panna (PR China), the homeland, Lao-Lue who are traditional residents in northern Laos, some of whom had settled in Seattle, Washington State, USA since the end of Indo-China war, and the female immigrants in Taiwan as subjects to study the relationships between Lue Buddhists and the temple. No one might doubt that they were still Buddhists since in the long run their life with temples had been disappeared in public sphere. But what and how did people do to be Buddhists without temples around in daily life for so many years for those different Lues? People instead

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collected carefully monks' photos and other relevant things at home. As the Paiyi or Burmese/Myanmar Lue do in Taiwan, the Lao-Lue in Seattle and some in homeland adopted any possible strategies to find photos of holy men, then hold tightly in their hands. Those pictures to me are critical emblems of Lue ethnicity and religious identity for the members who are mostly out of the homeland of Laos. The deep belief of existence of a holy man or *phuu mii bun* seems to be the most critical element for a Lue to be true Buddhist. Temple-based Buddhism is what I call "unstable institutional ownership of Buddhism" and holy-man-based Buddhism, I suggest, is a "stable close-fitting ownership of Buddhism". Theoretically a temple building should be stable and an easily broken photo is unstable. However, in Lue's situation the religion-scape is totally upside down. Flexible reality of Lue Buddhism indeed fully tells the people's past and present.

Keywords: Lue People, Theravada Temple, Photo of Holy Monk, Unstable Institutional Ownership of Buddhism, Stable Close-fitting Ownership of Buddhism, Flexible Buddhist

I. Introduction

One cannot imagine that an anthropologist or a tourist who visits any Buddhist Tai cultural area such as Thailand, Laos, Shan State of Myanmar, Xishuangbanna (Sipsong Panna) and Dehong Yunnan, China unconsciously would neglect religious attention during an exciting exotic journey. In other words, almost all fieldworkers under long-term participant observation and short-term visits must pay attention to Buddhist matters in contacting various *Tai* peoples. Except for some Tai-speaking animistically-oriented groups, e.g., the Zhuang, the Shui, the Buyi, and the Li in southern China, and Tai Dam and Tai Daeng in northern Laos, the majority of Tai peoples have been defined or stereotyped as enveloped in a Buddhist world.

Common sense indicates that the Tai people are devout Buddhists. Tour books emphasize such a point, and a valuable work entitled *Religious Tradition among Tai Ethnic Groups* edited by well-known anthropologist Shigeharu Tanabe in 1991 reminds us of abundant academic contributions on Theravada Buddhism for many years. Academic interests continue to expand into the following fields: Buddhism and gender (see e.g. Andaya 2002, Keyes 1984, Ockey 1999, Kirsch 1996, Mills 1995, Van Esterik 1996), Buddhists and nation-state (see e.g. Taylor 1993, Keyes 1995[1977]&1977, Cohen 1991), Buddhism and societal practice (see e.g. Jackson 1999, O' Connor 1993, Schober 1995), Buddhism vs alien beliefs (see e.g. Keyes 1993&1996), and analysis of phenomena of holy men (see e.g. Cohen 2001, Jackson 1999).

However, when we on the one hand celebrate the successful development of religious research in the Tai world, while on the other hand comfortably accept a description of "The Tai are Buddhists" as commonsensical, do we really think if a Tai Buddhist "thinks" himself as a true Buddhist? I am asking if a Tai Buddhist is still a Buddhist when he has been out of his homeland such as Thailand, Lao, or Sipsong Panna? More correctly to enquire, we, including

scholars and tourists, find temples everywhere in the Buddhist Tai world, then people may directly consider the crucial position of the temple which is a very splendid architecture in comparison to other common houses in neighborhood. Yet in the process of practicing beliefs, do we assume that if there is no temple then there are no Buddhists? Does a Tai Buddhist need to stay near a temple in order to making himself be a full-time believer? Does it mean he must be able to see the temple daily and conduct religious activities regularly because he is a Buddhist? In this work, I am going to take the *Tai-Lue* people who live in *Sipsong Panna* (PR China), the homeland, *Lao-Lue* who are traditional residents in northern Laos, some of whom had settled in Seattle, Washington State, USA since the end of Indo-China war, and the female immigrants in Taiwan as subjects to study the relationships between *Lue* Buddhists and the temple. Using several examples of Burmese-*Lue* who immigrated to Taiwan, I discuss whether or not there is a temple may not be a key element for a *Lue* Buddhist to affirm his status of true believer. And both American-*Lue* and Lao-*Lue* in their religious life confirm the same interpretive conclusion as well. There are some other elements which stands at a critical position for stabilizing the connection between Buddhism and the Buddhist.

II. Temples Re-opened: Buddhism Resurgence among *Sipsong Panna Lue*

When the newly-founded People's Republic of China (PRC) initiated a nation-wide project of investigating non-Han minority peoples in late 1950s and earlier 1960s, the religious sphere was always one of the aspects of culture that the socialist scholars focused on the most. The Communist investigators not only wished to know the religious expenses among commoners in daily life in order to find out the condition of class oppression, but also attempted to grasp the general phenomena of practicing supernatural belief. The Sipsong Panna Lue

or Tai (Dai)-Lue without question attracted their full attention because of the people's evident Buddhist culture.

JIANG Yingliang, a famous historian on Tai-speaking groups who had served as active magistrate in Sipsong Panna area in the ROC era, had mentioned (1984:529),

> "The Tai call temple 'vat', or also known as 'tsuang' or 'mianshi' (Burmese temple). In Tai area, every village has one temple, the bigger village may own several temples. Even for the tiny village where only 20 or 30 households exist, you still can find a temple inside territory".

Counting the number of temples and their major function might become a preliminary duty among those socialist investigators when reaching Sipsong Panna if what Jiang observed was true. Some statistics thus have been proposed. DAO Yongming and CAO Chengchang said that according to statistics during the earlier time of national emancipation, there were 574 Buddhist temples, 41 high-ranking *khubas* (senior and leading monks), 889 abbots, and 5,560 monks in the entire Sipsong Panna area and almost all villages had their own temples (1962: 115). WANG Yizhi had more detailed information. For easier understanding, I use a table to indicate his accounting of temples and monks in Sipsong-Panna (Xishuangbanna) in 1957 (1990:414).

	Temples	Abbots	Monks
Menghai county	269	470	2861
Jinghong County	208	321	2254
Mengla County	117	243	1531
Entire Xishuangbanna	594	1034	6561

This number, i.e., totally 594 temples, is a little greater than the previous one, i.e., totally 574 temples. We can assume a number of 600 might be the upper

limit. And it may reflect the fact of continuing development of Theravada Buddhism even in the early years under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime, especially for the time before MAO Zedong's strict reform. However, my purpose is not to study religious change among the Lue under the first 10 years of the CCP regime. I want to emphasize that almost all scholars who arrived in Sipsong Panna world had tried hard to express their understanding of the explicit cultural items of Buddhism. And the most critical evidence for them would be things such as each village having at least one temple and there being a huge number of temples and monks in the whole of Sipsong Panna territory. The temple is certainly very important in Lue people's traditional life, so when MAO's Cultural Revolution had been put in practice, those religious building were definitely one main target of attack.

Temples were shut down and became storage houses for nearly 20 years (Pic.1). In earlier 80s when the government began to change its policy toward opening to the world under DENG Xiaoping's leading ideology of de-Maoism, religion was theoretically acceptable. The priority for the Tais was to regain Buddhism among the Lue by re-opening temples, re-build Buddha statues, and recruit monks from neighboring Buddhist countries such as Thailand and Burma or from local community into temples. Georges Condominas points out that in Sipsong Phannaa [Sipsong Panna] "the vat is both the symbol and the centre of the rural collectivity" (1987: 448), therefore it is not surprising to see the Lue to build vat very fast everywhere within the territory of their former petty kingdom. Condominas suggests that "Of course there are some strictly religious motives in this rush for collective efforts of building temples,….But I think that the need to keep their ethnic identity had become at that time a necessity for Dai Lu communities,… [B]uilding monasteries was a way of reinforcing in the most emphatic way what remained of their cultural identity" (Condominas ibid: 449).

Pic.1 The main temple of Menghai area in Xishuangbanna, Yunnan, China. Used as a warehouse under the MAO's rule. Photo by HSIEH-LEE Saalih, 1998/01/15.

I had contended that Buddhism might not be the most significant symbol of Lue ethnicity due to the fact that the hill-dwelling Bulang, an Austroasiatic speaking group in Sipsong Panna, are Buddhist as well (HSIEH 1989). The critical ethnic marker, I maintain, should be the memory of "good old days"—a long-lasting historical Lue kingdom as Michael Moremen had discussed in his classical article entitled Ethnic Identification in a "Complex Civilization: Who are the Lue?" (Moreman 1965). A symbol of cultural identity is not the same as key element for maintaining ethnic identity; however it expresses the meaningful position of vat or temple in the process of keeping Buddhism beliefs alive. In other words, cultural identity is the same as religious identity and what can be adopted to stand for Buddhism is the temple or monastery. That is also the reason why the Lue eagerly looked forward to regaining all lost function of temples.

It seems to me that what Condominas argues is without temples, Lue identity would be lost, and if there is no re-building of the vat, Lue culture and ethnic identity would never have persisted. However, the Lue were still Buddhists, while unable to participate in temple activity during MAO's rule. Then how did the people preserve their Buddhist belief without the temple under the unhappy era of never touching Buddhism? The problematics of my statement is to try to ask, do the Lue really need a temple to claim their own cultural/ religious identity? It seemed that they had a mysterious strategy to keep their ethnic and cultural identity of being Lue and Buddhist under harsh circumstance. I shall unravel the puzzle.

III. A Temple has been Established: Lao-Lue Lives in Seattle

In the same work by Condominas mentioned above, other than reminding us about Lue's anxiety about constructing a temple, creating Buddha statues, and recruiting monks, he emphasizes the Lao refugees in Western countries establish new temples a few years after settling down in host cities. He indicates that there were at least 5 Lao vats in France in the end of 80s (Condominas 1987: 450). He seems to conclude that Tai-speaking peoples including the Lue and Lao really need their temple wherever the situation is very difficult for seeking survival.

I believe that Condominas' interpretation of religious/cultural identity among Tai-speaking peoples in unusual environments, such as under pressure of cultural destruction or in alien countries, is correct. However, to me, the Lao refugees are never homogeneous in ethnic background. My point is that there are quite a few Lue people moved out of refugee camps from Thailand to the U.S., France, and even Australia (Fong ed. 2004; Haines ed. 1989; Souvannavong 1999; Waters 1990).

All of these refugees, no matter where they end up, are categorized as Laotians. In order to clarify the religious life among the Lue out of their homeland, i.e., home *muang* and villages in Laos, we have to find out where they are and what they do in dealing with three major elements of being Buddhist: temple, Buddha statuary, and monks.

JIANG Yingliang, the senior Tai culture expert in China whose book I cited in previous section, had said,

> "Sometimes Lue villagers might temporarily move to another place to stay owing to the threat of natural disaster or fierce war. They must found a simple and crude temple at new location. When the returning time was coming, people always renovated the original village temple, sent monks back first, then all went back. No matter what they needed to do, to build new temple or to renovate old one, everyone must devote oneself into such kinds of religious honorable works" (1984:529).

The Lue in Seattle, Washington, one of the main cities in the U.S. where this particular ethnic group are distributed are exactly following the mode of religious resurgence Jiang described.

The Lue in Seattle mostly were from Muang Sing, Huayxay, and Luang Namtha in northern Laos. They founded the Lao Lue Association of Washington State in 1980 even though both the US government and Americans in general have no idea about the people and always put them into the category "lowland" Laotians. At that time when the Association began to run, there was no Lue temple in the Seattle area. They joined other majority Lao from Laos to practice religious life at a non-Lue Lao temple. Afterwards Lao immigrants divided into two parts, and each one supported a temple. The two Lao temples are called Vat yay, big temple, and Vat Noy, little temple. The Lue usually have connection much closer with the latter for perhaps personal reasons.

It was not until 1998, that the Association that is composed of 69 families decide to create and own a Lue temple. People donated money and searched for suitable location. A year later, the Association bought a house in southern Seattle with a loan from a local bank. The house has no temple-shaped appearance on account of its location inside a residential area where one is not allowed to build a temple-like one; although there are full of huge trees in the neighborhood and supposedly all landscaped can be hidden, and it has been named Vat Paa, the forest temple. But you can find everything inside the vat that is similar to the inner portion of a typical temple. They invited three monks to settle in it, the abbot is a Lue who originally is from Laos, and got training by the most famous Khuba Bunsung or Bunchun in Tachilek, northern Myanmar. The other two monks are Lao, but they feel more comfortable in there than in the Lao temple.

Vat Paa belongs to the Lue beyond question. There are 5 groups in the Lao Lue Association. Each group consists of 12 families on average, and they take turn to provide food for monks. People went to *tham bun*, i.e., make merits once a month, usually in the morning of Sunday, and had a party through Saturday night. They say "kin laew than" i.e., "eat first, then go to worship".

The establishment of a temple makes the Lue become true Buddhist and complete Lue, one thus may conclude. This may be a perfect story to tell a group of Lue immigrants to made efforts to establish a vat in order to have a more comfortable religious life and affirm their ethnicity. But are all stories developed toward such an absolute correct end? I mean, do the Lue Buddhists really need a temple? Taiwan's case challenges a positive answer.

IV. No Temple at All: Burma-Lue's Fifty Years in Taiwan

It is true that there are some Lue in Taiwan although many people feel confused about the possibility. And the Taiwan Lue not only have lived on the island for more than half a century but they maintained themselves as children of Theravada Buddhism well without contacting any temple. We should describe the story of modern history of East Asia in advance before talking about tales of the Taiwan Lue.

At the time when the KMT (the Nationalist Party or Kuomintang) army had been utterly routed and fled from attack of the PLA (People's Liberation Army) alongside the Yunnan-Burma borderland in the early 1950s[1], the Kingdom of Sipsong Panna, a petty Tai-Lue state in southern Yunnan, also met its doom. The newly established PRC founded Xishuangbanna Dai Nationality Autonomous Region in January 23, 1953. Quite a few KMT troops were still stationed in northern Burma and were anxious to fight back to the Mainland. In 1953 and 1961, part of remnants of defeated KMT army had withdrawn from Burma to Thailand, then fled to Taiwan (cf. HSIEH Shih-chung 1997; SUNG Kwang-Yu 1982).

The first group of KMT's Yunnan regular troops reached Taiwan in 1953. They had been arranged to garrison in a newly founded village named Chung-Chen (忠貞) in Chung-li (中壢), Taoyuan County (桃園縣), in the northern plain of the island. The next arriving date for another group of soldiers from northern Thailand was in 1961.

The government had sent teachers to teach Chinese for those non-Han wives only for a short time. Several informants said that the learning program was too simple and actually useless. Therefore almost all non-Han women indicated that in the long run they learned how to speak Chinese, or more accurate Yunnanese

[1] Burma and Myanmar refer to the same country. The official name of this country was changed from Burma into Myanmar in 1989 by the then military regime.

Mandarin, mainly based on the foundation of experience of family life instead of from formal classes.

There were three hundred more soldiers discharged eventually. Those who had spouses but without children were ordered to establish Po-wang New Village (PNV, 博望新村) in southern Chien-Ching State Farm (CCSF, 清境國家農場). And people who already raised one child were responsible for founding Shou-ting New Village (SNV, 壽亭新村) which is located in northern CCSF whose elevation is 300 meters lower than PNV (2040 meters). The others were settled down in Chi-yang State Farm (吉洋農場), Kaohsiung, southern Taiwan. As for the soldiers who were not willing to be discharged, and were recognized as strong and young, the government set up another village Kan-Cheng (干城), Taoyuan nearby Chung-Chen for them, and retrained to be a parachute troop. The total number of families sent to CCSF were 79 which included 77 Han-Chinese discharged soldiers and 129 family members.

In1974, half of the residents of SNV, through drawing lots, moved to Ting-Yuan New Village (TNV, 定遠新村) which is located in between PNV and SNV, for solving the bothersome problem of increasing population. In Ching-Ching area, people are accustomed to calling Yunnan's group, i.e. residents of PNV, SNV, and TNV, "yi-min" (righteous people, 義民).

According to SUNG, during the time he conducted fieldwork, i.e., May 1979, there were 4 Taiwan indigenes, 7 Han, and 62 non-Han immigrants among 73 yi-min's wives (1982:766). Sung identified ethnicities of the non-Han female immigrants as: 26 Paiyi (Tai-Lue or Dai Nationality [Daizu] in PRC's classification), 1 Guoluo Tai (a particular Tai speaking people distributed in the north of Chiangmai area, Thailand), 17 Luohe (Lahu), 8 Akha (Hani or Ikor), 2 Lisu, 3 Khawa (Wa), 2 Puman (Bulang), and 3 Yaojia (Yao). In other words, the yi-min's new villages formed three mini-communities and probably all integrated into a larger multi-ethnic Yunnanese community.

Within the villages, everyone knows everyone. And all know well the other party's ethnicity. The Paiyi publicly claim their identity, and keep a distinct memory of their homeland. So do most other Tibetan-Burmese tribal members, such as Luohe, Akha, and Lisu, except for forgetting some vocabulary of the mother tongue when asking them at an unprepared situation by an anthropologist like me. I believe that both Austroasiatic Khawa and Puman, and the others like Guoluo Tai and Yaojia show a similar pattern, although an advanced study ought to be carried out to prove it.

Many second generation people indicate their comprehension of the Paiyi language. A high percentage have a good listening ability however being asked to speak fluently is often not easy. Almost of all Han-Chinese or Yunnanese husbands say that they were able to speak many kinds of Paiyi and tribal languages when stationing in northern Burma in the 50s. Paiyi dialect in fact was a more popular one being used among these immigrants including Han soldiers and their tribal wives from northern Thailand or Burma in earlier time of arriving in Taiwan.

When the guerrilla army had the critical mission to counter-attack the Communists from northern Burma in the 1950s, soldiers were not allowed to get married. After the first group of troops withdrew to Taiwan in 1953, the head-quarter of KMT army changed its policy. It was the time about one or two years before moving to Taiwan, lots of members of the second withdrawing group found wives from neighboring townships or villages. Therefore, most of the non-Han women who came with their husbands to Taiwan afterwards originated from Burma. And they all have the potential to narrate a story about it. "Mien-Dien" or Burma is usually the first answer to respond to any request of their homeland no matter what ethnic group they belong to. Unless one continues to ask, or the conversation is proceeding well, the informant might not be motivated to tell the other party a China-Burma migration story of a particular ancestor in the historical period.

Although children of three yi-min's new villages have been embedded in multi-ethnic living environments and learned various kinds of cultural traits at the same time, a Han-Chinese directed ethnic/cultural hierarchy still deeply influences everybody. That is, Han-Chinese culture is at a higher position than all the others on a constructed ethnic status ladder. One of the most obvious evidence is that almost all non-Han wives become fluent in speaking Chinese or Yunnanese Mandarin after several decades living in Ching-Ching, but to the contrary those soldier husbands who originally were good in using both Paiyi and tribal dialects now substantially forgot them except for keeping a limited memory about Paiyi vocabularies. A second generation informant told me that he was often scolded and punished by his father when he occasionally used Paiyi dialect to respond to parents.

In short, both ethnic boundaries, i.e., Han-Chinese versus non-Han, or Paiyi versus tribal members, and sub-ethnic boundary, i.e., Chinese "Dai" versus Burmese "Paiyi", have been efficiently maintained within the three yi-min's mini-communities. People may not know detailed information about every group's traditional culture, ethnohistory, major place of distribution, or original meaning of ethnonyms, but they have distinct consciousness to distinguish one from the other. Experiences of living together for half a century made non-Han culture obscured and overlooked, but identity for members of all groups are well-sustained. As for the second generation, they mostly have two identities without hesitation, even though the portion of Han-Chinese is stronger than the opposite non-Han ethnicity (HSIEH Shih-chung 2004a & 2004b).

Chung-Chen New Village (CCNV, 忠貞新村) was founded in 1954 and consisted of about four hundred households. Kan-Cheng Wu Chun or Kan-Cheng fifth village (KCFV, 干城五村) is located in a more remote area. CCNV and KCFV, the neglected village-isles passed over by the winds of economic development, have existed for about five decades. They are exotic ghettos. As a matter of fact, villagers have constructed a special life style. Their survival

philosophy, historical consciousness, ethnic knowledge, and folk theory of culture are very profound. They not merely stand as witnesses of a grand modern history related to the development of nationalisms in East Asia and ethnic-cultural syncretism in Taiwan, but also play a good game of negotiating or dialogizing with kin, neighbors, friends, military companions and other alien ethnic members.

The veterans of CCNV were discharged from the Nationalist government's regular army that was stationed in Yunnan in the 1940s. Most of the soldiers were local Han-Yunnanese plus some Cantonese, with a few recruits "caught" from non-Han ethnic groups such as the Paiyi (Tai-Lue) and the Luohe (Lahu). Most were unmarried youngsters when they joined the army in their hometowns. They were marched far away from Han-Chinese settlements. Therefore, a majority of wives of the Yunnanese officers and soldiers were from non-Han groups, especially the Paiyi in Sipsong panna (Xishuangbanna) in Yunnan and Lue communities in northern Burma.

Multi-ethnic composition in Yunnan is a well-known regional feature. The same situation has been moved from there to Taiwan. In other words, we find many ethnic groups whose hierarchical relationships were evident in Yunnan who have settled down in the same community. In CCNV, the highest amount of Paiyi female residents in the first immigrant generation numbered around forty, and twenty for some other hill peoples. The common language for the villagers is Yunnanese Mandarin and even the second or third generation and their spouses have an outstanding ability in speaking accented Mandarin. They talked to me in standard Mandarin, but transfer to their own "mother-tongue" immediately when communicating with village members. Furthermore, Paiyi, a sort of Tai dialect that is really Lue, was also popular in earlier times. Husbands of Paiyi wives could at least understand what ethnic women said. The second generation whose age is about forty are ambivalent towards the usage of Paiyi. The listening comprehension of Paiyi among most

of middle-aged villagers is fine despite the lack of motivation or necessity to speak it.

People within the village know the ethnic distribution. Many of them have a rich knowledge of the ethnic minorities, such as ethnonyms, exotic customs, physical features, “savagery”, “timidity”, “obedience” and “backwardness”. People in the village chat with each other in the evening in an open field near the village office. Ordinarily several mahjong (麻將) tables are ready for the regular players from different houses at night. Those small vendors that offer Yunnanese/Tai food sporadically set in the village stimulate people’s memory of the homeland, and strengthen their self-identity of culturally defined persona. More and more immigrants from Thailand have settled in the Taoyuan area lately. Thai cuisine is sold in one of the alleyways every Sunday morning. Residents call it “Little Bangkok”. An Islamic mosque built in 1971 is located at the intersection of the business street and the main highway. About fifteen Muslim households meet there. Furthermore, “playing song”（ta-ke/打歌）, a kind of half-Han and half non-Han special folk song singing style, was a favorite among many residents from earlier times. In general, Yunnanese/Paiyi/Burmese restaurants, “Little Bangkok”, the mosque, and the folk singing provides the bulk of the local color in the CCNV.

The average age of the older generation is more than eighty. The village head who belongs to the second generation told me she once went abroad for two weeks and three people died during that short period. Funerals follow Taiwanese custom in that ritual specialists hired to assist are all from more modern lively towns. However, several youngsters expressed an interesting finding out about a special phenomenon appearing only in the CCNV. Many relatives, neighbors and friends inside the village joined the mourning household to chat, eat and gamble every night before the day of burial. People regard this as a good custom. However, on the other hand, behavior of some of the younger generation really hurts parents’ hearts deeply. Senior residents complained about

their children's alcoholism, gambling addiction, unemployment and over-dependence on parents. Everybody knows which boy or girl from particular households do drugs, or deal in drugs and prostitution. In short, a moral gap between two generations seems at first glance to be huge, but is in fact, superficial. The older generation has depended on the government their whole life. Now the new generation is dependent upon their parents. Also gambling among the older generation had become a common daily activity and the kids modeled their own behavior on it.

KCFV, compared to CCNV, is much more isolated from the main society. So far as I know, the media have not shown any interest in the KCFV although its multi-ethnic social structure is more "colorful" than other military communities. There are only two Yunnanese/Paiyi/Burmese restaurants along a street close to main gate of KCFV, and one vendor owned by a Paiyi woman inside village. The commercial atmosphere is not so prosperous.

Most of the non-Han wives of veterans came from northern Burma or Thailand. They, unlike CCNV's Paiyi originated from Sipsong Panna, a frontier country within China. The story of their participation in the Chinese army was touching when one recalls their tragic history as refugees in northern Southeast Asia in the 1950s. When part of KMT troops withdrew from Thailand to Taiwan in 1954, others were ordered by Chiang Kai-Shek to stay. They became loosely organized anti-Communist guerrillas. The soldiers were not allowed to get married because of their uncertain future. It was not until 1960 that the second group received an order concealed beneath a special military term called "Kuo-lei" (national thunder, 國雷專案) which the villages used to name a new park in the village to retreat. Many soldiers went out to "plunder" wives from non-Chinese tribes or rural communities.

It is no problem for non-Han women in KCFV to speak Mandarin. A good many residents like to tell their history of migration from Burma via Thailand

to Taiwan. The listeners usually can relate to a fully imagined story. Although there is nothing related to public performances in the expressive culture of local people in KCFV, there are some in personal situations. For instance, a Miao man always hums traditional tunes and one still has the chance to notice the exoticism when coming into contact with villagers by conversing on themes of ethnicity or cultural life. People who returned to their homeland either in Burma and Thailand or Yunnan brought back ethnic clothes, religious stuffs, bags or toys with local decorations, and music tapes. They re-shape their self-identity and historical memory by traveling. The emergence of local color in KCFV thus is mainly on the foundations of an intensive interaction among residents of different ethnic backgrounds within such an isolated community.

In short, the Paiyi or Burmese Lue maintain ethnic identification after moving to Taiwan for more than 50 years. However, they have never expressed motivation or intention to build a temple as Lao-Lue did in the Seattle neighborhood. The Lue, who traditionally are very religious in performing Buddhist practices, now in Taiwan don't seem to practice since temples, Buddha statues, and monks are not in existence. The Paiyi and Lue women have no interest in visiting Han-Taiwanese/Chinese Mahayana Buddhist temple, not to mention folk religious shrines or monasteries. But some of them told me they always visited a Thai temple if they had time before transferring on their flight from Bangkok to northern Myanmar to return to their original hometown. I ask myself: did the Burmese Lue in Taiwan lose their belief in Buddhism since there is no record of them worshipping Buddha at a temple? My answer is "No, they didn't!"

V. Standing a City-Temple and Ready for Leapfrogging: Lue Youngsters in Laos

The Lue are broadly distributed in northern Laos from Muang Sing through Udomxay to rural areas of Luang Prabang Province. There was a petty kingdom in historic time in Muang Sing and the ruler was a Lue royal family who moved from Sipsong Panna. Muang Sing can be defined as a concrete Lue territory like a mini-Sipsong Panna, and all hill tribes needed to pay tributes to the ruler. At present there are many Lue Buddhist temples in Muang Sing especially within the town center area so that the Lue boys go in and out of temple, exemplifying a traditional model. They mostly stayed in their rural hometowns and followed regular way of being novice at local temple for years and rarely migrated to the urban area and did not grow up at city temple.

However for the Lue families in Udomxay and rural Luang Prabang the parents might not only send their boys to the temple to be monks, as many others do same, to release the family's economic burden but also did their best to arrange for the kids to go to a city-temple either in downtown Luang Prabang or Vientiane, the Capital of the Lao People's Democratic Republic. In my fieldwork, I found at least one of each Buddhist temples of these Laos two cities has a majority of the Lue novices. In other words, parents had relatives or friends who served as higher ranking monks in the two temples, Vat L in Luang Prabang (Pic.2) and Vat S in Vientiane (Pic.3). Through this particular connection, Lue boys one by one are being sent there. It is probably acceptable if we call them Lue-ized temples in the biggest two cities in Laos although the abbots recruited Khmu novices as well and the people are counted as closely related to the Lue in the north.

Pic.2 Vat L in Luang Prabang, the temple where many Lue boys are ordained. Photo by the author, 2011/01/26.

Pic.3 Vat S in Vientiane, the temple attracts many Lue boys to be ordained. Photo by the author, 2006/02/10.

Several Lue informants in two Lue temples told me they may stay there until they graduate from college and find a job in the city. No one was willing to going back to the rural home because there is “no hope there but being a farmer like parents and earning very little money”. Some of them even decided to leave Vat L and moved to other temples in Vientiane to wait for a better chance in the secular world. The novices mostly were working very hard to learn English. They even had collected lots of questions of listening comprehension and grammatical principles in advance and wished to get my help when I revisited them. They all felt that English is the most important tool for survival after returning to a lay person’s life. Temple thus was a temporary living place for the great majority of novices. While a boy was novice or monk he had to be responsible for some religious affairs in the temple, but after he finished all daily requirements of temple work, his eyes immediately turned to look at the secular world: for example English learning or continuing high school education or even taking part in college entrance examination. Those things all belong to preparations for the future normal life. In a word, to find a job and to get married and have kids are ideal goal of their lives.

Keo was from Udomxay. He stayed at Vat L for ten years then moved to Vientiane and continued to be a novice at a mid-sized temple whose abbot was a friend of his father. He told me since there is no opportunity to have a good job the only way was to stay at temple. Finally Keo found a job as a mechanic to take care of a hotel’s electric system. Nith was from rural Luang Prabang. He needed to take boat for six hours then walk three hours more to reach his parents’ home in a very rural spot whenever he took leave for national festivals or holidays. Nith was a novice in Vientiane and studied at a financial college very hard. He passed important examinations to get an accountant license and then invested with his friends to open a company. Nith told me his plan is to own a gasoline station and earn big money. Mixay was originally from Udomxay as well. He was a leading monk at Vat S in Vientiane and studied with high grades

at the Buddhist College in the capital for four years. However, he was not as lucky as other Lue youngsters to be able to get a job in city so that he reluctantly returned to Udomxay. Mixay refused to be a farmer and is an English teacher in the town center. Vanhnoud was from Luang Prabang and stayed at Vat L for ten years then transferred to Vat S and graduate from college, ending his monkhood at the same time. He became a superior at a convenient store in Vientiane and got married recently. Keo, Nith, Mixay and Vanhnoud were my close and long-acquainted friends since they were novices. Not one of them ever mentioned any religious matters in conversation with me and have never re-visited their original temples to meet friends after becoming lay persons. The temple life to them, it seems, looks like an illusory past or non-existence. Sometimes when I asked them to go with me to enter into a temple during some famous religious celebration day, my friends performed like a tour guide who very simply introduced something then escaped from the religious situation right away. I had a feeling at that particular moment that Buddhist temples to my Lue friends was just a mid-point or shelter for helping people to jump up to a real world when the time arrives.

VI. New Town but no Temple: Luang Namtha's Story

Luang Namtha is capital town of Luang Namtha Province in northern Laos. Muang Sing, the town I mentioned above belongs to this province and becomes the northernmost town of Laos to face Muang La of Sipsong Pannan, Yunnan, China. The original capital town of Luang Namtha was located in a narrow valley near the airport. The majority of local residents are Kalom who identify themselves as a brother-group of both Lue and Tai Yuan, a Tai-speaking people who most live in Chiang Mai, Thailand. There is no Lue village around the old town area. All temples are Kalom style although quite a few novices are from Khmu, and belong to an Austro-Asiatic speaking group.

Since 1989 the Lao Communist government following the People's Republic of China's policy decided to adopt a market economy and open the country to the world. Muang Sing, as a former French colony with some European relics was one of the tourist spots that the government decided to develop. The first step was to enlarge the capital town of the province for incoming tourists. A new capital town located in a much wider plain in eight km north of the old town began to be designed and constructed. That place was originally Tai Dam's dwellings. Tai Dam moved from northern Vietnam generations ago and they are animists therefore they are a special ethnic Tai in contrast to the majority of Buddhist Lao in the country.

"Every village must have a temple". Both academic and tourist literature on Lao peasant society may make such a remark. However, the truth is there is no temple at all inside the new capital town of Luang Namtha. Probably more correctly we should say that every natural village must have a temple. Therefore, since we cannot find any temple in the newly-founded town, it is absolutely not so-called "natural". Actually, all of the so-called cities in modern Laos such as Vientiane and Luang Prabang are kind of compound of many natural villages. But obviously Luang Namtha is totally artificially made and contained no natural Buddhist village. The natural villages in this area pertain to non-Buddhist Tai-Dam. The only Lue village was out of the town center about eight kilometers and the residents of it told me that usually they have no reason to go to that Tai-Dam area.

More and more Lao from the south and Lue from the north have moved to the new capital since the 1990s and opened many guest houses, restaurants, grocery stores and clothes shops, not to mention that most of the public units are controlled by majority Lao. However, it was interesting that there was no temple in the new capital yet many Lao and Lue Buddhists had lived there for a long time. Some Lao finally felt they might need one so that people collected a small amount of money to build a very simple one at a hill a bit far from the

town center (Pic.4 & 5). Although it was not good-looking at all, the hastily completed temple at least signified the reality of Lao as Buddhist. Then how about the Lue? They all migrated from their own village where there was at least one temple inside and theoretically the residents occasionally needed to visit it for religious necessity. Then why do the Lue living in a new place not need a temple anymore? As far as I know the Lue immigrants never visited the simple-styled Lao temple nor that Lue village at a long distance away in suburban Luang Namtha for doing Buddha worship in the temple either.

Pic.4 A very simple temple in Luang Namtha, Laos. Photo by the author, 2006/04/10.

Pic.5 The interior of the simple temple in Luang Namtha, Laos. Photo by the author, 2006/04/10.

From 2007 till 2009 the government shut down Luang Namtha airport for two years' renovation. The original round way was too short so a new and long one was built for larger airplanes' departure and landing. They presumed more western tourists will come looking for the Muang Sing European elements. However unexpected things happened. Lots of Chinese merchants came down from the north to plant both banana and rubber trees during the time of airport expansion. Almost of all French-styled building in Muang Sing had been replaced by new guest houses and restaurants owned by Chinese and served for Chinese businessmen. The local Lue residents complained that *farang* (foreigners especially for the westerners) never came back. No western tourists means the typical Lue local products and food had no more customers and European building used for managing guesthouses were forced to close one by one. That was one of the reasons for many Lue moved to Luang Namtha for survival.

Business opportunity in Luang Namtha area changed from the western tourists as the target to swarming Chinese who take care of the farms. Some Chinese enterprisers persuaded the government to build a huge and beautiful religious hall and chaukhtatgyi reclining Buddha statue. The location they chose is exactly that simply-made Lao temple at the hill top. The old one had been re-modelled and another huge temple right uphill was in construction as well. The reclining Buddha statue was put in the highest point and standing different ethnic statues with Buddhist *waay* worship gesture in front of the Buddha statue. The managers there told me many Chinese came to take photos in which such a landscape of large-sized statues are always welcomed by Chinese. To summarize Lao residents might come up to the hill for religious purpose in the temple, and Chinese businessmen liked to visit and enjoy taking picture with big reclining Buddha. But both the temple and the Buddha statue didn't attract any Lue locals. The Lue are still Buddhists without question but lack the need to enter a temple. Then how can they keep their Buddhist beliefs with no record of contacting a temple? Should we take Lue's case into account for re-defining a Buddhist with no requirements to visit a temple? I will discuss more as follows.

VII. Holy Monks in Hands: Being a Flexible but True Buddhist

I have described four Lue cases in Sipsong Panna, Seattle, Taiwan, and Laos on their religious life in relation to the temple, Buddha statues, and monks. Although we find that both Sipsong Panna Lue and Lao-Lue in Seattle and were trying hard to recover the function of the temple or build a new one, it should not be ignored that these two groups of Lue had "lost" their temples for a long time under MAO's anti-religious policy in the PRC, fled from a chaotic home town and emigrated to another country. No one might doubt that they were still

Buddhists since in the long run their life with temples had been reset. But what and how did people do to be Buddhists without temples around in daily life for so many years? We may be able to figure it out from the data collected in Taiwan and Laos.

The Paiyi or Burmese Lue have not built any temples in Taiwan, but they all had kept some photos of famous monks at home (Pics.6-8). Many informants told me they asked friends to bring back photos from Burma or Thailand, and there were several older women who got married earlier even collected a number of invaluable old black and white pictures, which provided good memories of life-history. It is understandable that a typical Han-Chinese tablet of ancestor worship in the living room of a house always could be found due to the fact that the male head of household is Chinese. He is the husband of a Paiyi wife. But it is very interesting that a very common sight inside the house includes a couple of Theravada monks' photos set close to the ancestral tablet. The Chinese male family head always told me that those photos are immoveable treasures for his wife. The Paiyi female insisted on worshipping those monks in photos that presumably are very respectable and powerful men in distant and probably remote area in Theravada Southeast Asia. A man pointed to a Burmese monk photo and said, "This is my wife's number one precious item of collection". The Paiyi informants described stories of magical abilities among the great monks in pictures including no necessity to have food, having the capability of predicting people's fortune, and even being able to fly like superman and so on.

Pic.6 Buddha and monk photos on the wall of a Lue house in northern Taiwan. Photo by the author 2001/12/11.

Pic.7 The famous Phra Bunchun on the front door of a Lue house in central Taiwan. Photo by the author, 2003/01/20.

Pic.8 Photos of Buddha and monk on the wall in a Lue house in central Taiwan. Photo by the author 2004/12/19.

The Paiyi do have holy men or great masters of Buddhism, I suggest, and that should be the key symbol of being a true Buddhist. No temple, no monks, and no Buddha statues absolutely does not mean that individuals are no longer Buddhists. A Lue might not visit temple or even lose contact for very long time, but he is still a true Lue as long as photos of holy man are carefully treasured and they practice rituals of worship informally at home.

In Seattle almost all Lue households display a bunch of monks' photos, especially for Bunsung or Buncun, the greatest *phuu mii bun* or holy man by the Lue and many northerners in Mainland Southeast Asia at the corner or on the wall inside the living room with splendid decorations of flowers and colorful ribbons (Pics.9-11). It is not possible for a guest to enter in the house and miss seeing such a brilliant religious corner. This is unusual in comparison to their relatives in Lue home communities in Laos. That is to say, in Laos among the

Lue, their houses are simply furnished or decorated. The religiosity or Buddhist features inside the house is very limited. We thus can assume that all religious performances might be found in temple only. Then why do the Lue immigrants in Seattle transmit different ideology and perform another pattern of religious adornment? We should not forget that the Lao-Lue in Seattle had a long time experience of losing temple. Before establishing their own Vat, some of the Seattle Lue went to Lao and sometimes even Thai temples occasionally, but more visited nowhere. People instead carefully collected monks' photos and other relevant things at home. Again as the Paiyi or Burmese Lue do in Taiwan, the Lao-Lue in Seattle adopted any possible strategies to find photos of holy men, then hold tightly in their hands. Those pictures to me are critical emblems of Lue ethnicity and religious identity for the members who are out of the homeland of Laos.



Pic.9 Photos of Buddha and an old monk in a Lue house in Seattle. Photo by the author, 2004/03/12.

Pic.10 Photos of monks on the wall in a Lue house, Seattle. Photo by the author 2004/03/24.

Pic.11 Photos of Phra Bunchun and Phra Tua in a Lue house in Seattle. Photo by the author 2004/04/12.

Young Lue boys from remote villages in Laos left home to pursue a future happy life under their parents' hard push. In the first place, without exception they must find a temple out of their home area for lodging. They had no choice but to become novices because they couldn't stay in their village due to their family's poverty. However, wherever they went a bigger temple or city-temple was the only place to make contact and stay. They certainly were Buddhists when being a novice or monk. The yellowish robe with shaved head and living inside a temple definitely tell us about the full face of a Theravada religious specialist.

Pic.12 Photo of Phra Bunchun on the wall in a Lue restaurant in Muang Sing, Laos. Photo by the author 2012/04/13.

Pic.13 Phra Bunchun photo at a temple in Jingzhen, Xishuangbanna, Yunnan, China. Photo by the author 2011/12/25.

However, the temple days and layman life to a Lue man whose home is in a remote area are two opposite dimensions that indicates the man's disregard for the previous temple days. But he is still a Lue and certainly a Buddhist as well. Temple to him for the rest of his life can be completely ignored. What he needs is a successful family life through his efforts of making a living and raising kids. Perhaps members of his family such as his wife may collect photos of magical monks (Pic.12), but the man avoids full participation in religious matters especially for offering goods and cash to a temple.

As for the Sipsong Panna Lue, I believe that most of families might have hidden precious photos of khuba somewhere at home during the Cultural Revolution or perhaps the entire era under the MAO's rule (Pic.13), and it is powerful enough to affirm people's true Buddhist identity. Another question is, then why both Sipsong Panna Lue and Lao-Lue immigrants in Seattle still show their strong motive to recover or build temples, but it is not the same case among

Paiyi or Burmese Lue in Taiwan? The answer should be that almost all Paiyi are female, and those people who directed the establishment of temples in Sipsong Panna and Seattle are male. Main leaders of the Lue Association in Washington State are all male, and they also manage all administrative affairs of the temple. So I presume that masculinity must be a key element to direct any project of renovation and construction of temples. Temple drives people to unify together, and men at this very moment grasp a perfect opportunity to claim position of domination. Since Paiyi in Taiwan are female, they therefore have no cultural pressure to express gender status by means of the dynamic context of temple, monk, and Buddha statues.

VIII. Conclusion

In this article I have discussed four Lue groups in Sipsong Panna, Seattle, Laos, and Taiwan, and described the ways of expression of being Buddhists. It is true that temple with Buddha statue and monks inside is very important for the Lue. And that is the reason why we found people urging on community members to rebuild a temple after dismissal of serious impacts from political or war incidents. However, the deep belief of existence of a holy man or *phuu mii bun* seems to be the most critical element for a Lue to be true Buddhist. A holy man through the image on photos transmits his magical power to every individual and family. People know that the holy man is living there in the Buddhist world and he is always very close to the believers. The Lue in most of my field cases indicate their enthusiasm to support some respectable abbots to promote to high *khuba*. It reflects a situation of trying to “create” a new holy man among believers. It is unthinkable to be able to survive in a world without a holy man. The abbot of Vat Paa in Seattle recently became a high ranking monk under the circumstances of intensive pressure from Lue immigrants to grant their wholehearted request. The day when the promotion ritual was

initiated, all Seattle Lue joined in and made a luxurious celebration with exceptional happiness. Although the holy man people worship is in Myanmar which is supposedly very far away from this particular monastery in North America, to have a precious master abbot in Vat Paa is still very important. A high-ranking monk who has a close relation to the holy man is good enough for the people since they have self-confidence to feel the power of holy man through a rite by the temple abbot, a future holy man candidate. The female Paiyi in Taiwan have devoted themselves into taking care of photos of great monks with brand names. It is also a phenomenon of reflecting the more crucial position of holy man worship compared to the existence of a temple for the people to perform as a Theravada Buddhist. To search for what photos of monks that people had hidden in Sipsong Panna from the 1960s to the 1980s would be an interesting research topic. These photos may not merely function to affirm people's beliefs but also to construct a broad and deep holy man worship context in Lue world.

In short, the Lue are flexible Buddhists. They survive well all over the world and continue acting as true Buddhists by means of having crucial real material in hand, i.e., photo, to confirm themselves as connected tightly in religious life. If temple no longer exists, the mystery of Lue-mode flexibility abruptly appeared to serve as mechanism of ethnic/cultural identity. Temples with Buddha statues could not function as a powerful institution for people's safety of daily life in petty state such as Sipsong Panna or Muang Sing in the past. People were constantly fleeing out of their dangerous home area. The concrete temple might not be meaningful for the believers who must leave immediately for any possible reason. Therefore, the legend of a holy man instead acts as a mechanism to keep believers of Buddhism to maintain personal religious belonging. A photo of holy man at such a moment is obviously more important than a huge Buddha statue. One could carry it in pocket to search for future good life. Youngsters from rural Laos at present exhibit similar moving

stories as their ancestors did in historic time. Temple-based Buddhism is what I call “unstable institutional ownership of Buddhism” while holy-man-based Buddhism, I suggest, is a “stable close-fitting ownership of Buddhism”. Theoretically, a temple building should be stable and an easily broken photo is unstable. However, in Lue’s situation the religion-scape is totally upside down. Flexible reality of Lue Buddhism indeed fully tells the people’s past and present. ONG Aihwa in her fascinating book *Buddha is Hiding: Refugees, Citizenship, the New America* (2003) describes Cambodian refugees in their efforts to adjust into American new life after escaping from Pol Pot’s killing field since the mid of 1970s. The traditional religion of Cambodians is Theravada Buddhism. The situation of Lue in Seattle and in Taiwan more or less is similar to Cambodians in California. Even the Lue who move from remote rural area to the city in Laos are looking for better life as well. To live in such unstable environment the Lue non-homeland residents may form the holy-man-based Buddhism and develop it easily since Temple-based Buddhism has no chance to be put into practice. To the Lue, the representative of Buddha has never been hidden whenever they encounter a totally strange and powerful cultural regime with strong political backup. The Lue Buddhists are a group of people whose religious life are exactly beyond the typical temple.

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研究論文

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印尼民主發展中身分認同議題對華人參與政治的影響

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摘要

多元族群的身份與信仰一直成為印尼社會融入的挑戰。由於殖民制度，自獨立以來印尼社會不斷出現族群衝突問題，加上獨立後排華政策和半套的同化政策也惡化華人與印尼其他族群的關係。印尼族群之間文化與信仰差異的衝突和印尼政治文化中以伊斯蘭為共同核心價值所造成的排華事件，對印尼社會與國家發展帶來負面影響。自 1998 年排華事件後，印尼政府進行全面性政治改革（political reform），去中央化（decentralization）政策的實施讓地方居民擁有機會參與地方政府，同時也能參與制定地方法規。政治改革給予印尼公民享有民主制度的直選的權益，使地方居民能有參政機會，這給予了居住在地方的少數族群－尤其是華人前所未有機會。儘管政治民主化的過程中，身份認同問題層出不窮，但印尼華人在政壇上有明顯的發展。雖然成功當選國會議員或者地方首長的華人為數不多，但是參政的華人愈來愈多，也不啻為一種良性的進展。

關鍵字：多元族群、政治改革、排華、身份認同

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The Impact of Identity Issues on the Development of Indonesian Democracy and Chinese Politics

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Abstract

The relationship between ethnic identity and beliefs has always been an important issue in Indonesia as a diversified society. Conflicts among local ethnic groups in Indonesia were mostly generated due to differences in culture and (religious) beliefs. May 1998 anti-Chinese riots were triggered by the common social contract in Indonesian political culture then brought a negative impact on the development of Indonesian society and the country. In the post-riots period, the Indonesian government then decided to carry out a comprehensive political reform. The implementation of the decentralization policy allows the Indonesian citizen in the provincial and regency/city level to have the opportunity to participate in their respective local government's administrative tasks as well as to participate in the decision making of local regulations. However, the policy reform in Indonesia also brought further problems and challenges. This is an unprecedented opportunity for ethnic minorities in the country, including Chinese, but also provokes some new political issues. The ethnic identity issues have become an obstacle to political participation in Indonesia today, not only affecting the Chinese Indonesian, but also affecting other political actor including the Javanese ethnic. Although identity issues have

emerged in democratization process, but Indonesian Chinese political participation have clearly developed, and Chinese participation increasing significantly.

Keywords: Ethnic Identity, Political Reform, Decentralization, Political Issues

一、前言

印尼作為一個多元文化的國家，在政治社會發展的進程中，面對族群認同與國家認同的問題。印尼國土分散，在荷蘭殖民帝國統治印尼之前，此地區經歷過不同勢力所建立的王朝，從著名的室利佛逝王朝、滿者伯夷王朝到後來伊斯蘭蘇丹王國都曾統治過當今印尼共和國的這片土地（Basri 2012: 26-33）。儘管後來成為獨立統一的國家，但每一座島上居民的文化都具有相當大的差異。1945 年 8 月 17 日印尼宣布獨立，印尼國家民主政體依然處於發展階段。

印尼獨立至今已 75 年，經歷過不同的政體演變。首先，舊秩序時期為蘇卡諾於 1945-1965 年領導的建國時期。該時期分為三個時段，維持獨立時期（1945-1949）、代議民主時期（1950-1959）及指導式民主（1960-1965）。舊秩序時期印尼處於政治混亂時期，獨立不久的印尼面對荷蘭重返並佔領印尼東部地區，各地出現內亂、分離主義、政治爭鬥與分裂，直到 1965 年 9 月 30 日的一場軍事政變結束了這個時期，進入由蘇哈托帶領的新秩序時期（1966-1998）——軍政府實施的威權體制時代。此時期採取與前一時期相反的政治策略，以建設國家替代建立強大外交政治。威權政府以軍事方式統治國家，如政府機關與軍人分享權力及國家資源、蘇哈托家族與親信掌控印尼經濟與企業（顧長永 2013：1-51）。

長期在威權體制的壓迫之下，印尼社會反政府聲浪日益高漲，各地區出現抗議活動。另外加上政府貪污腐敗、官商勾結和裙帶關係，使得印尼經濟每況愈下。1997 年 7 月的亞洲金融風暴更衝擊印尼政治經濟及社會緊張的情勢，最後導致 1998 年 5 月 12-15 日的暴動事件，又稱 1998 年 5 月事件（李美賢 2005：220-226）。此事件使華人再次成為政治的代罪羔羊及印尼動盪政治的犧牲者。

1998 年 5 月暴動引起國際注意，印尼政府面臨國際輿論壓力，亟需解決國內族群問題和實現政治改革。除此之外，印尼國內也出現大規模的反威權政府運動及學生、民主主義支持者上街抗議。由於國際和國內的壓

力，蘇哈托於 1998 年 5 月 21 日宣布辭職，並由哈比比（B. J. Habibie）上任，帶領印尼進入政治改革時期。1999 年 6 月進行國會選舉與修憲，並在同一年的 10 月由國會代表選出改革後的第一任總統——瓦希德（Abdurrahman Wahid）。瓦希德總統後因貪污醜聞（Buloggate dan Bruneigate）及施政不當，如解散國會、凍結專業集團黨（Golkar Party）等詔令，引發政治結盟瓦解，因而未滿任期被彈劾下台。瓦希德卸任後，由梅嘉娃蒂（Megawati Soekarnoputri）接手。梅嘉娃蒂任期是印尼民主蓬勃發展時期，與國會擬定出多項改革政策，其中最大的決策為修正總統大選由國會代選改為直選。梅嘉娃蒂以蘇卡諾女兒之姿得到了百姓的支持，但是她所建立的政府還是受到軍事影響，所以沒有做出很多的政治改革。於是在 2004 年的總統大選並沒有成功連任，而由尤多約諾（Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono）當選印尼第六任總統，也是印尼第一任直選出來的總統。2004 年是印尼政轉折點，展開印尼進入民主旅程，以階段性進行去中央化（Decentralization）政策提供印尼公民——尤其是地方公民——更大的政治參與權利。去中央化讓印尼地方政治（Local Politic）快速發展，不僅帶給地方少數族群人民政治參與，也給予華人重新從政的機會。

在改革運動及瓦希德總統的政治政策支持下[1]，華裔公民不再僅關注經濟領域，他們也開始進入長期以來被禁忌的政治領域。除了開始競選議會外，在 1999 年大選前夕，許多有中國裔公民創立自己的政黨，例如印尼華人改革黨（Partai Reformasi Tionghoa Indonesia, Parti）、印尼同化黨（Partai Pembaruan Indonesia, PPI）和印尼多元統一黨（Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, PBTI）。三個華人政黨中只有印尼同化黨與印尼多元統一黨參與 1999 年的總統大選，而僅贏得唯一一席國會席次的是由印尼多元統一黨所提名的參選者（Suryadinata 2007: 238-264）。儘管如此，政治改革仍

[1] 發佈 1999 年第 4 號 9 總統令，取消印尼華人公民國籍法（Certificate of Indonesian Citizenship, SKBRI）及解除中文禁令；2000 年發佈第 6 號總統令，撤銷 1967 年第 14 號關於禁止公開舉辦華人文化信仰、及習俗的總統令。梅嘉娃蒂上任後發佈 2002 年第 19 號，將華人農曆年自 2003 年訂為國定假日。透過一系列法令，華人文化首次被印尼政府承認。

給予華人參與政治、建立政黨、社會組織，以及提名參與國會議員、地方首長的機會。

然而 1998 年 5 月事件是一場排華事件。該事件顯示了印尼政治問題和社會族群之間的關係及問題。華人文化與習俗與印尼當地文化有很大的差異，引起社會互動之間的文化衝擊。此外，早期殖民政府分而治之（*devide et impera*）的政策及印尼獨立後威權政府所實施的同化政策，更加惡化族群之間的問題。該政策不但讓族群之間的差異更加明顯，也使族群之間的成見與偏見更加惡化，因而成為社會融入的障礙和挑戰。

印尼華人移民到印尼的歷史悠久，融入至印尼社會的過程中影響印尼華人的身份認同。華人參與印尼民族運動，亦與印尼其他族群爭取獨立抗戰。有些華人在印尼社會中遭遇與印尼多數人相同被殖民的困苦，而有些華人因生意手段受到殖民政府信賴，進而被雇為協助殖民政府治理華人社區或徵稅的官職。受到殖民政府重視的華人雖少，但是為了討好殖民政府和謀取商業利益的心態已對印尼原住民造成傷害，故引起其他族群對華人的怨恨及排他感（Dawis 2010: 23-39）。加上華人生活在自己的生活圈裡面，尤其多數新客華人只與同族人往來[2]，鮮少與當地居民互動，因此在印尼社會中對華人形成華人「排他性」（exclusiveness）的觀感，導致產生華人很高傲、不合群等成見。這些種種原因使得參政的華人時常被質疑其忠誠與身份認同。

除了移民歷史悠久，印尼華人的參與政治也已很長一段時間。政治改革後，印尼政民主迅速發展。言論自由化及組織自由化之後，政黨林立且多元。政治自由化也使曾被蘇哈托威權政府禁止參與政治三十餘年的華人能夠與印尼其他公民一樣享有參政機會。本文以族群身分及民主化理論探討印尼民族化過程中的身份認同議題對印尼華人政治參與的影響。

[2] 新客華人（Totok）是指後期在二十世紀初級移民到印尼的華人，新客華人與土生華人（Peranakan）的文化與認同感有明顯的差異。新客華人保留原有族群文化，並沒收到印尼當地文化影響。他們可能出生於印尼，但是還實踐族群傳統文化，以中國方言為溝通語言。新客華人一般指純血華人、沒有與印尼當地人通婚。早期多數新客華的政治認同傾向認同於中國。

二、民主化與多元文化觀點

（一）民主觀點

杭亭頓（Samuel Huntington）認為民主是評量現代國家政治發展的普遍參考方式。一個正在進行民主化的國家，是否可認定為轉形成功為民主國家會根據其的歷史發展、民族建構、社會結構和族群關係進行調整（Huntington 1997: 4-12）。民主政治是目前世界多數國家所實施的政治體系，但是各國對民主政治的詮釋並不相同。聯合國教科文組織對於世界上實施民主制度的國家分為兩大相互矛盾的類型，即西方國家的自由民主主義和共產民主主義（Budiardjo 2008: 105-107）。

有些國家政府的民主概念並非依據民主本意來建立政府，而以政府認為的理想方法來訂定民主政府。民主制度雖有幾項基礎標準，如選舉、政治與組織自由化，但是實際上這些都不表示完全民主，如朝鮮民主主義人民共和國、寮人民民主共和國都以民主名義制訂國家政府，然北韓與寮國實際上是不折不扣的一黨專政國家。杭亭頓表示，除了選舉，民主是限制權力，行政、立法與司法相互制衡和相互監督。此外政治穩定也是評估一個國家民主程度比較的參考（Huntington 1997: 8-12）。政治穩定決定了國家的民主水準與保證民主的進步，穩定也是衡量一個國家政治發展的重要標準，而政治發展與現代化社會的發展密切相關，現代化社會包括經濟、民族主義和國家完整性。

阿爾蒙德（Gabriel Almond）認為社會變革可能需要相對較長的時間，但是政治體系可能因短期突發性一系列的社會問題而發生變化（Almond 1973）。印尼政治體系的形成並非短暫發生，而是長期的政治施壓、貪污、腐敗政府、官商勾結、裙帶關係等問題而造成的結果，引起了後續經濟低迷、通貨膨脹和失業造成了社會的不滿，導致出現反政府的勢力，試圖推翻蘇哈托及其政權。

印尼的政權更替運動已經進行了數十年，但是「民主鞏固」是討論民主國家的政治發展時最常出現的問句。自由之家（Freedom House）根據政治權利（Political Rights, PR）和公民自由（Civil Liberties, CL）來衡量的將民主劃分為三個等級：非自由（not free）、部分自由（partly free）和自由（free）。民主化程度的結果顯示，每個國家的民主並不穩定，尤其是在發展中國家。



圖一　全球民主化狀態

（資料來源：Freedom House 2020. *Global Freedom Status*）

自 2017 年至 2020 年，自由之家的調查結果顯示，印尼的民主程度仍然不穩定，自由之家的數據呈現，印尼公民自由的標準逐年下降，而民主化程度屬於部分自由的範圍，但指數卻逐年下降。2017 年，印尼的民主程度達 65 點（PR 31：CL 34）；2018 年下降 1 點，為 64 點（PR 30：CL 34）；2019 年下降 2 點，為 62 點（PR 30：CL 32）；而 2020 年，民主化程度僅為 61 分（PR 30：CL 31）。以上的數據顯示，印尼社會公民自由受限制，尤其是宗教自由和禮拜場所建設的嚴格規定（Freedom House 2020）。

天寶印尼報紙（音譯 Tempo Indonesia Newspaper）匯總了 Setara Institute 數據調查顯示，2007 年至 2018 年的 10 年中，有 300 多起拒建和摧毀少數禮拜場所的案例，其中 199 起是破壞教堂案例和 133 起襲擊清真寺事件（Nurita 2020）。印尼社會出現因宗教多數派強大及政府未能保障少數信仰權利，而產生少數族群被迫屈服於多數的問題。此等問題反映出各級政府的失敗與無法容忍其他宗教的心態（intolerance）（Hadi 2019）。

杭亭頓表示，鞏固民主需要公眾和精英分子對民主價值觀的信任。自 2004 年以來已從國會代選改為人民直接選舉制度的印尼，仍然是一個過渡民主國家。印尼的民主仍然面臨著經濟、政治和社會穩定的各種問題。此外，民主政治的知識相對重要，因為教育能幫助百姓適應社會的變化和演進。而對於民主是否鞏固，政府則扮演說服人民的重要角色。另一方面，政治精英的行為也成為衡量公眾對民主政權信任程度的標準。政治和民主知識可以決定民主建立的成敗（Huntington 1997: 331-340）。

（二）多元文化觀點

愛爾蘭學者 Maleševic 認為，「身份」（identity）在冷戰後開始迅速發展。不同族群身份可以通過語言、節慶和日常習慣來識別，例如飲食文化及藝術（Maleševic 2006: 14）。印尼各地的蠟染圖案即是一個藝術文化的體現，每種蠟染有自己和當地特色，被稱為當地智慧的元素。

印尼是多元民族國家，具有多種文化及習俗並有著悠久的移民歷史。爪哇人（Javanese）是印尼最大的族裔，其次是巽他族（Sundanese），馬來人（Malay）和馬都拉族（Madurese），上述為印尼四大族群。後續阿拉伯、印度中國等移民者亦移民於此。印尼人類學家 Liliweri 指出，印尼的族群少有純血統族裔，因為這些族群有很多混血，例如巴達維族（Betawi），因雅加達是早期的貿易聚集點，此地區的原住民不僅血統混雜印尼其他族群，還有阿拉伯、華人和印度血統（Liliweri 2018: 10）。但是即使有族群之間的通婚現象，族群身分認同問題仍然形成，尤其是在龐大族群間更為明顯。

多元化（pluralism）是一個非常時髦的詞，出現在歐洲宗教戰爭之後的16 世紀。該詞通常用來形容政治制度、文化或者社會，如：多元民主（pluralist democracy）、多元文化（cultural pluralism）及多元社會（pluralistic society），但多元化與多元化中相互尊重的概念，如寬容（tolerance）時常相反。在多元化的框架下，政治常與政府框架及決策者有直接的關係。但與此同時也存在政府以外的團體，並能利用有限的資源來影響政府決策。Liliweri 強調，多元化觀點認為多元有助於改善社會，同時讓社會中所有不同文化，無論是多數文化或者少數文化、不同專業團體，包含信仰、工會、專業組織等都能享有相同的待遇。但實際上，多元所呈現的並非平等而是同享的政治機會（Liliweri 2018: 165-173）。

就印尼而言，同享政治機會案例非常明顯。強大的族裔身份認同形成了多數民族群體（ethnic majority），由政府代表進行排擠其他或少數族群，甚至進行族群清洗。在蘇哈托（Suharto）威權政府時期的同化政策即是族群清洗政策。同化政策歧視並剝奪華人文化權利。其結果後來造成族群之間的關係惡化，導致 1998 年 5 月的排華事件。

三、印尼政治改革前與改革後的華人政治

1998 年 5 月的一場社會暴動事件帶來印尼全面性的政治改革。長期處於威權統治之下的印尼出現眾多社會與族群問題，印尼社會失去對政府的信心，引起社會動盪。政治改革成為必要的途徑。1998 年 5 月 21 日蘇哈托下台後，印尼進行各方面的政治改革。威權腐敗政府結束後，印尼民主有明顯進展，當很多國家民主發生退化的時候，印尼民主反而延續發展。儘管如此，民主進展的過程中無論在中央還是地方選舉都會出現政治手段（Edward Aspinal and Marcus Mietner 2010: 21-23），如褻瀆和誹謗引發的身份認同政治問題。

（一）改革前的政策

舊秩序時期（稱為蘇卡諾時期）的印尼是新獨立的國家。1945 年 8 月 17 日宣佈獨立後，荷蘭再度返回，並佔領印尼東區島嶼，印尼再次陷入維持獨立的抗爭中，同時新成立政府積極推動「自由（free）」與「積極（being active）」的外交政策，讓印尼加入國際組織，並得到國際的支持。由於殖民歷史的緣故，蘇卡諾總統主張反殖民主義，並相對親近共產主義，因此印尼共產主義崛起，印尼共產黨成為強大的政黨。而努力推動外交關係的蘇卡諾政府，忽略了國內的發展、經濟蕭條與政治問題，讓印尼社會動盪，造成社會中出現反政府運動。此外加上印尼政府各派系的政權爭鬥，讓印尼政治局勢動盪不安。當時仍是陸軍少將的蘇哈托便以共產主義會危害印尼國家安全、不利於印尼的政治、經濟和社會發展為由爭奪政權。有一種說法是由東南亞社會與現代歷史專家 Wertheim 所提，蘇哈托假藉深怕印尼赤化的西方自由民主主義為由，在 1965 年 9 月 30 日引發一場軍事政變，史稱 9/30 事件，並指責該政變為印尼共產黨奪權的手段（Setiono 2008: 914-924）。9/30 事件後，蘇哈托展開奪權行動，剷除印尼共產黨人和與共產黨有關係的人士，佔領暫缺的官員職務（顧長永 2013：18-22）。

9/30 事件之後，蘇哈托在 1966 年成功得到政權，並對華人實施一系列的同化政策。表面上，同化政策是為了統合不同文化外來族群，實踐國家民族統一。但實際上該政策是為了打壓華人的身份與習俗。蘇哈托上任後，為了實現該政策，實施了族群歧視的法規，如：

1. 總統決定書 No. 127/U/Kep/12/1966 關於華人改名法令，從中國姓名改為印尼式姓名之規定。
2. 總統指令書 No. 14/1967（Inpres No.14/1967）關於華人宗教信仰、文化習俗實踐之規定。
3. 總統指令書 No. 37/U/IN/6/1967 關於華人移民以及國籍問題相關規定。

4. 總統決定書 No. 240/1967 關於印尼華人基本政策，包括：限制與封閉華人文化習俗及華人教育政策，規定華人教育得按照同化政策來進行。

關閉華校是同化政策中對華人影響最大的法令，同時禁止開辦外僑大學、禁止採用華語書刊，並禁止使用華語、關閉中文報刊、禁止中文書刊、文化產品的進口和發行，亦呼籲華人改中文姓名為印尼式姓名。除了以上幾個總統法指令書，印尼最高等人民協商會也實施了 1966 年第 32 條（TAP MPRS XXXII Tahun 1966）的決定書。規定列舉如下：一、所有非拉丁（Latin）字母的報刊由政府出版；二、禁止出版中文的書籍、報刊以及傳單；三、禁止進口中文報刊與所有中文媒體刊物（Dawis 2010: 104-114）。9/30 事件結束了蘇卡諾的舊制序政府，並進入蘇哈托領導的新秩序政府。後者為了消滅共產主義，以自由民主名義將印尼政體改為威權體系國家。蘇哈托以威權專制掌控 32 年的印尼政治。

同化政策下，華人在生活中與原住民或其他族群，看似沒什麼差異，但實際上華人卻受到就業的限制。如在印尼社會有著不成文規定，華人不能參政。即便在秩序時期後期有一位華人部長，鄭建盛（Mohamad Hasan），但他是蘇哈托的親信及密友。蘇哈托以指派方式，讓鄭擔任短時貿易和工業部長。除了禁止參政外，華人亦不能從事與社服、法律、公職相關的行業。印尼華人學者 Danandjaja, M.A 認為，華人在同化政策過程中遭受的打壓與歧視不符合印尼共和國建國精神——「存異求同（Bhinneka Tunggal Ika）」，同時也讓印尼社會分裂，族群之間的問題越演越烈。

（二）改革後的政策

印尼政治改革中最根本的問題是規劃中央與地方政府的權力制度，改善以中央為政治中心。印尼威權政府時期地方預算皆由中央分配，地方政

府並無權力發揮地方發展潛能[3]。印尼屬於島嶼及多元社會的國家，每個地區的屬性與人文社會都各不相同，貪污、腐敗及官商勾結的政府怠慢印尼各地區的發展。不平均的資源分配使島嶼之間的發展落差極大，如爪哇島以外的地區都處於落後的狀態。因此印尼政治改革最基本的項目之一，在於中央釋放給地方治理的權力，使地方政府以當地的特質開發該地區，降低地區的落差，並提高各地區的競爭力。

1999 年開始，新成立國會修憲並制訂一系列地方分權相關的法規。修訂後的法規涵蓋多方面的事物，從中央和地方政府之間的財政比例到賦予地方政府國會（DPRD）全權。地方分權制度下的地方國會擁有制訂與地方有關的政策，並調整了省份與其下行政單位的權限。改革後的地方分權制度給予地方政府最大限度善用地方資源發展地方產業與經濟，提高地方智慧與地方在區域之間的競爭力，以及培育具有發展區域能力和競爭力的當地人力。地方分權展開地方公民參政的機會，成為地方首長及地方國會議員，或者單純參與民主運動選擇地方首長及國會議員，讓地方決定自己的發展。地方分權的法規更制訂於一系列的《地方分權條例》中（Wasistiono and Polyando 2017: 18-35）。

1. 1999 年第 22 條法規

1999 年第 22 條法規是針對政治改革的第一次修法後的地方分權法規。本法規由哈比比時期所修改，主要修改有關地方政府支出和收入的權限，並賦予國會地方首長選拔權力，將原本由中央政府指派的模式更改為由國會議員代表選舉。從民主精神角度來衡量的話，本法規的修改尚未達到平衡地方政府的權力分立（Separation of power）的制度，所以此法規實施後地方政府出現政治亂象，國會議員權力大於行政首長於是形成行政首長聽從國會，同時需要對地方國會和總統負責的現象。而在法規方面，地方國會有擬訂權，但沒有制訂權（Wasistiono and Polyando 2017: 367-371）。

[3] 蘇哈托威權政府時間，印尼政府實施中央集權制度，中央政府掌控所有政治決策，包括地方的決策。地方首長只擁有有限的權益。所有的決策都以官僚與官員利益為主。中央政府的決策的單向性制度，以中央政府為決策者，地方政府執行者，而百姓只是採取政策的對象（Hidayat 2003）。

2. 2004 年第 32 條法規

本法規在尤多約諾時期修改。2004 年第 32 法規擬定出相對大的變化，使印尼民主發展大步的進展。從自法規實施後，地方首長從地方國會代表選出更改為當地公民直選（Wasistiono and Polyando 2017: 430-431）。

3. 2014 年第 23 條法規

距離 2004 年第 32 法規上路之 10 年後，因國內與國際情勢，佐科威（Joko Widodo）政府再度進行地方分權的修法。本法規注重國家團結議題、公民擁有最高權力和透過恢復地方國會作為立法的職能實現社會公正。本法規實施後，地方國會擁有制訂地方有關法規的權力，而中央政府只管控國安及國家全面性相關的法規與政策。省政府的行政角色則作為中央政府的代表，負責規範地方政府，包括縣市和鄉村的運行（Wasistiono and Polyando 2017: 440-442）。



圖二　印尼政治改革後的地方分權法規要點

（資料來源：Wasistiono, Sadu and Polyando, Petrus. 2017. *Politik Desentralisasi di Indonesia*. Sumedang: IPDN Press.）

地方分權法規的改革改變了印尼中央與地方政府的政治關係。Priyambudi Sulistiyanto and Maribeth Erb（2009: 3）認為地方分權是印尼全面性的轉型，也是印尼在民主過渡期中強化民主的一項重要政策（Hidayat 2003）。

就以上所述，印尼地方分權的民主轉型可分成三個階段。1999 年第 22 條法規是屬於初期政治轉型階段。在此階段，中央政府開始賦予地方國會選地方首長的權益，但是尚未有制訂法規權力；2004 年第 32 條法規是轉型的第二階段，屬於發展階段。在此階段，因國家發展趨勢中央政府大幅度調整地方權力法規，賦予地方公民直選地方首長的權益及參政的機會，但仍然限制國會的立法功能，直到 2014 年第 23 條法規執行後，地方分權才進入相對成熟階段，民主權力分立在地方政府實現，達到行政、立法及司法的平等並相互制衡。

印尼政治改革與民主化的過程中也出現負面的影響，一方面地方分權開放了地方公民參政的機會，另一方面地方分權掀起了在各級地方政府機構金錢政治和貪污。除此之外，地方政府直選引起地方政治家族的崛起，在未轉型完善民主制度過程中，金錢政治和關說已造成地方政治腐敗及惡化（Sulistiyanto and Erb 2009: 3-4）。儘管如此，地方分權仍然帶給印尼民主正面的發展。自從 2004 年第 32 條有關於直選地方首長的法規執行後，也帶給印尼少數族群與華人參政的機會（Aspinal and Mietner 2010: 270-273）。

由於早期印尼政治多限制在爪哇島，所以爪哇島以外的族群相對較少有機會參與中央政治，連地方政府的首長或重要職務都是中央指派的親信，所以政治改革對少數族群而言是前所未有的機會。對華人言而言，參政並不是新的體驗，但是過去的華人受限於種種原因，如政治傾向與認同、對印尼的認同等，因而不受印尼政壇歡迎。加上華人對於 1965 年軍事政變的創傷和威權政府時期的施壓，讓華人對政治缺法了信心與憧憬。印尼華人研究者湯友蘭（THUNG Ju Lan）表示 1965 年軍事政變事件創傷一直影響印尼華身分認同問題。到 90 年代，所有居住在印尼的華人已是

土生土長華人，對祖國的認同感已淡化，或者一些華人清楚已經回不去祖國，或者在過去已選擇印尼國籍，政府的排華（assimilation）政策讓華人有被當成外人的感覺，使華人更加忽略與他們無關的事情，包含有關於其周遭生活環境取捨等種種事項的決定。因此導致華人迄今被視為「排外」、「不合群」、「不願融入」等的族群（Wibowo 2010: 9）。

1998 年 5 月排華事件，讓華人知道，即使沒有接觸政治，他們一樣成為政治的犧牲品，所以唯有參政才能夠捍衛自己的安全，而且有別於在舊秩序或新秩序擔任公職的華人都是由指派的方式產生，華人在政治改革後的參與變得比較積極，且華人在政治改革後的參政方式是由政黨提名，選民決定將選票投給誰。是故，當選的華人是透過民主制度選出來的結果。政治改革對整體印尼社會帶來極大的變化。

如今印尼民主發展已步入軌道，但鞏固過程中也出現阻礙，如族群、文化與信仰的衝突接二連三出現在印尼各個地區，尤其華人身份的議題。印尼華人印尼化的過程是長期的社會問題，至今華人身份認同依然能成為爭論的議題。華人身份問題是印尼歷史的產物及歷屆政府政策的結果，其不斷影響印尼社會發展，更是印尼國家和社會發展的挑戰。

四、印尼民主化與華人身份認同對參與政治的影響

1998 年 5 月的暴動事件證明了統治 32 年的威權政府同化政策的失敗。該事件使華人再度成為印尼政治的代罪羔羊，造成華人極大創傷（Suryadinata 2007）。排華事件之後，印尼政府的政治改革使華人的生活有很大的變化，除了能更自信地表達自己的身分，也更能自然地成為印尼社會的一份子（Kuntjara and Hoon 2020: 203）。從以下面向可看出印尼社會對於華人身分認同的改變：首先，印尼政府取消所有針對華人的排華政策，讓華人融入當地社會並帶來正面的影響，同時也讓印尼其他族群認識華人文化，亦能消除長期以來彼此的偏見。其次，1998 年的排華事件讓華人意識到參政能夠維護其安全與利益，而積極參政更能讓他

們透過合法的方式爭取印尼其他族群對他們的認同，並獲得印尼其他族群的支持和認可（Suryadinata 2007: 246）。該事件後，華人政治參政人數明顯提高（Tanasaldy 2015: 446-479）。華人也意識到政治是有效方式來達成目標，讓他們可成為印尼社會的一部份。透過參與政治，華人能表達他們的政治理想及提高政府和印尼社會對華人的了解，同時建立其政治權力。

儘管改革後印尼政壇出現以華人成立的政黨，如印尼華人改革黨（Parti）、印尼同化黨（Parpindo）和印尼統一多元黨（PBI），但是這些政黨並沒那麼受到華人歡迎。相反的，多數華人參與的政黨反而是民族主義政黨（Nationalist Ideology Party），甚至溫和的伊斯蘭主義政黨（Moderate Islam），如印尼鬥爭派民主黨（PDIP）、國家任務黨（PAN）和民族覺醒黨（PKB）（Suryadinata 2007: 246-255）。其中最受華人支持的是印尼鬥爭派民主黨，其次是國家任務黨及民族覺醒黨（Purdey 2003: 432）。其他後來陸續新成立的政黨，如民主黨（PD）、人民良心黨（Hanura）、國民民主黨（Nasdem）以及大印尼運動黨（Gerindra）都有華人黨員、華人國會和地方首長的提名。

1998 年排華事件使華人意識到自己的安全無法依靠別人保護，而必須自己爭取。因此當印尼政府實施改革時，華人藉此機會加入政黨成為政治人物，爭取政黨提名參與國會議員或地方首長的選舉。同時政治改革迫使政黨進行改革。以某些族群或團體為意識形態的政黨在改革時代不再佔優勢，因此許多政黨都透過發展文化多樣性的制度爭取及贏得華人的支持，並開放名額給華人參與國會議員候選人的機會。雖然不是整體印尼社會都有此想法，但是認為華人參政的行動如其所願得到印尼社會支持的想法相對可觀。



圖三　2004 年至 2014 年華人參與國會選舉人數

（資料來源：Tim. 2019. “Jatuh Bangun Etnis Tionghoa dalam Politik Indonesia,” *CNN Indonesia*.）

根據統計，有 150 位華人候選人參加了 2004 年選舉的立法選舉，在 2009 年攀升至 213 位華人候選人，2014 年更增加至 315 名華人參與競選。換言之，華人在 2009 年參加中央議會選舉的比例比 2004 年的選舉增加了 42%，而參與 2014 年選舉的華人候選人則比參與 2009 年的選舉增加了 47.89%，華人參政的比例可算逐年增加。

印尼如今已經歷 20 於餘年的政治改革，印尼華人政治參與提升了華人與其他族群的關係。儘管如此，華人參與印尼政治的發展並非完全無礙。印尼與中國的貿易往來再度掀起對華人的身分的猜疑，對華人產生「想像陰謀」（imagined conspiracy）（Herlijanto 2016: 1-19）。華人身分議題、以爪哇人政治中心的多數決政治及和信仰之間的衝突都是印尼民主發展的挑戰。

2017 年的雅加達省長選舉（Pilkada Jakarta）是身份認同政治（identity politics）勝利的一個例子。身份議題可以用來作為動員群眾壓制政治對

手的手段。雅加達前任省長鍾萬學（Basuki Tjahaya Purnama—Ahok）因褻瀆罪而入獄 2 年即與身份認同政治有關。雅加達省長選舉顯示身份議題與社會中的輿論對印尼政治人物有很大的影響，如 2019 年印尼總統大選。



圖四　信仰與政治選擇

（資料來源：Indikator Politik Indonesia. 2019/04/17. “Exit Poll Pemilu 2019,” *Indikator Politik Indonesia.*）

印尼著名市調公司 Indikator 調查顯示身分議題與信仰影響 2019 年大選。調查顯示 59.1%的受訪者表明會考慮總統候選人的信仰、政見與共同價值。儘管印尼不是伊斯蘭國家，但是印尼仍是最多人口信奉伊斯蘭的國家，因此信仰不但影響印尼社會與文化，也影響印尼政治，並時常被用來實現政治目的（Setiono 2008: 585-600）。

儘管華人文化在印尼社會是少數文化也是次文化，但是華人身份是一實體。Mely G. Tan 將王賡武對東南亞華人身份的解釋概括為幾種類型，包括歷史身份（historical identity）、中華民族主義身份（Chinese nationalist identity）、社區身份（communal identity）、民族或地方身份（national identity）、文化身份（culture identity）、族群身份（ethnic identity）和階級身份（class identity）（Tan 2008: 163）。在印尼社會中，並不是只有華人具有雙重身份的問題，印尼所有族群都有同樣的雙重身份認同，因為印尼所有的族群具有很強的國家身份（national identity）與族群文化身份（ethnic and culture identity），如爪哇人或其他原住民族群，他們同時是印尼人，也能擁有族群的文化身份，同時也具共同的伊斯蘭文化。然多數的華人並非穆斯林、不是印尼社會認同的共同文化一員，所以華人對印尼認同感時常因為維持原有文化及信奉不同的信仰（多數華人信奉道教、儒教或基督徒）而被質疑。

Kauffman 認為身份認同政治是激進份子為了達到政治目的的政治工具，他認為身份認同政治不僅限制於認同某族群身份，而是組織化的歧視運動。Hegel 則認為身份認同政治與個人或國家認同某一個團體有關，國家對某一個團體的認同才能消除社會中對少數民族的歧視行為（引自 Afala 2018: 13-17）。根據 Liadi and Erawati（2020: 35-35）對中加里曼丹省（Central Kalimantan Province）地方首長選舉的研究顯示，儘管印尼選舉監督委員會（Bawaslu）嚴定禁止實用族群、信仰議題來競選，但是還是有候選人無所不用其極地鼓吹選民選擇相同宗教信仰的候選人。

Hobsbwan 認為，印尼社會中發生的身份認同政治是動員個人或群眾拒絕他人身份的身份認同政治（引自 Afala 2018: 31）。印尼社會中明顯的排華事件是有跡可尋的：一、殖民因素，長期被殖民的結果造成印尼社會族群之間有無法解開的心結，社會關係出現裂縫。殖民最重要的結果是使印尼人（原住民族群）失去信心，因而引起備戰心態與對外來人（華人）有明顯的敵意。如同萬里長城並非一日建成的概念，印尼其他族群對華人的敵意也並非單一原因鑄成，其中尚有錯綜複雜的因素交合而成；二、文化差異因素，華人文化與整體印尼文化有很大差別，華人文化的食衣住行都與

印尼當地文化相互違背，如印尼文化皆以伊斯蘭文化為主，禁止喝酒、吃豬肉、賭博等，而且行為低調，但是華人卻有喝酒、賭博、吃豬肉等習慣，行為相較高調，導致兩者格格不入。最後則是政治因素，整體而言，華人在印尼社會並非都遭遇不好經驗，很多地方的華人與當地居民都生活的很融洽，非常自然地融入當地社會。多數浮出台面的問題都是政治操作的結果。綜上所述，歷屆政府的政策、華人本身問題及半套的同化政策都成了華人身份議題的禍首及導致社會分裂等種種因素。實際上，身份議題是動員社會的政治工具，而所有公民，無論是華人、其他族群都只是政治的犧牲品。

五、結論

根據自由之家 2020 年的統計數據顯示[4]，印尼參政的自由度僅為部分自由，總得分率為 61 點，分為政治權益（political rights）佔 31 點，公民自由（civil liberties）佔 31 點。此結果顯示，印尼發展中的民主發生停滯，從中央到地方政府都有貪污的問題及對少數族群的歧視議題。此外，少數族群在國會代表非常少，其中華人和在伊斯蘭社會中被視為禁忌的同性群體在國會代表都非常低[5]，雖然印尼政治改革已進行 20 多年，但族群衝突依然存在，而華人身份議題與華人對印尼的忠誠一直是印尼政治中的熱門話題。

Bland 認為，2019 年印尼大選是身份認同政治的勝利（Bland 2019）。佐科威（Joko Widodo）與阿明（Maruf Amin）的組合在選舉上產生了許多預測，他們的得票率證明了身份與信仰議題的嚴重性。選擇阿明作為其副

4 詳細資訊請參見網站：https://freedomhouse.org/country/indonesia/freedom-world/2020. Accessed on 2020/07/24。

5 印尼華人不願參政有許多原因，首先，華人認為，參與政治對他們沒有好處，誰當上地方首長、國會代表都無法帶給他們任何改變。再來，部分華人認為選其他族群的候選人是明智的作法，也能讓他們比較安全，不受到矚目。因為印尼社會中一直有種不成文的規定，華人首長、國會代表或其他公職都必須比其他族群的政治人物更加努力以獲得更高成就，假如無法達成此規定將使所有華人遭殃。於是對華人而言，選其他種族會讓他們更加安全，更何況政治改革後，印尼政壇出現很多多元主義的政治家。

手有助於提升佐科威的得票率，尤其是穆斯林的票。佐科威（Joko Widodo）2019 年的得票率比 2014 年在以伊斯蘭為大本營的兩大省分明顯增加。身為印尼最大伊斯蘭組織的領導人，阿明擁有龐大的穆斯林支持者，他帶給佐科威（Joko Widodo）相對大的幫助。

學者對印尼政治的身份認同政治議題皆抱持一致的看法，認為其是實現政治菁英的政治目標與利益的途徑。印尼華人政治的身份認同政治議題明顯是信仰與族群差異的敏感議題，不僅影響政治領域，也影響社會融入並影響中央至地方政府的行政。作為擁有多元文化的國家，印尼社會不但有華人文化差異，各族群的文化亦各不相同，所以如何維繫好社會之間的橋樑、促進印尼多元社會建立一個使所有不同文化背景的印尼公民都能認同的國家民族身份，是印尼政府所要面對的重要課題。

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泰國南部普吉鎮啅世 To Sae 信仰初探
A Preliminary Study on To Sae Worship in Phuket Town, Southern Thailand

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一、序論

在泰國各區域的宗教信仰統計分布中，接近馬來西亞的泰國南部，其穆斯林比例明顯高於泰國其他區域（表一）。多數關於此邊境區域研究關注族群與宗教間的衝突，但亦有研究著眼於此區域不同族群與宗教群體間的互動與共存（西井涼子 2001）。與此相關，在泰國南部普吉的啅（*To*）信仰值得學界進一步注意。穆斯林聖像 *To* 的信眾主要為華人與泰人佛教徒，而非該地區的穆斯林。這些 *To* 被視為是普吉早期的開荒者，因而被華人及泰人認為是土地守護神而崇拜信仰。片岡樹更進一步指出，這些 *To* 信仰與華人土地神信仰，如本頭公、大伯公、福德正神的綜攝習合現象（片岡樹 2012）。然而，在本研究中，我將分析其在普吉發展的三種不

* 本文為科技部專題研究計畫「泰國南部泰華社群的穆斯林聖像 *To* 信仰與實踐」（108-2410-H-001-103-MY2）的初步調查報告。本調查進行過程中，獲得許多田野報導人和朋友的幫忙，本人至為感謝，沒有你們的協助，本文將無法完成。本文初稿曾於 2019 年在由馬來西亞拉曼大學陳愛梅博士主持的「史料與田野調查：拿督公研討會」中發表，亦感謝與會者的寶貴建議。

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同模式，旨在指出其近來的發展，非僅限於族群關係與土地守護神信仰面向。

在普吉眾多不同的「啅」（*To*）之中，本研究將以普吉鎮上的「啅世」（To Sae）作為分析的主要對象。To Sae 又被稱為 Phota To Sae，*Phota* 泰文字面意思為父祖[1]，用以稱呼受尊敬的男性長者，而 *To* 則是馬來文中對長者的稱呼[2]。在本研究中，我將討論不同的 To Sae 神廟的創設和其近來在普吉發展不同模式間的關係。

地區	佛教	伊斯蘭教	基督宗教	其他
全國平均	93.5	5.4	1.1	<0.1
曼谷	93.7	5.0	1.3	<0.1
中部地區	97.0	2.5	0.5	0.1
北部地區	96.9	0.1	3.0	<0.1
東北地區	98.9	<0.1	1.1	<0.1
南部地區	70.9	28.9	0.2	<0.1

表一　2018 年泰國各地區宗教人口百分比。

（資料來源：泰國國家統計辦公室 National Statistical Office of Thailand）

二、文獻回顧

過去關於華人的穆斯林神像信仰研究，多數為馬來西亞的拿督公信仰研究，尤其集中在西馬，強調其華人特色和族群關係的影響。雖然有部份研究指其源於前伊斯蘭的馬來地方信仰 *keramat*（Cheu 1992）[3]多數研究仍

[1] *Phota* 一詞泰語日常使用上為姻親的岳父之意，然在這裡使用上並非此意。而是以 *pho*（父）、*ta*（外祖父）等用以稱呼自己親屬或非親屬卻尊敬的男性長輩詞彙，以疊字方式表示對神靈的尊敬，類似的詞彙例如 *Phopu*，或是在泰國東北的開拓者神靈 *Puta* 皆類似。從這個角度來看，*Phota To* 與拿督公有異曲同工之妙，皆是拿不同語言對於長者尊者的稱呼，合併來稱呼神靈。

[2] *To* 一詞為馬來語 *datok* 之略稱，尤其冠於神佛之前，陳育崧認為 *tokong* 一詞為馬來語 *to* 與華語「公」的混合語，許雲樵更進一步指出泰人亦以 *to* 來稱呼伊斯蘭伊瑪目，甚至華語「大伯公」的「大」字亦來自馬來語的 *to*。詳可見，陳育崧 1951。

[3] 在印尼實也可見類似原基於 *keramat* 信仰的華人宗教轉化，見 Salmon 1993。

指出其具華人特色，例如其為介於家內土地神與村落土地神中間的土地信仰特質（陳志明 2000）、傳統道教神祇的官定地位（Peow 2012）、亦或是相關的儀式實踐，如紅蠟燭、香，或是如陰陽概念等（王琛發 2001），皆反映了華人宗教的綜攝特色。多數研究也指出這類華人的穆斯林神像崇拜，與華人移民和以馬來穆斯林為主要族群間的多元族群社會中族群關係的脈絡相關，為華人移民適應馬來世界的方式（Chin and Lee 2014）。亦有研究指出另存在不同族群形象的拿督公，例如 Orang Asli、暹人（Siam）、印度人、錫克教人等拿督公，同樣地反映了華人與此不同族群間的互動關係（Peow 2012; Chin and Lee 2014; Lee and Chin 2014）。甚至是在近來漸增的馬來穆斯林國族主義脈絡下，華人社群維繫其文化傳統，同時展現適應與抵抗的方式（Cheu 1992）[4]。

相對於馬來西亞拿督公研究，泰南的 *To* 僅有少數研究略有提及。在西井涼子關於泰國南部沙敦府（Satun Province）村落中佛教徒與穆斯林共生的研究中，她亦有提及 *To* 信仰的存在。穆斯林神像 To Nan 被視為是村落的守護靈，具有土地神的特質。在該村落中，無論是佛教徒亦或穆斯林皆敬拜 To Nan，並視自己為 To Nan 的子孫。她也指出，隨著森林開拓與建設新道路等村落的發展，To Nan 的力量也逐漸衰退（西井涼子 2001）。另外，片岡樹關於泰國南部普吉府華人的本頭公信仰研究中，亦提及 *To* 信仰的存在。他注意到在 50 間他所紀錄的華人廟宇中，有 6 間亦同時有 *To* 的祭祀（Kataoka 2012）。他認為這是華人土地神與地方土地守護靈的綜攝現象。他還指出有同時是華人土地公和 *To* 的乩身，而且他認為華人土地公與 *To* 都和老虎的象徵有所關係（片岡樹 2012）。

從過去馬來西亞和泰國的研究可見，學者們多認為拿督公或 *To* 為土地的守護靈或守護神。另一方面，他們也多與早期的開拓者或是主流的馬來穆斯林群體有關。然而，在我於泰國南部普吉鎮上的田野調查中發

[4] 梅慧玉（2014）在印尼雅加達的研究也指出，華人因「聖跡崇拜」而產生的「他類神」，如印尼神、回教神、拿督等，其中「行善成神」的概念提供了伊斯蘭一神論、馬來文化泛靈信仰與華文化多神觀的交會介面；但在實踐上，卻透過降乩等而脈絡化成為華裔童神文化的一部分，並透過此有多元及不同版本的認同與詮釋。

現，雖然 *To* 作為土地守護靈的模式依然存在，但在近來 To Sae 的發展中，我認為至少還有其他兩種不同發展模式。這兩種模式與泰國的還願交換系統（*bonban* 或是 *bon-kaebon*），以及近來乩身所提供的宗教服務有關。下面我將從普吉鎮上 To Sae 神廟的創設緣由[5]出發，更詳細地討論這三種模式。

三、發展類型

（一）土地守護神

如前所述，*To* 原本與土地守護靈信仰相關。To Sae 被認為是許久以前來到普吉的三位穆斯林開拓者，並各自被稱為白 To Sae、紅 To Sae 與黑 To Sae。他們並非真的兄弟，而是來到普吉後認識，並一同在高地修行，最後修煉成神。有些人指其來自爪哇，但亦有些人認為他們來自沙烏地阿拉伯，甚至具有王族血統。但無論他們從何而來，都反映了當地華人或泰人社群相信普吉的早期開拓者為穆斯林，他們比華人和泰人更早來到普吉。

這些 To Sae 神像在多數神廟中皆可見作穆斯林打扮，或者神廟中有相關的符號標記。To Sae 神像的形象多為蓄長鬍長者，頭上多戴有宋谷帽或頭巾，並拄杖、著白衣或白袍。許多神像後方會有伊斯蘭教的星月標誌，有些神廟中還會掛有寫著阿拉伯文的清真寺圖像。從這些裝飾或符號標誌，可見得其被視為穆斯林的形象。但雖然如此，如同本文開頭所指出的，其信眾主要為華人與泰人佛教徒，較少有穆斯林前來參拜。

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[5] 這三個分類並非根據其內容上同一標準的異同，而是以各神廟在初始創設時的原因來作分類，但並不完全等同於各神廟在當代的功能分類。實際在當代各神廟的運作上，三者可能是混雜的：例如一開始作為土地守護神的神廟，也可能被信徒拿來求取個人心願，靈媒也可以用此神廟進行宗教服務。但就討論上而言，從其初始創設的原因，作為分析上的理想型，可以幫助我們理解圍繞著 To Sae 在不同時間點可能有的不同功能。

第一間 To Sae 神廟（神廟外側亦自己宣稱為普吉島上所有廟宇的第一座）位在從普吉鎮上往鎮旁山丘的路上（圖一）。這座山丘被普吉當地人稱為啅世山（To Sae Hill）。據稱這座山丘過去並無任何道路與建築，山中佈滿了森林，且有老虎與蛇出沒，對普吉鎮上的人來說是危險之處。因此，我們可以見得普吉人將 To Sae 視為是對充滿危險的森林與野生動物的山丘之守護靈。普吉鎮人亦視老虎為 To Sae 的隨從或化身。換而言之，To Sae 作為這未知土地的守護靈，同時體現了其象徵安全與危險的一面。

圖一　往 To Sae 山方向的第一間 To Sae 神廟

（林育生攝於 2019 年 7 月 7 日）

然而，在約 1970 年代，數間電視廣播公司開始計畫在 To Sae 山頂建設廣播站，因而開始開拓森林、建設道路，以通往山頂的設置處。此時，另一座 To Sae 神廟也同時建設於山頂廣播站旁（圖二）。我們可見得，隨著新的道路與建築發展，人們必須要開始祭拜其土地守護靈。其中一個 To Sae 神廟的管理人告訴我，當時若非在山頂建立了 To Sae 神廟，廣播站很難順利地完成建設，並且遭遇許多問題。這和西井涼子的研究稍有不

同[6]。在她的研究中，To Nan 因為道路開發及村落發展而漸失力量，但相反的 To Sae 反而因為建築及道路的開發，更需要仰賴其力量以順利完成。

圖二　To Sae 山頂廣播站旁的 To Sae 神廟

（林育生攝於 2019 年 7 月 9 日）

另外，如同片岡樹所指出，有些普吉的 *To* 與華人的土地神信仰有綜攝習合現象，例如與此地區本頭公、大伯公、福德正神等的習合。他的報告中指出在普吉府內杼縣（Kathu District）地區中的福生宮與福山宮，這兩座以土地公為主神的華人廟宇當中，同時亦可見於其旁有祭祀 *To*。然而，這兩座廟中的 *To* 並非本文主要探討的 To Sae，而是其他的 *To*。另外，片岡樹亦提及前述普吉第一座 To Sae 神廟中的福建裔管理人，其同時是華人土地神與 To Sae 的乩身，他也因此認為這反映了華人土地神與 To Sae 的綜攝習合現象[7]。

6　西井涼子。2001。《死をめぐる実践宗教：南タイのムスリム・仏教徒關係へのパースペクティヴ》。京都市：世界思想社。頁 107-114。

7　然而此座神廟在我 2019 年 7 月訪問之時，神廟的管理人已非片岡樹所提及的同時為土地神與 To Sae 乩身的福建裔人。現任的神廟管理人告訴我他來此處已十多年，以前的確有另一位乩身也同時在其他華人廟宇中降乩，但後來 To Sae 不讓他待在這裡，因此他已離開，不待在此神廟了。現任的管理人從 15 年前開始，僅單純有黑 To Sae 降乩。

隨著這種 *To* 與華人宗教的綜攝習合現象，To Sae 作為土地守護靈，也不再只侷限於前述的危險山林或是新興公共建築，他甚至也變成了許多華人廟宇甚或是其他私人建築的守護神。在普吉鎮郊，有兩座華人廟宇，各自都有祭拜 To Sae 作為其土地守護神。其一為在普吉鎮後山（Rang Hill）山腳下的三世諸佛廟宇，該廟設置於 2002 年，原址為墓地，後來已挖起移至別地。據廟宇的管理人所言，那時候 To Sae 指示說要在此地蓋廟讓人能夠放下執著，所以蓋了此廟，廟中華人神明亦有、泰式佛像亦有、也有如 To Sae 的穆斯林神像。原本 To Sae 是放在主殿後面的神殿中，每年在普吉年度盛事的九皇勝會時會將此後殿關閉，但後來覺得既然是華人廟宇就還是以華人神像為主，因此在 2017 年時將 To Sae 以及其他泰式佛像都移至廟下方一旁的旁間中供奉。但也預計若廟再往旁邊擴張的話[8]，會將 To Sae 再請回來。但另也有他廟的人告訴我，當初是在蓋三世諸佛廟宇的時候，同樣碰到了許多問題，因此才請示了 To Sae 並在此地設神廟供奉 To Sae，廟宇才順利建設完成。另外值得一提的是，這裡所供奉的 To Sae 與多數其他 To Sae 為清楚的穆斯林形象有所不同，根據廟的管理人的詮釋，指出這裡奉祀的 To Sae 是白、紅、黑三位 To Sae 中最長者白 To Sae，但因他是虎人（*sueasaming*），所以供奉其虎面人身的形象（圖三）。這與其化身為老虎或老虎為其隨從的常聽到的解釋略有不同。

[8] 在主殿外，2017 年旁邊也蓋好了一座新的觀音殿，正是在那個時候將 To Sae 以及其他泰式佛像移往其他房間。此地捐款人主要皆非普吉人，觀音殿其中一位較主要的捐款者是曼谷作建築土地相關者。

圖三　三世諸佛廟宇外供奉虎面人身像 To Sae 及其他泰式佛像的房間
（林育生攝於 2019 年 7 月 8 日）

另外一間祭拜 To Sae 的華人廟宇為普吉鎮往內枎縣路上鎮郊的七星娘娘廟，此廟設置歷史已百年以上，但就訪談及廟中所存的書面資料，並不知確切的建設時間，僅知當時此地開採錫礦，華人移民帶來了七星娘娘的木頭金身，因而設置了此廟宇。但 To Sae 的祭拜並非與七星娘娘廟的設置同時，推測應該是在後來屢次的翻修過程中所設置，其形式為泰式家屋樣式的土地神廟，裡頭沒有神像，但廟宇委員會的人告訴我此土地神廟即為 To Sae，也不知道確切設置的時間，此外除了一般平日祭拜外，並沒有特別的祭拜儀式（圖四）。不過普吉鎮上其他 To Sae 神廟亦有人告訴我，那邊祭拜的可能不是 To Sae，應該為 To Tami，其可能是從地理位置來判斷。

除此之外，如我後面會再詳述，有些 To Sae 的乩身會提供給信眾許多各別的宗教服務。其中一項即為協助信眾在家外設置泰式的土地神廟 *san phraphum*（或 *san chaothi*）。這些設置在各別家屋外的泰式土地神廟，有些也同樣奉祀 To Sae。這亦反映了 To Sae 作為土地神的特色。

從這些 To Sae 神廟設置的例子可見，無論其為穆斯林、華人亦或是泰式，To Sae 在這些情形下都與土地守護靈信仰的概念有關。

圖四　七星娘娘廟外供奉的 To Sae 為一般泰式土地神樣貌

（林育生攝於 2019 年 7 月 10 日）

（二）還願交換（*bonban*／*bon-kaebon*）

雖然許多 To Sae 神廟如過去許多研究提及，是與土地守護靈的信仰有關，但近來普吉鎮上許多 To Sae 神廟的發展，不完全直接與其相關。第二類的 To Sae 神廟與泰國的還願交換（*bonban*／*bon-kaebon*）有關。*Bonban* 指的是信眾向神明許願並承諾若願望達成會予以回報。這些回報的奉獻品自由度很高，包括諸如食物、戲劇表演、放鞭炮等等，端視信眾與神明之間的約定。在 To Sae 的例子中，除了豬肉與酒這些一般穆斯林的禁忌之外[9]，其他的奉獻基本上都是允許的。而在這些眾多奉獻的可能性之中，其中之

[9] 但三世諸佛廟宇的管理人，告訴我在那邊祭祀 To Sae，酒是允許的。僅豬肉不行。菸也是可以接受的，但後來因為菸常可能會燒到 To Sae 的鬍子，所以後來也少以菸來祭拜。此例相較他例較為特別。

一即是為 To Sae 蓋新神廟來祭拜祂，信眾們稱此為「獻廟」（*yoksan*）。依此方式，許多在普吉鎮上的 To Sae 神廟，與土地神信仰並無直接關連性，而是與這種信眾和 To Sae 的祈願有關。

在我於普吉鎮上的調查中，至少有三間 To Sae 神廟是與這種信徒的還願交換奉獻有關。最大的一座 To Sae 神廟，亦位在 To Sae 山上，但與山下和山頂兩座較直接與土地信仰有關的神廟不同，這座在通往山頂路中間的神廟，據說是由一位從事房屋租賃業的普吉當地人捐獻所蓋的。這座神廟的資訊是在普吉的觀光資訊或網路資訊當中稍較詳細者，主要供奉白、紅、黑三位 To Sae，但一旁也有奉祀其他不同神像（圖五）。路過者不少會來獻香祈求，旁邊亦有相關的小賣店，準備可以祭拜 To Sae 的物品和一些簡單的食物。但關於當初這位「獻廟」者為何獻廟以及為何選在此地的原因並不清楚，一旁小賣店的管理人也並非普吉當地人，對於神廟的歷史亦不甚清楚。

圖五　To Sae 山中最有人氣的 To Sae 神廟

（林育生攝於 2019 年 7 月 7 日）

第二座此類「獻廟」的神廟，則是位在普吉鎮上普吉府立醫院旁的 To Sae 神廟（圖六）。該廟的獻廟人為一由外府來的潮州裔男性，初到普吉時並不富裕，在一間亦是由潮州裔所開的餐廳擔任廚師的工作，後來他出來開了自己的餐廳十分成功，人生也過得順遂，其感念於向 To Sae 的祈願達成，因而在 1995 年於此處設立神廟以酬謝 To Sae。在這位潮州裔男性過世之前，他每年都會在神廟舉辦拜師（*wai khru*）儀式，並且會有許多乩身參加該儀式；但據傳其妻子子女並不太熱中於此，在其過世之後，此類每年舉辦的儀式規模小了許多。現在負責管理這座神廟的，是住在附近的一位由清邁嫁到此地的 60 歲泰北泰人女性，其先生的祖父為福建裔的普吉本地人；但他們也說現在此一神廟較少有活動，而他們自己家中也有祭拜其他華人神明，甚至孫子從小就有善財童子降乩，並參加九皇勝會活動，且稱因仍食豬肉並未在家中祭拜 To Sae。他們也指出，過去在這個廟設立之前，多數人都會到前述位在 To Sae 山中央的 To Sae 神廟去祭拜，但後來建立了此一神廟後，即方便大家來祭拜。

圖六　普吉府立醫院旁的 To Sae 宮廟（Damnak To Sae）。

（林育生攝於 2019 年 7 月 9 日）

第三座與此相關的神廟，與前兩座稍有不同。相較於前兩座神廟雖為個人獻廟但開放給大眾祭拜，第三座神廟則較屬於私人性質的神廟。我並未實際到訪此座私人神廟，據傳是一位住在內杼縣（Kathu District）的女性，祈願能嫁個好老公，後來跟一位有錢的外國人結婚後，因為願望達成也獻廟蓋了一個私人的神廟以酬謝 To Sae。

在這些例子中，我們可見 To Sae 已不再是和土地及地域的概念直接相關，祂更像是個泰國一般有靈驗的神明，當信眾向祂許願並且願望達成之時，信眾就會獻廟給祂作為交換，以酬謝其幫助。

（三）乩童宗教服務

第三種類型的 To Sae 神廟與 To Sae 的乩身有關。雖然如片岡樹所言，有些乩身同時能接受 To Sae 和華人土地神的降乩，但大多數 To Sae 的乩身與華人土地神並無直接關係。在調查訪問中，除了僅有一例是只有 To Sae 降乩的乩身外，多數的 To Sae 乩身都同時能夠接受其他華人神明的降身，例如李府王爺、關公等等，但並非僅限於土地神。這些同時能接受 To Sae 和其他華人神明降乩的乩身通常先是有華人神明來降乩，尤其是在普吉著名的九皇勝會中首次降乩。然後通常會是在數年後，他們也開始能夠有 To Sae 來降乩。例如一位七十多歲的紅 To Sae 乩身就說，他在 2002 年時開始參與普吉鎮上一間現亦有斗母宮的華人廟宇的九皇勝會活動，那時第一次有李府二太子木吒降乩在自己身上，而 To Sae 是在兩年後 2004 年才開始降乩的。另外在內杼縣（Kathu District）有另一位 To Sae 的乩身，也同樣是先降關聖帝君，而後才有 To Sae 來降乩。

與第二類的 To Sae 神廟是由信眾直接和 To Sae 祈願溝通不同，在第三類的 To Sae 神廟中，信眾透過 To Sae 的乩身以尋求宗教服務和協助。這些服務包括了如前述所言的，為信眾們設置泰式土地神廟 *san phraphum* 或 *san chaothi*。其他的服務包括如健康、事業、或是對未來的指引，這些都不直接與土地守護靈信仰相關。而當信眾增加且穩定之後，有些乩身就

會試圖建立自己的或共用同一神廟以祭拜 To Sae，這些神廟的建設通常都來自於曾向乩身尋求服務的信眾們的捐獻。普吉鎮上 2016 年新建的一座 To Sae 神廟就來自於此種背景。在這個神廟建設之前，該地僅有一間私人華人廟宇。但前述同時為李府二太子及 To Sae 乩身者，約莫十多年前就開始每週日晚上固定在此處接受問事[10]，每次大概會有十多人，多則二十多人左右前來。後來在 2016 年，集資在這裡蓋了一間 To Sae 神廟，也開始在每年泰曆 6 月 15 日固定舉行拜師（*wai khru*）儀式。此後，不只是他會使用此地服務問事，其他 To Sae 乩身亦能使用此地接受問事。信眾也可自行來祭拜 To Sae，尤其以一般穆斯林到清真寺聚會的週五為多（圖七）。

我在 2019 年 7 月拜訪此一 To Sae 神廟之際，前述同為李府二太子及 To Sae 乩身者，正逢週五來此處祭拜 To Sae，但實則因其身體不適，因此到年底前停止每週在此處的問事。但在他離開之後，有另一乩身前來，並有兩位女性前來問事。乩身上半身赤裸，下半身穿著白色褲子，他先是坐在椅子上，然後漸漸開始發出像是有東西要吐出來的聲音，接著開始搖頭大叫，並跳到地上狀似爬行的老虎[11]，然後爬進神廟中。這時候一位女性助理拿了紅色頭巾給他，他也自己綁上。後來旁邊兩位約四、五十歲的女性走進去問事，女性助理只拿了一兩張像是日曆紙的東西給她們，然後出來後跟其他人說，不要旁人在那邊聽，所以一群人也就接續出去。問事女性進去跟乩身講話，乩身偶爾也會回話，也偶去觸碰女性身體一、兩次，然後偶爾會發出小小吼聲。女性後來用日曆紙包了錢在裡面放在前方，沒有直接交給乩身。後來乩身叫女性助理來，女性助手也進去低語了幾句，後來跟兩位問事女性說了些話，送了她們離開。接著女性助理把前面的燒香熄掉後，把他的頭巾脫下來，乩身就馬上倒下恢復神智了。由於問事涉

[10] 據該乩身所言，他也不是只在此處接受問事，有時也會出去到信眾家中接受問事，或如前述所言到信眾家設置泰式土地神廟。他說若是他去設泰式土地神廟 *san phraphum* 的話，土地神就會是 To Sae。若是在神廟的問事，最多的都是問關於健康、生意、未來是怎樣，或者是有人如果被下咒了(*don khong*)，就會來求解。來的時候都是一個一個進去問，因為問的時候很多是跟私事有關，不想讓別人聽見。

[11] 如前所述 To Sae 亦被相信為能化身為老虎。但就我詢問幾位乩身，他們說雖然都同樣是 To Sae，但每位乩身降乩時的狀態不一樣。

及個人隱私，基於研究倫理我並未直接詢問問事內容為何，僅就問事過程作紀錄。但可見得此處神廟與乩身問事的關係，多於單純的土地守護靈信仰，並且與此地相關的乩身並非獨佔並常駐在此，而可能是固定的時間如週日晚上，或是有問事時才來此地進行宗教服務。

圖七　2016 年主要有乩身及其信眾設置的 To Sae 神宮（Damnak To Sae）。
（林育生攝於 2019 年 7 月 12 日）

前述在內杼縣（Kathu District）同為關聖帝君和 To Sae 乩身的神廟亦為類似形式。訪問此神廟時，因該乩身不在且旁邊神廟的乩身不願意接受進一步訪問，所以未能獲得直接訊息。但在該處名為 To Sae 宮（Damnak To Sae）的神廟中，亦可見巨大的關聖帝君像，即可見得其如他人所言，有不同神祇降乩的情形。此外，在 To Sae 宮旁有一私人的朱府王爺千歲廟，以及在不遠處另有一 To Yes 的私人神壇，這些不同的乩身間彼此都有互助合作交流，且有類似的經驗。例如附近神壇中，今年七十多歲的 To Yes 乩身就稱他常會到此一 To Sae 宮一起降乩，參與問事活動；他自己是在 25 歲時參與內杼斗母宮九皇勝會的活動時，有李府元帥的降乩；後來

在四十多歲的時候，才開始有 *To* 自己上身，並開始從事相關的宗教服務。據其所言，李府元帥的降乩是他自己去請來的，但 To Yes 則是不請自來的。

四、討論與結論

雖然如同過去研究指出，To Sae 仍與普吉鎮上土地守護靈的概念有關，但從第二種和第三種型式的 To Sae 神廟發展來看，To Sae 已不再如過去，僅是象徵著對於充滿危險的陌生土地、以及不確定的穆斯林開拓者的集體焦慮，其反而成為一個靈驗的神明，能夠一對一地、或是透過乩身，來解決信眾的各別問題。To Sae 神廟的設置，也從設置於 To Sae 山的山腳、山頂，到華人廟宇或公共及私人建築外，轉而到與特定的土地無關的「獻廟」或「乩身」而成的不同 To Sae 宮廟。

此外，與過去馬來西亞研究中所強調的族群脈絡不同，雖然在泰南普吉亦有相當比例的穆斯林居住，但近來 To Sae 神廟的發展並不與此族群脈絡直接相關。這些宗教實踐與乩童所提供的宗教服務，多與商賣事業，亦或是公共及私人建築的新設改建有關，因而反而與普吉地區當代的經濟及都會發展更直接相關。例如 To Sae 山上廣播站的設置、鎮郊墓地的清理重建等等，就是與普吉都會地區的發展及土地利用有所關係；而多數私人家屋的新建，以及個人或透過乩童問事的內容，也與近現代經濟活動下，個人的事業與生活更為直接相關。

因此，相較於過去馬來西亞研究中，習於將拿督公置於華人處在多元族群文化社會中，對於土地信仰認識的脈絡來討論。我認為對於泰國類似的 *To* 信仰的發展，甚或是擴及近來星馬及印尼的拿督公研究，不能僅從此族群關係與認同角度出發來討論，更應該注意的是無論是泰人或華人在當代的經濟及社會發展等新興脈絡下，所遇到的不同問題與面向。

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書　評

台灣東南亞學刊，16 卷 2 期，2021 年，頁 197-204

評黃蕙蘭（OEI Hui Lan），《沒有不散的筵席：顧維鈞夫人回憶錄》（*No Feast Lasts Forever: Madame Wellington Koo*）

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一、書籍介紹

本書《沒有不散的筵席：顧維鈞夫人回憶錄》為黃蕙蘭（OEI Hui Lan, also known as Madame Wellington KOO）女士 1975 年出版的自傳 *No Feast Last Forever: Madame Wellington Koo*（Ms. Isabella Taves 協助完成）中譯本[1]。中譯本最先是由天津編譯中心在 1988 年發行，修正若干文字疏漏後，於 2018 年 10 月由中國文史出版社再次發行。與英文版相比，中譯版參考了《顧維鈞回憶錄》的內容，對若干細節進行了確認，也刪除英文版當中若干照片，並對若干章節美化[2]。

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1 除了 1975 年的英文版外，黃蕙蘭曾於 1943 年以 *Oei Hui Lan* 為書名出版自傳，但此一版本並無中譯本。但本文主要是以 1975 年英文版的中譯本為主要評論方向。

2 例如：英文版的第十八章 Lovesick Ambassador，理應被翻為「多情的大使」，在中譯本卻被譯為「幾番風雨」，並刪除有關西安事變以及張學良婚姻關係的內容。

二、內容介紹

黃蕙蘭 1899 [3]年生長於荷印三寶壟的華人家庭，為當時以糖業起家之富商黃仲涵次女，民國外交才子顧維鈞第三任夫人。時尚雜誌 Vogue Italy 曾將黃蕙蘭視為 20 至 40 年代中國最具有外貌與影響力的女性（D'Annunzio 2015），與蔣宋美齡齊名。但與蔣宋美齡相比，黃仲涵的富裕與影響力，以及顧維鈞在中國外交界的聲譽[4]，使黃蕙蘭更早受到西方媒體的關注。

本書大致分為三個部分，第一至八章主要以黃蕙蘭的原生家庭及童年為主題，記述祖父如何自中國遷移至爪哇，並發跡於三寶壟的過程，以及父母親行事風格對她帶來的影響。例如：母親傳統保守，不輕裝出遊，要求黃在婚前守貞；父親則交遊廣闊，妻妾成群；兩人皆細心栽培使黃才貌兼備，希望黃能嫁入官宦世家。第九至十六章以婚姻生活和社交生活為主題，描寫黃與顧的相識過程，以及兩人在倫敦、巴黎，以及北京的生活，特別是黃如何藉由與各國政界人士（及家屬）的社交，協助顧維鈞在外交圈的工作。相較於顧維鈞在西方社交場合的拘謹，黃的多國語言及才藝能力，連蔣宋美齡都大為讚賞。最後八章，則以黃晚年生活及對人生的省思為主，雖她已於 1956 年（57 歲）與顧維鈞離異，仍以顧維鈞夫人自居，於紐約安享晚年。

三、評論

本書雖非學術性著作，但由於當事人身分特殊，相當程度顯示 20 世紀初期東南亞華人菁英的生活。書中有幾個面向特別值得介紹：東南亞華人菁英與世界菁英的互動、女性華人菁英的跨國遷移經驗、文化資本與經濟資本的交錯。

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[3] 來源見：https://www.npg.org.uk/collections/search/person/mp54442/madame-wellington-koo-nee-hui-lan-oei.

[4] 1927 年之前，顧維鈞曾出任北洋政府駐美、英公使，外交總長、以及內閣總理。1930 年，顧維鈞加入南京政府後，出任駐法、英、美大使等職。

（一）東南亞華人菁英與歐洲菁英的互動

黃蕙蘭成長於荷蘭統治下的爪哇，當時華人菁英一方面沿襲不少中國傳統價值觀及生活方式，另一方面又受到歐洲殖民者的影響，呈現出與中國本部華人菁英不同的樣貌。例如：一方面講求華人之間的門當戶對，並將婚姻做為擴展事業版圖的手段，同時也把殖民者的語言文化，視為重要的學習對象（Tai 2014；Post 2019）。父親黃仲涵的事業正是藉由與當地華人富商（魏家）在 1884 年的聯姻，得以順利發展並步入上層階級。聯姻後黃家透過與殖民者的交好，壟斷了蔗糖、鴉片、橡膠、木薯等產業，一度成為東南亞最大貿易商。

雖然黃蕙蘭並未接受正式的學校教育，但在黃父的安排下，黃蕙蘭接受歐洲家庭教師的指導與自學，學習英、荷、法等多種語言，以及音樂、馬術等多項技藝。由於這些來自歐洲的語言及技藝，並非來自制度化的學校教育，而是家庭教師的指導及生活觀察，反而有助於黃蕙蘭在日後能以更自然的方式與歐洲各國政要互動。例如：二戰期間，黃接受英國邱吉爾的邀請，前往首相府邸參加宴會。當邱吉爾的低落情緒渲染於整場宴會，無人能緩解的狀況下，黃以邱吉爾對繪畫的興趣為開頭，成功帶動宴會氣氛，讓賓客留下深刻印象[5]。

黃蕙蘭與歐洲上層社會的社交能力，除了來自原生家庭的培育外，或許與黃同時兼具「東方女性」的身份有關。當時鮮少有東方女性出現在歐洲，能夠在階級地位上與歐洲政要匹配的東方女性更少。黃的自身特質與歷史機運，使黃與歐洲政要的交流顯得自然。然而令人好奇的是，此一交流的過程，有多少是因為黃與歐洲上層社會在禮儀、服飾，以及飲食存在共同的偏好？抑或是黃滿足了歐洲上層社會對東方女性的神祕想像？即黃與歐洲菁英的互動，是建立於上層社會在消費文化上的共通性，還是所謂「東方主義」的想像與展演？

[5] 引自黃惠蘭，1988。《沒有不散的筵席：顧維鈞夫人回憶錄》，頁 212-213。

（二）女性華人菁英的跨國遷移經驗

黃蕙蘭 21 歲（1920 年）與顧維鈞結婚後，便以中國大使夫人的身分隨顧維鈞派駐歐洲與美國，並往返於不同城市間，此一遷移經驗對她本人帶來什麼影響呢？這段期間中國政局發生不小的變化，顧維鈞也從任職於北洋政府、被南京政府通緝，最後轉為出任南京政府駐外大使。與此同時，黃家的家族企業在爪哇也經歷了荷蘭殖民、日軍佔領及印尼獨立三個階段。黃蕙蘭又如何面對這些變化呢？

面對中國政權，以及爪哇政治局勢的變化，黃蕙蘭似乎比顧維鈞更展現出超乎常人的彈性。當顧維鈞對於自己身處於中國不同的政治人物間，還必須維持一定的禮教與身段感到疲倦時，黃蕙蘭卻如同其父親一樣，以務實的態度及手段看待這些政治變化，進而謀求可能的最大利益。例如，黃蕙蘭雖然從未到過台灣，但是她一直到晚年都是以中華民國護照在多國間旅行。若以當今盛行的說法，這是一個攸關身分認同的重要選擇。但是對黃來說，這只是在當時美國與北京尚未建立外交關係下的務實選擇，雖然略有不便，但也無需費心[6]。黃蕙蘭對國際局勢變化的反應，充分展現出南洋華人富商家庭的彈性，甚至超過身為外交官，但是出身於江浙的顧維鈞。

除了彈性外，透過黃蕙蘭還可以看到哪些不同於過往的遷移經驗呢？有別於當代主流的移民研究，將「遷移」視為女性掙脫既有束縛，追尋自我價值的過程。我們發現雖然遷移提供黃蕙蘭脫離海洋中國（爪哇華人家庭）的性別價值觀，也使黃蕙蘭進入陸地中國（顧維鈞等人）對女性的期許中。例如：父親黃仲涵雖然寵愛黃蕙蘭，卻從未期許黃要熟悉家族企業。即使當時黃家在爪哇的事業如日中天，黃母仍期許黃蕙蘭能夠透過婚姻獲得向上流動的機會。父母對黃蕙蘭的期許，都顯示在黃蕙蘭初識顧維鈞時，她對於各種社交場合中「官府優先」的反應[7]。黃母對於黃顧兩人聯

[6] 引自黃惠蘭，1988。《沒有不散的筵席：顧維鈞夫人回憶錄》，頁 255。
[7] 引自黃惠蘭，1988。《沒有不散的筵席：顧維鈞夫人回憶錄》，頁 96-97。

姻的熱烈期盼，更反映出當時南洋華商希望透過與官家聯姻，進而鞏固自身地位的價值觀（Godley 1981: 36）。

雖然聯姻後的社交生活，讓黃蕙蘭擁有超乎絕大多數海洋中國的女性華人菁英可以想像的生活圈。但似乎也使黃蕙蘭落入陸地中國對女性的限制中。例如，黃雖然對於當時中國外交圈中男性外交官另結新歡的風氣不滿，卻也無力改變。面對顧維鈞的婚外情，黃的反應卻是認為，如果她能夠更早學到「不能使丈夫雌伏」的價值觀，不要讓自己的鋒頭超過顧維鈞，也許能避免與顧維鈞離異。即使黃蕙蘭與顧維鈞在 1956 年離異，並且顧維鈞已於 1958 年另外結婚，黃仍稱自己才是真正的顧維鈞夫人。面對子女後輩的婚姻與交友，黃蕙蘭也不像一般南洋華人對於跨種族通婚的包容態度，反而如同北方華人一樣，希望是維持華人間的通婚[8]。這些變化都顯示，若以當今的概念來檢視，黃蕙蘭的跨國遷移，似乎並未對自己的性別與家庭，帶來更多自主空間。

（三）文化資本與經濟資本的交錯

黃蕙蘭與顧維鈞的離異，除了可能與海洋中國的華人與陸地中國的華人在若干價值觀的衝突外，也可能是黃、顧兩人在文化資本與經濟資本的不對稱導致。從黃的自傳中發現，小從宴會的安排，大到外館的佈置，黃與顧兩人多次在社交事務上意見不一致。令黃蕙蘭愉悅（也可能是令顧維鈞尷尬）的是，往往事後證明，黃的安排更符合當時歐洲上層社會的品味與偏好，更能有助於顧在外交事務的拓展。這顯示黃蕙蘭雖然從未接受過正式的學校教育，但黃對歐洲上層社會文化的熟悉程度以及展演的能力，可能超過從小就在上海就讀教會學校，並獲得哥倫比亞大學博士學位的顧維鈞。

黃蕙蘭在文化資本的展演能力，除了來自幼年時期的培育外，也與黃仲涵的經濟能力有關。根據黃蕙蘭的說法，不論是顧維鈞任職北洋政府時

[8] 引自黃惠蘭，1988。《沒有不散的筵席：顧維鈞夫人回憶錄》，頁 264。

期的官邸，或是出任駐英公使與駐美大使期間的使館修繕，這些費用既不是由北洋政府或南京政府支付，也不是由顧維鈞個人的收入承擔，而是由黃家來支付。黃蕙蘭出於社交需求或個人偏好的衣著服飾等費用，也都是由黃仲涵支持。顧維鈞雖對於相關開支略有微詞，也無力干預。

黃、顧兩人在文化資本與經濟資本上的差異，使黃蕙蘭雖然名義上是大使夫人，但是在社交場合卻比顧維鈞更受重視。例如，書中第 4 頁，蔣宋美齡、黃蕙蘭與顧維鈞共同出席慈善活動的照片顯示，黃比顧更知道如何將文化資本與經濟資本適當結合，轉換成為獲取社會資本或政治資本的工具。也許在若干正式場合時，顧維鈞的制度性文化資本（學歷）比黃蕙蘭的內含性文化資本（品味）更受重視，但是很顯然黃蕙蘭更懂得將不同類別的資本進行轉化與結合。兩人在文化資本形式與經濟資本總量的差距，也許在南洋華商中不足為奇，並不會形成溝通障礙。但是由於黃蕙蘭的表現遠超過當時中國官場對官夫人角色的期待，使南洋華商看來是文化資本、經濟資本與政治資本多重結合的雙贏組合，卻成中國官場眼中可能的競爭關係。當蔣宋美齡公開稱讚黃蕙蘭對外交事務的貢獻時，不難想像顧維鈞可能承受的壓力。黃、顧兩人在文化資本與經濟資本上的差異，也許是促成離異的主因。

杜維明曾在《文化中國：扎根本土的全球思維》表示，文化中國的其中一個層次是散居在世界各地的華人，將文化與政治的認同分離，散居在外的華人可以是他國的國民，在文化上卻對中華文化產生依歸。某種意義上，黃蕙蘭正屬於這類人物，她從未久居中國，也慣於西式生活方式，但自我認同中，華人文化是她從未拋下的一部份，也是她內心衝突的根源。而黃惠蘭與顧維鈞的衝突，似乎也說明了海洋中國與陸地中國的差異。《沒有不散的筵席：顧維鈞夫人回憶錄》雖然不是學術研究的讀物，但書中關於 20 世紀初期東南亞華人女性菁英的遷移和認同，以及背後的階級意涵，使本書成為不可多得的著作。

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《台灣東南亞學刊》徵稿啟事

一、《台灣東南亞學刊》（Taiwan Journal of Southeast Asian Studies）為國立暨南國際大學東南亞研究中心刊物。本刊歡迎有關東南亞的文學、哲學、歷史、社會、經濟、教育、政治及外交等中英文學術論文之投稿；同時也接受對有關文獻或本刊所刊文章之評論。

二、來稿中英文不拘，中文稿件以一萬五千至兩萬五千字為原則，英文稿件以八千至一萬字為原則，稿件類別包含研究論文、研究紀要、東南亞議題報告、書評，或評論。研究論文與研究紀要須經匿名審查合格後刊出。

三、本刊只接受未發表之原著，不接受已經出版或一稿數投的論文。為了便於匿名審查作業，正文中請勿出現透露作者身分的文字。經本刊審稿者審定刊登後，不得向其他刊物投稿，且未經同意亦不得轉載於其他刊物。本刊編輯單位有權以紙本、光碟或上網形式全文發行。

四、經刊載之著作，致送作者當期期刊一冊及電子檔。

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《台灣東南亞學刊》審稿與出版辦法

中華民國 98 年 12 月 18 日編輯委員會例行期刊編輯會議修正

中華民國 105 年 12 月 2 日編輯委員會例行期刊編輯會議修正

一、本刊編輯委員就來稿性質做初步篩選，凡符合本刊性質及形式要件即行交付審稿；來稿之評審由編輯委員及相關研究領域之學者擔任。

二、來稿（含研究論文、研究紀要）審查採雙匿名方式進行。

三、來稿經兩位專家學者匿名審查；每位審查意見表上陳述意見，並於下述四項勾選其中一項：

（一）推薦刊登

（二）修改後刊登（請審查人明確指認出修改之處或代改正，如僅提原則性修改意見請勾第（三）項）

（三）修改後再審

（四）不予刊登

四、處理方式

處理方式		第二位評審意見			
		推薦刊登	修改後刊登	修改後再審	不予刊登
第一位評審意見	推薦刊登	1	2	2	4
	修改後刊登	2	2	3	4
	修改後再審	2	3	3	5
	不予刊登	4	4	5	5

狀況 1：　寄接受函給投稿人並請寄電子檔及列印出來的紙本。

狀況 2：（a）函知投稿人逐項答覆。
（b）由主編核定通過後同狀況 1。

狀況 3：（a）函知投稿人逐項答覆。
（b）送回審查人重審。
送第三位審查。

狀況 4：　第三位審查人（修正後複審）之意見：如為「修正後再審」，將送本刊編輯委員會決定。

狀況 5：　函知投稿人稿件不接受並退回稿件。

五、是否刊登稿件，編審委員會應將評審意見與結果等以不具名函寄投稿人。

六、每一期收錄研究論文至少三篇以上，同時歡迎各類型稿件投稿（研究論文、研究紀要、書評或東南亞社會議題調查報告）。

七、本辦法經編輯委員會會議通過後實行，變更時亦同。

《台灣東南亞學刊》論文來稿撰寫體例

一、基本原則

（一）首頁內容請包含以下部分。1、論文題目：若有副標題，正、副標題間以冒號「：」區隔。2、論文類別：請參考「徵稿啟事」中文稿類型的說明。3、作者姓名、任職機構、電話、電子郵件帳號與誌謝等。

（二）中文摘要以四百字以內、英文摘要三百字以內為原則。關鍵詞以五個為原則。

（三）外文名詞盡量寫一般通用的中文譯名，並在首次出現時以圓括弧加註原文。非通用的外國人名可直接用原文，第一次出現時寫全名，以後則寫姓氏即可。

Michael G. Roskin 指出，新保守主義成形於 1980 年代，美國總統雷根和英國首相柴契爾夫人是典型代表人物。Roskin 發現，新保守主義的基本主張，包括主張自由貿易、縮減社會福利、小政府主義，以及強調愛國主義等。

（四）註解與圖表請放入文中。

二、標題及標點符號

標題的序號如下：一、二、三、……，（一）（二）（三）……，1, 2, 3……，（1），（2），（3）……，甲、乙、丙……為序。

一、在野勢力的挑戰

（一）在野勢力的崛起

1. 1959 年的全國大選

三、引用

（一）引用書目時，採文中夾註方式，中文著作寫作者的全名，西文著作只寫作者姓氏；作者姓氏與年代之間空一格，不加符號。

1. 在文中提及作者姓名：

Pecora（1989: 250-257）引了當時中央情報局的報告以及其他學者的話。

2. 沒有在文中提及作者姓名：

林氏也成功地取代了與其競爭的公司以鞏固對食品與油工業之控制（Sato 1993）。

（二）姓氏不明確的作者：

印度人的學校卻往往因為教科書或教師的不足而運作不佳（Arfah A. Aziz and Chew 1980: 106）。

（三）引用作者有二人，中文用頓號、西文用 and 連接。

華記成員多數傾向支持執政黨，而洪門成員則傾向支持反對黨（林廷輝、宋婉瑩 2000：110）。

直到 1975 年，LET 已經占了總上課時數的 40%（Soon and Chin 1997: 12）。

（四）引用作者有三人或三人以上，中文用第一作者加等字，西文用第一作者姓氏加 *et al* 表示。

教育程度的不同，會造成個人價值和態度上的變遷（文崇一等 1975：200）。

在這樣的情境底下，族群偏見構成了「集體行動的資源」（Abercrombie *et al.* 1983: 65）。

（五）在正文中直接引述文句，引文前後加冒號及上下引號。

1. 引文後不加出處，句尾的標點符號在下引號之前。

誠如傳銷人的一句口號：「世界最大的財富不是金錢，而是人群。」

2. 引文後加註出處，句尾的標點符號在出處之後。

他在書中寫到：「唯一阻礙進步的原則就是，什麼都可以」（Feyerabend 1975: 23）。

3. 所引用的文句是全句結構的一部分，下引號之前不加標點符號。

由行政官僚「已經善盡所能處理，立委指責似有誤解」的回答中……

（六）引文若在三行以上，獨立起段。正文最後加冒號，引語左右各縮排兩個字，前後不加引號。

作者指出東南亞華人在認同上的困難：

> 雙重意識是南洋華人一開始就無法避免的現象。身為華人而具有濃烈中華民族主義意識，原是天經地義的事。但是，中華民族主義的活動場域在中國，不在南洋。殖民地政府自然不允許華人在星馬公然宣揚中華民族主義；儘管成員以華人居多，馬共也不願意被視為華人組織。宣揚民族主義，彰顯中華屬性（Chineseness）或傳播和中國相關的資訊只能在華文報刊、鄉親會館、商會、與華文學校進行。（張錦忠 2003：45）

四、附加外文原文

（一）一般用語小寫。專有名詞字首大寫。

（二）外文書名、期刊、篇名，字首一律大寫，但介系詞（of, into, between, through）、冠詞（a, an, the）、連接詞（and, but, or）小寫。

五、數字寫法

年月日、測量、統計數字、百分比等，用阿拉伯數字。

該項調查於 1994 年 7 月間在台灣各地以面訪進行。在 1,433 位有效樣本中，閩南人有 561 位、客家人有 441 位……表示不支持任何政黨者占 60.3%。

六、註解

（一）註解旨在說明或補充正文，相關參考資料請寫在參考書目中。

（二）註解採隨頁註，正文中的註解編號，以阿拉伯數字加在標點符號前的右上方。

《台灣東南亞學刊》編輯委員會為劃一論文規格，特編訂〈論文來稿撰寫體例〉[1]，敬請參照[2]。

七、圖表

（一）圖表均以國字編序號，序號和圖表名之間空一格，不加符號。

（二）表格、地圖或圖像名稱，均列於圖之下方。圖表出處或資料來源，列於圖表名稱下一行。例如：

圖二　東南亞各國地圖示意圖

（資料來源：張錦忠，2003，《南洋論述：馬華文學與文化屬性》，頁 1。）

八、參考文獻

（一）中、日文在前，西文及其他語文在後。

（二）中、日文依作者姓氏筆劃。西文及其他語文，依作者姓氏之字母順序排列。華人姓氏的拼音所有字母皆為大寫，台灣以連接號連接的兩個名字拼音，連接號前後之拼音，其第一個字母皆大寫。姓氏不明確的作者或特定組織的報告，無須區分姓與名，可直接撰寫全名。

（三）中、日文書刊名、法律／行政命令名稱前後加雙書名號《》，西文書刊名以斜體表示，不加符號。

（四）中日文文章篇名前後加單書名號〈〉，西文則前後加雙引號“ ”。

（五）參考文獻不加編號。

（六）參考文獻範例：

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[1] 參考資料：《台灣社會學研究》、《台灣人類學刊》、《文化研究》體例。

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7.同一作者有一筆以上的資料， 第二筆起用一橫線代替作者姓名。

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TAN, Chee-Beng. 2020. *Chinese Religion in Malaysia: Temples and Communities*. New York: BRILL.

Anderson, Benedict.1992. *Imagined Communities*, 2nd ed. London: Verso.

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8. Non-English journal article

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